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 This project is a discussion of the way in which the science fiction of Ursula 
K. Le Guin highlights the role of consent in metaphor, an act that decenters the 
experiential relationship with the world as source of metaphorical interactions, and 
highlights the role of metaphor in accessing the unmeasurable, and the unknown.  A 
combination of Le Guin’s complex system of metaphor and Paul Ricoeur’s work in 
both metaphor and the composition of acts of will delineates the structures and 
resultant uses of metaphor both in literature and the world.  Within the structures 
outlined in this work, metaphor falls into four categories determined by where, 
when, and by whom consent is offered: living metaphor, metaphorized words, 
effaced metaphor, and determinative metaphor.  These structures indicate the uses 
and misuses of metaphor within social and political dynamics, as well as offering an 
illustration of how metaphor allows for the expansion into the unknown. 
 The following text is constructed in four chapters, each of which address four 
different interactions using four of Le Guin’s science fiction novels and one of her 
novellas.  The chapters and subjects are as follows: the unknown in The Left Hand of 
Darkness; governance in The Dispossessed; the Other in The Eye of the Heron, “A 
Woman’s Liberation,” and The Left Hand of Darkness; creation in The Telling.  Le 
Guin’s relationship with respectful interaction places the author in a position that 
allows for a clear conception of how consent is productive in metaphor through each 
of four styles of metaphor – living, metaphorized word, effaced, and determinative – 
interactions with those varieties of consent: informed, historical, borrowed, or 
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manufactured.  As well, Le Guin’s work follows through to suggest the results of the 
use of each of the different styles of metaphor in either an expansion of the world of 
the recipient or the repression of referent of the metaphor. 
Key words: metaphor, consent, effaced, determinative, Ursula K. Le Guin, 





 Ce projet est une discussion sur la façon selon laquelle la science-fiction d’Ursula K. 
Le Guin marque le rôle du consentement dans la métaphore, un acte qui décentre la relation 
expérientielle avec le monde comme source d’interactions métaphoriques, et qui souligne le 
rôle de la métaphore pour accéder à l’immesurable, ainsi qu’à l’inconnu.  Une combinaison 
du système complexe de la métaphore de Le Guin et du travail de Paul Ricœur tant dans la 
métaphore que dans la composition d’actes de volonté définit les structures et usages 
résultants de la métaphore dans la littérature comme dans le monde.  Au sein des structures 
exposées dans ce travail, la métaphore s’insère dans quatre catégories, déterminées selon où, 
quand, et par qui le consentement est offert : la métaphore vive, les mots métaphorisés, la 
métaphore effacée et la métaphore déterminative.  Ces structures indiquent les usages et les 
mésusages de la métaphore au sein des dynamiques sociales et politiques, en plus d’offrir 
une illustration de la façon dont la métaphore permet l’expansion dans l’inconnu. 
 Le texte qui suit est construit en quatre chapitres, chacun d’entre eux abordant 
quatre interactions différentes et se basant sur quatre romans de Le Guin et un de ses romans 
courts.  Les chapitres et les sujets vont comme suit : l’inconnu dans The Left Hand of 
Darkness (La Main gauche de la nuit); la gouvernance dans The Dispossessed (Les 
Dépossédés); l’Autre dans The Eye of the Heron (L’Œil du héron), « A Woman’s 
Liberation » (« Libération d’une femme ») et The Left Hand of Darkness; la création dans 
The Telling (Le Dit d’Aka).  La relation qu’entretient Le Guin avec l’interaction basée sur le 
respect place l’auteure dans une position qui permet une conception claire de la façon selon 
laquelle le consentement est productif dans la métaphore, à travers chacun des quatre styles 
d’interactions de la métaphore – vivante, mot métaphorisé, effacée et déterminative – avec 
ces variétés de consentement : éclairé, historique, emprunté ou fabriqué.  De plus, le travail 
de Le Guin va jusqu’au bout pour suggérer des résultats de l’usage de chacun des différents 
Sheckler 5 
 
styles de la métaphore, soit dans une expansion du monde du destinataire, soit dans la 
répression du référent de la métaphore. 
Mots clés : métaphore, consentement, effacé, déterminatif, Ursula K. Le Guin, Paul 
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Introduction: With Respect to the Future 
 
. . . I was soon to discover that even the seemingly most mundane of things – 
grammar, syntax, sentence structure – even these are animated by something 
unseen, dare I say, magical, behind and beyond them.  That the length of our 
sentences, their gait, their sound, that our use of tense, of point of view, of 
pronouns, all have their histories, their stories, their political and cultural 
implications, and each could be a building block, a concrete gesture, for good 
or for ill, toward an imagined future world. (Naimon, 14) 
 
According to Ursula K. Le Guin, “the future, in fiction, is metaphor” (Le Guin, 
intro LHD, np).  The syntax of that statement creates a profoundly interesting 
possibility, a double understanding.  By placing the modifier after the subject and 
within a subordinate clause (which of course is removable without compromising the 
sentence), Le Guin creates an alternative statement worth considering: the future is 
metaphor.  Because of the sentence structure, it is a suggestion rather than a claim, 
but that double meaning left on the page is an idea of the utmost importance because, 
whether the actual material future is a metaphor or not, standing where we do, with a 
past we remember in a present with which we can interact, we find that the only way 
to deal with a future that to us is strictly abstract is to negotiate that future through 
metaphor.  So, the statement that “the future is metaphor” becomes a fascinating but 
also startlingly accurate statement that requires a pause with each reading, one which 
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suggests that metaphor must be more than the straightforward claims that have been 
argued and discussed since Aristotle’s first statements about the form would suggest.   
Not unlike Friedrich Nietzsche’s claim that language is in its essence 
metaphorical, that each “leap from one sphere into the heart of another, new sphere” 
(stimulus to image, image to word) (4) is metaphorical, Le Guin presents the shifts in 
our thinking about time, future, and literature as metaphorical as they all include 
states/relationships for which “we have no other way[] at hand for thinking” (Suvin, 
SF as Metaphor, 188).1  Specifically concerning the future, for humans at any given 
moment, the future does not yet exist and is unreachable, and can thus only be 
considered from a metaphorical position – a position that demands the substitution of 
what is not for what is; in other words, we replace that unknown future with an 
imagined one.  Indeed, the future must be approached through the imaginary because 
“the speculative is the condition of the possibility of the conceptual” (Ricoeur, Rule, 
355).  Creation depends on the imagination; stories offer alternative worlds and a 
consideration of alternative results.  Science fiction specifically deals with a future 
that is alternative, or as Nick Hubble would have it, “[r]ealist fiction sets out to 
describe the world; science fiction (SF) sets out to change it” (xii) through either 
extrapolation begun at the present moment or “a thought experiment within a larger 
conversation about the cultural production of science and its implications” (Milburn, 
562).  Yet, regardless of the attempts of the wildest of imaginations, the future 
                                                          
1 Fictional – and specifically SF texts – can be considered as “totalizing and thematic metaphors” 
(Suvin, SF as Metaphor, 198), or, as Le Guin’s states, “All fiction is metaphor.  Science fiction is 
metaphor.  What sets it apart from older forms of fiction seems to be its use of new metaphors” 
(Introduction LHD, np).  
Sheckler 11 
 
remains metaphorical because, for us, the future is not only what it is not, but also 
what it cannot be, that is, that future we imagine.  As such, Le Guin is correct; 
despite all the global maneuvering and manipulation of countless think-tank’s and 
governing bodies, and despite all pretense at prediction, except in the very broadest 
of strokes, the future will not be as we have imagined it, although what we imagine 
will change that future in profound and unknown ways.  So – as we cannot ignore 
the fact that the present stretches blindly into what is to come – the question 
becomes, how do we interact with a dynamic, unstable, and unavoidable future?   
Le Guin’s work suggests that if we are not to slip into utilitarianism and end in 
dystopia, we must respond specifically through living metaphor and, through that 
response, recognize (if not absolutely change) our relationship with the unknown.2  
For Le Guin, the unknown is the frame inside which the known resides, and that 
framework is the repository of all potential: “Praise then darkness and creation 
unfinished” (LHD, 246).  That word, “unfinished,” contains the potential without 
which life cannot exist, and in the recognition of that potential and the “darkness” 
within which it resides – a darkness that by default creates and then reifies the need 
to accept the unknown and unknowable as extant, and then notes the risk inherent in 
all interactions with that unknown – must come the recognition that it is only 
because of that darkness that imagination is possible: “The unknown. . .the 
unforetold, the unproven, that is what life is based on” (Le Guin, LHD,71).  Thus, Le 
                                                          
2 Note that Le Guin’s unknown is not limited to the unknown of Jacques Lacan, i.e. the real, the 
desire of the Other that cannot be accessed (although Lacan’s unknown plays a part in discussions of 
the unknown Other). 
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Guin’s work suggests that through the conscious and respectful imagining of each 
immediate next step (as opposed to the series of sweeping leaps to an assumed end 
that is prediction) combined with the occasional considered “guess”3 that includes an 
underlying and resilient comprehension of the inevitable inaccuracies and limitations 
(i.e. the subjectivity) of those imaginings, we create a method by which to move 
forward.  In fact, not only is the concept presented in multiple texts, but in fact, Le 
Guin enacts this methodology in her own interaction with metaphor in the many 
texts that comprise her science fiction oeuvre.   
It is through metaphor and the consent that necessarily is embedded within all 
metaphor (as will be discussed) that Estraven (LHD) is able to interact with the 
unknowns of the ice and the Ekumen, and through metaphor that Shevak (TD) can 
offer “open hands” that share with the Other the fruits of his remarkable research 
which dramatically changes a multitude of worlds, and as well, it is through 
metaphor that Sutty (TT) can face a world in which the “impossible” happens under 
the eye of the sceptic.  As well, it is only through metaphor that such discussions can 
happen because metaphor allows for expression that is elided and foreclosed in 
rational language.  Only with a combination of rational language and metaphor can 
one reach that which is reasonable if applying the definition “possessing sound 
judgement” (MW) because that judgement must include the unknown and the 
                                                          
3 The difference between a guess and a prediction is an important detail of this work.  A guess is 
respectful of the unknown and the guesser’s relationship with that unknown allowing scope for an 
infinite range of variables; whereas, in prediction, in which one claims knowledge of the future, often 
in order that the prediction can then be presented as an “end” which justifies the predictor’s choice of 
“means,” that claim and the resulting approach by necessity limits the variables of that future.  
Although the difference is subtle, it is determinative.  As will be discussed in detail in the first 
chapter, any claim to an ability to know circumscribes the unknown, changing its shape and scope. 
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unmeasurable if one is to hope for any measure of accuracy in its reflection of the 
world. Criticism of the metaphor as lacking in “identity or specificity” (de Man, 
Epistomology, 28) presupposes that value lies only in the measurable, and although 
lack of accuracy is not to be dismissed, if one neglects the unmeasurable, the world 
is circumscribed, presenting another form of inaccuracy. 
 As such, this work will focus on four of Le Guin’s science fiction novels and 
one novella and her use of metaphor within those texts through the medium of four 
different subjects:  the unknown (The Left Hand of Darkness), governance (The 
Dispossessed), the Other/alien (The Left Hand of Darkness, “A Woman’s 
Liberation,” and The Eye of the Heron), and creation (The Telling).  Through these 
surprising and still fresh interactions with worlds that do not exist, Le Guin uses 
metaphor to create methods of engagement with which to interact with the 
unfamiliar, the unlikely, and the impossible – a profoundly necessary set of skills in 
any world.  Le Guin’s use of metaphor allows the text to establish and access sites of 
interchange between the measurable and the immeasurable: i.e. the known, the 
unknown and the unknowable.  In Le Guin’s work, metaphor and the moment of 
consent that is embedded in all metaphor act as an interface whose results change 
according to the form of that consent, decentering metaphor as materially sourced, 
and creating a dialectic between the material and the immaterial that allows for a 
consideration of the known, unknown and the newly imagined.  As such, Le Guin’s 
novel use of metaphor creates an alternative imaginary to much (if not all) of the 




NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE WITH SCIENCE FICTION 
 Described variously as “heretic subject matter” (Suvin, Meta, xiv), a “major 
bone of contention” (Westfahl, 1), “an improper joining of radically different 
domains” (Milburn, 560), and a series of “ongoing processes of negotiation” (Bould, 
1), processes that are as resistant to measure as a “wispy cloud” (Gunn, Introduction, 
ix), the parameters of science fiction seem to exist within more disagreement than 
accord, a form of “Genre War” (Easterbrook, 510) but one that exists internally 
(Easterbrook coined the phrase in a discussion of SF’s position among other genre as 
“paraliterature”).4  It is a debate that became nastily overt in the Sad/Rabid Puppy 
controversy during the 2015 Hugo Awards.5  That said, genre itself is a fraught and 
troubled concept, one that Le Guin has repeatedly suggested is intertwined with and 
determined by marketing: “Genre, in fact, is now pretty much a function of the 
publisher's presentation or the author's reputation” (Le Guin, Lost, np).  But 
assuming we accept the fact of genre, even the date of inception for the genre of SF 
varies by thousands of years depending on who is doing the defining and by what 
                                                          
4 Michael Kandel labels the controversy “genre apartheid” (2) in his text “Is Something New 
Happening in Science Fiction?” suggesting more than a mere disagreement through his implication of 
serious suppression founded in power structures based in racism and patriarchy. 
5 The Sad/Rabid Puppy controversy was an attempt of the extreme right – a faction who wanted to 
return SF to its “roots”, i.e. straight, white, male – to control who was nominated for the 2015 Hugo 
awards and ended with “no award” as the result in five categories (the total number of no awards 
given over the life of the award previously was five) (Dean, np).  The episode is a direct reflection of 
what Le Guin describes in her introduction to the Norton Book of Science Fiction: “It [hard SF] 
denotes a fiction using hi-tech iconology with strong scientific content, solidly thought out, well 
researched and tough-minded; it also often connotes a fiction whose values are male-centered, 
usually essentialist, often politically rightist or militaristic, placing positive ethical value upon 
violence” (emphasis mine, 18), and to misquote Jane Austen critique of what defines “good 
company,” I suspect that in defining SF “with regard to [‘strong scientific content’ the Rabid Puppies 
are] not very nice” (Persuasion, 207).  Rather, the end goal seems to be to return the genre to the 
worst and most simplistic of its “roots” – a simple, polarized world without the complication of ethics 
and respect for the Other.  Addendum: as this text is being submitted, the 2018 Hugo awards were 
announced with well over 50% of the awards going to women (Hugo, np), a hopeful outcome. 
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standards.  Claims of original/first authors are as widely divergent as the ancient 
Greeks to Mary Shelley to that “new kind of storyteller” who offers “a new kind of 
prophecy” (Warner, xiii, emphasis mine), H.G. Wells.  In their Concise History of 
Science Fiction, Mark Bould and Sherryl Vint claim SF as no genre at all, declaring 
“there is no such thing as SF, but instead multiple and constantly shifting ways of 
producing, marketing, distributing, consuming and understanding texts as SF” (1).  
As such, SF remains in a constantly liminal position, unstructured and changeable – 
if not exactly fluid – despite demands for stability and definite statement.    
Indeed, the splits that exist in SF are profound, and as such, the determining 
hallmarks and mandates of the genre produce nearly as much debate as the inception 
date, with critics and authors weighing in in order to either limit who is included or 
dodging what has been and, arguably, continues to be considered a stain on one’s 
literary reputation.  The more ridiculous moments of the debate include Isaac 
Asimov’s application of outrageous limitations as to subject matter, “Science fiction 
deals with scientists working at science in the future” (Asimov, Extraordinary, 22), 
and  Margaret Atwood insisting that her work cannot be science fiction if it includes 
no “spaceships and monsters” (Potts, np), a theme she has repeated multiple times 
including in answer to Marleen S. Barr when she refused to allow Oryx and Crake to 
be categorized as SF insisting upon the term speculative fiction because “science 
fiction includes rockets and giant squids” (430) (a problematic statement, Barr notes, 
as both rockets and giant squids exist in the present world and in the case of the 
Sheckler 16 
 
squids only once in SF).6  Both responses are obviously problematic and suggest a 
“house divided against itself” (Barr, 430) whether those attempts are made in an 
effort to include or exclude, and are reflected not least in efforts to keep the genre 
plot driven and unabashedly male oriented.  Le Guin, herself, noted in the 1975 
special issue of Science Fiction Studies that if the “status of women in society is a 
pretty reliable index of the degree of civilization of that society” then we should 
“ponder about whether SF is civilised at all” especially considering the way the 
genre seemed to be profoundly “authoritarian, power-worshipping, and intensely 
parochial” (208).   
The imposed limitations are astoundingly numerous, and even some of the 
great academic experts in the field have composed stringent lists of requirements as 
to what constitutes science fiction in their attempts to control the genre: Darko 
Suvin’s parameters create a situation in which a “huge portion of the total literary 
output [presently categorized as SF] is . . . thus labeled ‘Terra Noncognita’” 
(Parrinder, Revisiting, 38) and thus not within those parameters.7  Questions of 
                                                          
6 With all due respect for Atwood’s impressive body of work and fine mind, she does present an 
excellent example of the opposite end of the spectrum to Asimov’s attempt to gain control of the 
genre he wished to define in such a way that his own work would stand as a paradigm of the form.  In 
the statement quoted above, she seems to be claiming the right to define the parameters of a genre for 
which she appears to have only disdain, and – if we were to take her words seriously – one of which 
she has little knowledge.   
7 Suvin, himself, requires a strict limitation on the use of the term Science Fiction, which he coopted 
(Bould, 17).  According to Suvin, only the truly novel text based on both a radical “novum” (SF and 
Novum, 63) and “cognitive estrangement” (Estrangement, 4) should be categorized as SF, thus, 
disallowing, certainly fantasy and myth, but as well, a huge number of texts that are merely stories 
retold in space, but also disallowing the militarized fantasy of the propagandizing branch of SF as 
merely pushing an agenda. 
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agenda and political influence come into the debate as well, with Jamil Khader 
noting the   
. . .imperative upon scholars to uncover, to use, Frederick Jameson’s phrase, 
the “political unconscious” of a text – by which I mean in this case the 
unrecognizable gaps, the unresolved contradictions, and the hidden 
assumptions that govern mainstream SF texts in their rewriting of the social 
reality. (111)8  
Determining tropes, intentions, and agendas all come into the debate that has raged 
for nearly as long as the genre has existed.  Perhaps most important, because of its 
placement in the chronology, is Hugo Gernsback’s9 attempt to define the genre he 
named as a link to a soon-to-be-materialized future when he wrote that Amazing 
Stories was “a magazine of ‘Scientifiction’” and contained stories that included “a 
charming romance intermingled with scientific fact and prophetic vision” 
(Gernsback, 3), a statement that brings us to the hallmark and determiner most 
relevant to this text – prophecy. 
                                                          
8 Khader’s text is a criticism of Le Guin’s “expropriation of blackness” (114) that, without 
considering the groundbreaking inclusion the text offered in its use of a black protagonist within the 
context of the 1960s, seems unnecessarily critical in its lack of context despite his praise of Le Guin’s 
“relentless affirmation of the humanity of the Other” (113).  Khader’s argument is interesting, but to 
some degree self-eliding in that it requires (as do many criticisms of Le Guin’s work) that the text 
should be more than it is by expanding subjects that were not Le Guin’s focus.  The argument that 
does justify Khader’s position is based in Le Guin’s choice to use said black protagonist while 
“[l]osing sight of Genly Ai’s racialized Otherness” (113).  The problem with that argument is that it 
assumes knowledge of Le Guin’s far future world and a requirement that every text cover every issue 
fully – a not uncommon fault in criticism in general.   
9 Hugo Gernsback, founder and editor of Amazing Stories, coined the term Science Fiction after first 
concocting and then losing control of the word Scientifiction (Bould, 6). 
Sheckler 18 
 
 On that third page of that first issue of Amazing Stories under the magazine’s 
masthead is a banner that reads “Extravagant Fiction Today --- Cold Fact 
Tomorrow” and, as noted above, Gernsback himself claims “prophetic vision” for 
his “charming stories” (ibid)  The idea of prophecy/prediction is still extant and in 
fact unavoidable in discussion of the genre even today, as made clear in Marina 
Warner attribution of both to Wells in her 2005 introduction to the Penguin Books 
edition of The Time Machine and Khader’s suggestion of SF’s affect on “social 
reality” (ibid) as well as in any number of other discussions and essays.  It is a claim 
that sits at the center of one of the major splits in the genre, dividing the texts into 
two major camps: extrapolative, often plot driven texts that valorize the military and 
expansionist dreams of the ultra conservative vs complex, often character driven 
texts which consider possible outcomes of “thought-experiment[s]” (Le Guin, Intro, 
LHD, np), or  what Darko Suvin calls the “novum” or a “totalizing” form of 
“novelty” (Sf and Novum, 64) that creates alternative situations.10  These more 
complex texts employ a “method which does not provide certainty but does provide 
speculation” (Cummins, 122) suggesting an associated split – that between 
prediction, with its suggestion of arcane knowledge, and the guess.   
The two styles, the division between which seems to reflect the split between 
“hard” and “soft” SF, although that split is generally founded on whether “hard” 
(physics, chemistry, etc.) or “soft” (anthropology, psychology, etc.)  sciences are the 
                                                          
10 Obviously, many texts blur that boundary and the split is not a clean one, but there are also texts 
that exist fully to one side or the other of such a dividing line, and the difference in approach creates 




focus, produce a profound alterity between the relative texts. Although both follow 
an impossible/not-yet-possible series of events to an end, by definition and necessity 
plot driven texts produce “characters” as plot devices – objects – through an 
imbalance created by an extreme prioritization of the plot so that such texts move in 
sweeping disregard for those characters who are relevant only if useful.  The result is 
often a profound lack of character coherence as apparent in text like Orson Scott 
Card’s Ender’s Game in which we are informed that Ender is six years old despite 
statements and actions that suggest the experience of a trained forty-year-old.11  
These plot driven texts are inevitably constructed to serve alternative ends whether 
those ends are to suit a driving market, as discussed by John Scalzi’s writer in 
Redshirts (Scalzi’s satire of plot driven SF television shows) or to quite seriously 
promote a specific agenda, as in the first-strike-style foreign policy that is promoted 
by the plot-device that is Card’s character Colonel Graff.  These characters/plot-
devices are often presented as completely sure they know what will happen next, 
how the new technology will save the world, or how the newly discovered Other will 
end it (consider the repeated insistence that the world is in need of saving through 
military action that permeates Card’s text).  Each claim to prophecy is, of course, a 
claim of knowledge of the future as if that future already exists in static form, 
certainly a form of hubris, but more importantly a rigid form of limitation that 
disallows alternative comprehension of the situation or the space in which to imagine 
an alternative result.  In fact, the relationship between “prophecy” and future events 
                                                          
11 There are literally dozens to hundreds of examples of this disconnect in the text; one of the first is 
obvious in six-year-old, first-grade Ender’s commando style fight with Stilson on page six that results 
in Stilson’s death. 
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is much more complex than such claims to a one to one action response conception 
of prophecy allows and, just as Suvin notes of SF in general, “is in a constant 
implicit dialogue with the ‘normal’ expectations of its reader” (Narrative Logic, 41) 
without recognition that the unknown future has no requirement to reflect the 
“normal.” 
In fact, to understand the problematic nature of such claims and the resulting 
association SF has with the concept of prophecy/prediction one needs to consider the 
relative position the choice of vocabulary creates for the reader/analyst.  As noted, in 
claiming a prophetic nature for the genre, one must accept (if not embrace) a future 
that is to some degree static if not predetermined.  In other words, if one can see that 
future ahead, that future must already exist in some form.  Even if one believes that 
prophecy based on extrapolation, that extrapolation by necessity limits the variables 
in the equation that is the prophecy; in other words, from such a position, the future 
is immediately circumscribed and constructed from the building blocks of the seer’s 
own world, e.g. the golden age writers absolutely saw SF as primarily based in 
scientific fact from which the future could be extrapolated, yet, while claiming 
knowledge of that future, those same writers ignored the “facts” of the world around 
them: for example, the fact of women as thinking, functioning members of the 
population both in general and within the scientific community.  In consequence, in 
much of the work of early SF writers from Doc Smith to Asimov, Heinlein, and 
Clarke, women did not exist as recognizable subjects, but rather as props or plot-
devices: female characters existed to get lunch while being rescued (Smith, The 
Skylark of Space), be kind to the less fortunate (Asimov, Foundation and Empire), as 
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willing sexual partners (Heinlein, Stranger in a Strange Land), or they simply did 
not exist at all (Clarke, 2001: A Space Odyssey).12  Although the list is a series of 
single specific instances of a perspective-based extrapolation, the point remains: how 
is it possible to predict/prophesize the future without implementing the 
inaccuracies/bias of the seer’s perception of the present?   
These failures to see the world of the present and the presumption that the 
future is there for the writer to predict work together to create a split between the 
extreme conservative position of many SF writers – i.e. Card’s thinly veiled 
propaganda, Heinlein’s militaristic stance on the other as offered by his text Starship 
Troopers,13 and of course, the transformation of Clarke’s protagonist, Dave, 
evolving into a sentient being godlike in its capacity – and a world filled with 
subjects who might not be white, male, or straight and those writers who reflect that 
world in their work: Ursula Le Guin, John Scalzi, Ann Leckie and a host of others.  
The message of many if not most of those plot driven texts is clear: men (not 
humans) are masters of the universe.  It is a stance that even the single fact of 
climate change would seem to contradict, and yet it continues; even within the last 
thirty years, these writers of plot-driven (and consequently limiting and inaccurate) 
texts have been lauded as visionary: “Isaac Asimov and Robert A. Heinlein . . . filled 
the pages of Astounding with stories devastating in their originality and Olympian in 
                                                          
12 This is not to say there is nothing of value in Golden-age SF; I do, however, wish to note the built-
in inaccuracies of these influential writers. 
13 Suvin quotes Pringle and Clute as characterizing Heinlein’s text as showing “aggrieved partiality” 
going on to say that Heinlein’s “strength and flaw in Starship Troopers is world-excision.  Not only is 
there no civilian life in it, but any and all ‘animality’ outside of fighting” not to mention no “love” or 




their inevitability” (Gunn, Education, 9, emphasis mine), godlike indeed, and as 
such, inaccurate.  So, as it is unlikely that these writers and critics would admit to a 
belief in predestination, if the world reflects the confabulations of SF, one has to 
conclude that when a writer seems to successfully predict the future, the text is not 
predicting the future – it is constructing it.14   
If the conservative forces within SF claim that we/they can “know” any 
number of “truths” – what will happen in the future, the results of a next move, the 
identity of the Other, etc. – Suvin’s discussion of cognitive estrangement as a 
necessary element of SF is a consideration of what it is that we do not know, both in 
our present world and any future one we can imagine.  That said, although Suvin 
“rigorously rejects any attempt to limit science fiction to the functions of prophecy 
or extrapolation” (Parrinder, Revisiting, 44), Suvin’s claim that “It is intrinsically or 
by definition impossible for SF to acknowledge any metaphysical agency” (Suvin, 
Novum, 83) draws an impossibly hard line and creates an untenable standard for a 
genre that occurs in a world that is not materially extant just as it implies a god-like 
ability in access to knowledge.  As Parrinder notes, Suvin’s parameter “implies that 
the purpose of SF is one of truth-telling” (Revisiting, 44), a statement which brings 
our attention to the fact that the most troubling parallel between Suvin and the hard 
SF cohort is not subject matter but inflexibility.15  Parrinder goes on to suggest that, 
                                                          
14 Le Guin herself takes exception to the idea of SF as prediction stating in the 1976 introduction of 
The Left Hand of Darkness, “the ‘future,’ on any quantum level, cannot be predicted,” going on to 
add “Science fiction is not predictive; it is descriptive” (np).  Her position is supported by her fiction, 
a point that will be discussed more fully. 
15 Suvin’s contributions to theory regarding SF have been considerable including the important 
concepts of the novum and cognitive dissonance, and should not be downplayed, but his absolute 
stance on what is and what is not SF mirrors the central issue of a community in which a huge 
number of the members create limitations as to who gets to join the club.  Later in his career, his 
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as “the future cannot be predicted with any certainty” (Parrinder, Revisiting, 45) and 
notes that Suvin is suggesting that such apparently predictive moments in the genre 
act as “heuristic models” (Parrinder quoting Suvin, Revisiting, 45).  Although 
Parrinder is suggesting the term means that SF allows the reader to prepare for this 
unknown future, what he neglects to note is that that preparation acts to create the 
very future for which one prepares and so, in that one analogy, switches the role of 
SF from prediction to construction, and in doing so changes the relationship between 
SF and agency.   
In fact, SF incorporates whatever situated position that writer himself 
inhabits, and that situated position does not need to be overt for the transference to 
occur.  Jason Haslem notes in his text Gender, Race, and American Science Fiction: 
Reflections on Fantastic Identities, the role SF plays as an agent of social 
constructions is variable, and not “all SF offers a radical undermining or critique of 
the dominant order” in that any text “may return to the (unconscious) functioning of 
the symbolic order” (12).  Thus SF, particularly plot driven SF, embeds in its 
constructions the world as the writer perceives it, an inclusion that acts as a 
limitation on what can/will happen next.16  And it is here, in Haslem’s reference to 
the figurative, that the discussion must include the relationship between SF and 
metaphor, and in prompting that discussion yet another must take place first: a 
                                                          
position has become less emphatic in his statement that in the end, criteria are “reducible to a 
preference for one model over another” (Novum, 5). 
16 As SF has become a “dystopian mode” (RMP, 35), the question of fiction acting as a template for 
the future becomes a terrifying possibility.  If we recreate that which we imagine, rather than acting as 
a warning, SF becomes a template. 
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discussion determining the relationship between metaphor and respect.  In this text, 
such a discussion must begin with Le Guin. 
 
LE GUIN AND RESPECT 
 In a genre which has been, historically, overwhelmingly dominated by men, 
Le Guin was an anomaly for the first half of her career; now, despite more and more 
female writers in the genre, Le Guin continues as anomalous, not because of her 
gender, but because of her relationship with respect for the Other, and in 
consequence, with metaphor.  Her position as a force in science fiction as well as a 
renowned writer in other genre (in particular fantasy) became unavoidable when she 
won both the Hugo and Nebula awards in two different instances for her novels The 
Left Hand of Darkness and The Dispossessed.  She was the first woman to do so and, 
at the time, the only author to do so twice.  Hundreds of articles and dozens of books 
have been written concerning Le Guin and her oeuvre, including a number of 
monographs as well as Donna R. White’s extremely useful text organizing and 
summarizing the criticism that was written before 1999, Dancing with Dragons: 
Ursula K. Le Guin and the Critics.  What becomes clear in reading the criticism of 
Le Guin’s work, both laudatory and critical, is that Le Guin moves people, and 
perhaps more importantly, Le Guin responds to people.  While this text does not 
have time or space to go over all aspects of the criticism in this introduction, there 
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are important recurrent themes and patterns that feed into this discussion of 
metaphor.17 
 In his brief monograph of Le Guin’s work The Farthest Shores of Ursula K. 
Le Guin, George Slusser took note of one of the important motifs that filters through 
nearly all of Le Guin’s work: Taoism.  That central and repeated pattern within Le 
Guin’s text is likely one of the causes of her anomalous position in that what Rafail 
Nudelman noted as most remarkable in Le Guin’s texts was an “extraordinary 
interconnectedness” (212) that used “causal connection” without a linear timeline 
(210), a move that creates a wholistic patterning that allows for completion of 
storyline on multiple levels – suggesting too, that any world is made up of layered 
stories that work on both micro and macro levels and bridge the strata on which the 
various tales unfold.  Returning to the original comment, Slusser’s engagement with 
the texts and with the text’s engagement with Taoism is astute and carefully 
produced, and an important addition to previous work18 – but his work is produced 
deep within the situated positioning of conservative, male academia, a position from 
which he refers to Genly and Estraven as “the two men” (28) without a blink or a 
reference to the storm that was already raging over Le Guin’s presentation of 
Estraven as what feminist critics viewed as primarily male despite the radical 
concept she had introduced in creating Gethenians as dual-gender.  Although Le 
Guin received kudos from many quarters over her radical innovations in gender 
                                                          
17 I heartily encourage a reading of White’s discussion of the criticism of the first four decades of Le 
Guin’s career.  Both thorough and even-handed, White gives the reader an overall conception of the 
discussions and conflicts that were part of Le Guin’s evolution. 




presentation in LHD, some members of the feminist community took issue regarding 
Le Guin’s choice of pronoun – “he” – and what they felt was the eliding of female 
roles in presenting Gethenians.  This argument will be addressed later in detail but is 
relevant here not because of the positions, but rather, because of the way Le Guin 
has responded to her critics, both feminist and “not.” 
    Le Guin has been called many names, and many varieties of adjectives 
have been applied to her work and her self, but invariably Le Guin, whose texts 
often deal with questions of “Wholeness and Balance” (Barbour, title), has 
responded with respectful, if sometimes heated, discussion.  The more notable 
accolades have included Robert Schole’s statement that Le Guin is “probably the 
best writer of speculative fabulation working in this country today” (Scholes, 35-36), 
Suvin’s characterization of Le Guin’s writing as having “thrust and strength” 
(Parables, 265), and Harold Bloom’s unequivocal categorization of The Left Hand of 
Darkness as a “masterpiece” (2).  That said, the reviews have not all been laudatory, 
and still Le Guin has remained respectful.  Even when Norman Spinrad referred to 
Le Guin as a “hectoring guru,” “a noble granola eating woman” (not a compliment 
in the context), and “the token nigger of the literary establishment” (qtd by White, 
97), White notes that her responding “letter was a polite reassurance that she does 
indeed still consider herself a science fiction writer.  She signed the letter ‘Granola 
Eating Woman’” (White, 97).  Clearly, Le Guin’s response reflects her own 
standards of behavior rather than Spinrad’s.   
In terms of the feminist debate, Le Guin’s response was at first slightly (and 
in my estimation understandably and even possibly legitimately) defensive; 
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however, her extended response was unusual in that she listened and changed, 
choosing to educate herself in feminist theory and to attempt to expand texts already 
written and published, after which she worked to evolve her writing choices to 
address what she felt was an unintentional but unfortunate limited scope of view in 
her early writing.  As Lisa Hammond Rashley puts it, “she [Le Guin] has never been 
afraid to consider and reconsider her positions” (22).  Her response was 
unquestionably admirable, but the point of this discussion is not to defend Le Guin; 
it is to address the question that I have been asked on multiple occasions during the 
completion of this text: if my concern is to comprehend and deconstruct the way in 
which metaphor is formed and functions, why use the works of Ursula K. Le Guin?  
The answer to that question is that Le Guin’s metaphors suggest a quite radical 
relationship with respect: that it is respect that allows for consent, and consent is an 
unavoidable component of metaphor.   
 Although a polite and thoughtful response to her critics is an impressive 
demonstration of maintaining a respectful relationship with the other while under 
fire, the more important demonstrations of Le Guin’s respect are found embedded 
within the relationships Le Guin maintains with her texts, the characters, the readers, 
and the unknown – and thus, in metaphor.  In “Where do You Get Your Ideas From” 
from Dancing at the Edge of the World, Le Guin, herself, describes her process of 
writing, making the statement, “A story rises from the springs of creation, from the 
pure will to be; it tells itself; it takes its own course, finds its own way, its own 
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words; and the writer’s job is to be its medium” (198).19  She goes on to add, “[t]he 
writer, writing, then is trying to get all the patterns of sounds, syntax, imagery, ideas, 
emotions, working together in one process, in which the reader will be drawn to 
participate.”  This allusion to orchestration flirts with a suggestion of control which 
Le Guin notes and then defuses, as she finishes with a statement that makes 
reference to the unquantifiable nature of all teamwork, the “magic” of interconnected 
efforts: “I think it comes down to collaboration, or sharing the gift” because “the 
words never fully embody the text” (199).  As Jim Jose puts it, for Le Guin “it is the 
reader who completes the story” (181).20  This discussion of method signals a series 
of respectful relationships in which Le Guin relinquishes control in order that all the 
elements can fall into place and both the characters and the readers be offered the 
space necessary to the process of creation.  It’s worth noting that this process or 
method includes accepting that the text itself is an unknown, certainly in the time 
before it is finished, but noting as well that the text will remain an unknown as long 
as there are unknown readers who may someday choose to take part in the 
                                                          
19 This description sounds mystic, and many critics have found it difficult to speak of Le Guin without 
using vocabulary that goes beyond metaphor to engage with what appears to be a kind of 
metaphysical mysticism.  Suzanne Elizabeth Reid speaks of “age-old patterns” and “wisdom” (1); 
Scholes calls her “The Good Witch of the West” (35), and Bloom constantly refers to mythology in 
his discussions of both Le Guin and her writing.  Of course, Le Guin herself uses metaphor that 
reaches outside the material to explain both her own process and that of her characters despite her 
own dislike of the occult (qt by Galbreath, 37).  This need for words that attempt to signify the 
invisible seems to be in response to an engagement with the immeasurable and directly connected to a 
need for metaphor.  
20 Le Guin’s position on the spectrum of relationships that compose a text touches – or at least brings 
to mind – Roland Barthes’ ideas in “The Death of the Author,” in which he “breaks habits” (Lietch, 
1457) (specifically habits of reading), and makes the statement that “the voice loses its origin, the 
author enters into his own death, writing begins” (Barthes, 1466).  However, despite initial 
similarities, it seems unlikely that Le Guin would agree to what at least appears to be a fairly total 
negation of the writer that exists within Barthes’ most extreme claims.  For Le Guin, a text is a 
collaboration, but the roles are not equal nor equally weighted.  Like any dance, each dancer has 
her/his own choreography, sometimes in unison and sometimes danced alone. 
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creation/re-creation of the text.  This temporally fluid – “four-dimensional?” – 
approach to a text produces an astoundingly large variety in interaction. 
 In approaching the reader as a formative and influential element of the final 
product, Le Guin changes the engagement to one that by definition must allow that 
reader to exist as an agent, creating a scenario in which, because the text is recreated 
with each reading, the process never ceases and must be reinvented in each 
engagement.  A courageous endeavor, and one that this text will argue reflects the 
form of a living metaphor.  The structure of a text within Le Guin’s conception of 
the process requires an interconnection of a huge variety of respectful relationships 
each of which, by definition, is constructed on consent – certainly that of the writer 
and the reader – but also, arguably that of the text and the characters as well. 
 
CONSENT AND METAPHOR 
 In the 1978 text On Metaphor Ted Cohen opens his essay “Metaphor and the 
Cultivation of Intimacy” with a discussion of whether or not metaphors have 
meaning: “The central, fundamental question concerns meaning.  Does a 
metaphorical statement possess, in addition to its literal meaning . . .another 
(metaphorical) meaning wherein resides its capacity to be true. . .?” (4).  The 
question, of course, lies at the base of the major split in all discussions of metaphor; 
which prevails – semiotics or semantics?  Does the primacy of the word exceed the 
semantic meaning of the phrase or vice versa?  Is metaphor decorative wordplay or 
an attempt to access that which cannot be expressed literally? a way to create beauty 
or portal to the immeasurable?  Although it will become clear that this text agrees 
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with Paul Ricoeur’s conception of metaphor as a semantic form and thus a possessor 
of meaning, what is undeniable regardless of the theorist’s position is that, whether 
or not metaphor has meaning, what metaphor does possess to a frightening degree is 
influence. 
 Theory of metaphor is not only a “messy reality” (Gibbs, 4), but as well a 
complex field with a “tremendous diversity of work” (Gibbs 12) (Ricoeur calls 
metaphor theory “boundless” [Metaphorical, 141]), and includes a huge variety of 
approaches, approaches which include “neural theory” (Lakoff, Neural, 17), 
“structure-mapping” (Gentner and Bowdle, 109), and the relationship between 
culture and body (Yu, 247), to name a few of the interactions.  Thus, theory of 
metaphor interconnects fields of study as diverse as neurology, psychology, 
philosophy, music, literary studies, and many more.  Although there has been 
important work produced on how metaphor underlies our world through 
conceptual/cognitive metaphors’ construction of culture (Lakoff, Metaphors, 4) – or 
as Ning Yu puts it, “metaphors are grounded in bodily experience but shaped by 
cultural understanding” (247) – the insistence that metaphor is at least to some 
degree universal because of the connection to empirical experience (Yu, 248) that 
pervades the empirical study of metaphor limits much of the present theories’ 
awareness of particularity:  in fact Yu claims that “our common bodily experience” 
creates metaphor that “are more likely to be universal” (248).  Although few 
theorists would claim that all metaphor is universal, the tendency to assume that the 
shared state of our bodily relationships with the world create a universal 
understanding of that world tends to produce an approach that elides the specificity 
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and particularity of metaphor, and thus, the specific effects of agents within an 
interaction.  Because of this unfortunate and widespread tendency to paint metaphor 
as universal and the stasis that exists in absolute statement, this text will use Paul 
Ricoeur as its primary theorist.  Ricoeur’s open-ended discussion of the fluidity and 
movement, the “epiphora,” of metaphor (Rule, 17) that cannot exist in other figures 
because metaphor is not merely a noting of similarity (simile) or a positioning of 
proximity (metonymy) but in fact “sets predicative operations in motion” (Rule, 155) 
moving between the impertinent to the pertinent,21 his placement of the metaphor 
“between words and sentences” (Rule, 156), his complex layering of semic fields, 
and not least, his earlier work on acts of will create a position that reflects Le Guin’s 
texts’ suggestion that metaphor must be reinvented in each new moment of its 
existence if it is not to become a repressive force.   
Ricoeur’s conception of the “self-transcendence of language,”22 specifically 
that of metaphor as a semantic form (Rule, 85), allows space for the forgotten 
element within the structure of metaphor, an element that Le Guin’s fiction puts in 
place over and over again and one that suggests that, although metaphor must be a 
                                                          
21 Ricoeur’s work on impertinent predication stems out of earlier work by Jean Cohen, Structure du 
langage poétique, but discussion of predication in this text is based directly on Ricoeur text The Rule 
of Metaphor. 
22 Ricoeur’s recognition of the complexity of metaphor and his refusal to attempt to foreclose that 
complexity and the resulting movement within the form makes him the best option for this text.  Far 
too many theorists attempt to simplify or limit metaphorical form; Denis Donoghue, for example, 
opens his 2014 text on metaphor with the statement that “It [definition of metaphor] supposes that 
there is an ordinary word that could have been used but hasn’t been,” noting that such a definition is 
“good enough” (1).  Admittedly, Donoghue undercuts his own definition later in the text when he 
notes that “there is no reason to assume that there are words for everything” (183), a position which 
suggests the outlier that is a metaphorical moment would be the moment when vocabulary is most 
extended.  Certainly, Le Guin’s use of metaphor suggests that such a definition is not “good enough” 
and that there is no “ordinary word” for the situation, and it is there, in the lack of that “ordinary 
word,” that the metaphor exists. 
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shared understanding, it cannot be assumed to be universal.  Rather, to understand 
the structures of metaphor and its effect in the world, Le Guin suggests we must 
consistently maintain an awareness of the moment of consent: i.e. by whom, where, 
and when consent is given in any moment of metaphor, a position upheld in 
Ricoeur’s work: 
Inasmuch as ordinary language differs from an ideal language in that it has 
no fixed expressions independent of their contextual uses, to understand 
discourse is to interpret the actualization of its polysemic values according to 
the permissions and suggestions proposed by the context. (Ricoeur, Rule, 
381, emphasis mine) 
In other words, rather than an objectivists assumption that, because metaphor must 
be a shared experience to function, that need suggests a state of universality, both Le 
Guin’s and Ricoeur’s work suggests any moment of metaphor is particular and fluid 
and contains a moment of consent, and the degree to which fluidity is maintained is 
determined by the placement of that moment of consent.  In other words, how, where 
and when that consent is posited determines what form the metaphor takes and its 
effect in the world. 
 Whether or not one wishes to believe that metaphors construct the world in 
general, the fact that metaphors construct the world in which we live is undeniable: 
Karsten Harries makes the statement that “metaphor joins dissimilars not so much to 
let us perceive in them some previously hidden similarities but to create something 
altogether new” (71).  Lakoff and Johnsons discussion of the metaphor “argument is 
war” is just one example that clearly demonstrates that “[m]any of the things we do 
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in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war” (4) as promoted by the 
metaphor that structures the thinking around argument.  Thus, the language 
surrounding the action of arguing – “indefensible,” “attack,” “won/winning” – is one 
“we live by in this culture, [as] it structures the actions we perform in arguing” (4).   
As such, the metaphors by which we live create and are created by the culture in 
which we live with each working as an element in an interconnected system23 that 
includes multiple forms of metaphor.  That said, the construction of those metaphors 
is not a benign process that always occurs organically, and it does not imply 
universality.   
                                                          
23 Conceptual metaphor theory is mapped in a series of texts by Lakoff and Johnson and later Lakoff 
and Turner.  For a succinct overview, at the opening of her text Metaphor and Corpus Linguistics, 
Alice Deignan outlines the basic precepts – “Metaphors structure thinking; Metaphors structure 
knowledge: Metaphor is central to abstract language; Metaphor is grounded in physical experience; 
Metaphor is ideological” (13).  My novel system of categorization does not call conceptual metaphor 
into question in general but does call into question some of the position from which the work thus far 
has taken place.  Lakoff and Johnsons experientialist and empiricist approach has a number of 
productive facets, including their conception of “interactional properties” (214), their structure of 
“entailments” (9), their conclusion that metaphor is based in “imaginative rationality” (235), and a 
careful decomposition of how metaphor plays into conception (56); however, their linear approach, 
their slide into universalist conceptions despite their attempts to reject hard objectivism, and their 
final position that there is no “absolute truth” (226) figures their position as closed.  This closed 
position seriously limits their work in terms of usefulness to this text in that Le Guin’s work posits the 
need for both consent in metaphor and a respectful relationship with the unknown founded in consent 
to/acceptance of our position in an unknown universe, Kant’s inaccessible “thing in itself” including 
his claim that “cognition reaches appearances only, leaving the thing in itself as something actual for 
itself but unrecognized by us” (112).  Although my argument is not one of transcendental idealism, 
both positions require space for recognition of a lack of access to some knowledge – potentially 
including “absolute truth” – rather than Lakoff and Johnson’s claim that said knowledge does not 
exist – itself a claim to knowledge they cannot possess.  In other words, whether or not an absolute 
truth exists, that truth is not available to the perceiver, but its existence must be left as an open 
question whether in a relationship with an Other or an unknown universe.  In the statement that 
absolute truth does not exist, they become Nietzsche’s agent who is “indifferent to pure knowledge” 
(2) and fail even to admit the possibility of said knowledge because that knowledge is unavailable to 
them.  Without an open-ended conclusion, both teams (Lakoff and Johnson and Lakoff and Turner) 
become the other side of a polarized discussion which elides the very middle ground on which they 
claim to stand.  As well, as Elena Simino and Gerard Steen note, the cognitive approach that the two 
teams promote “tends to underestimate the importance of totally novel metaphors” found in literature 
despite offering some “profound insights into the relationship between metaphor in literature and 
metaphor in everyday language” (326), a related problem in that novel or “living metaphor” (Ricoeur, 
344) requires particularity and an open-ended final position. 
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Le Guin’s use of metaphor combined with Ricoeur’s conceptions of the acts 
and actions of metaphor – i.e. predication which includes consent – suggests that 
there is an alternative methodology by which to understand the effects of metaphor 
within the world and within literature.  A thorough analysis of Le Guin’s metaphor 
(specifically within her SF novels) suggests that there are four specific supersets of 
metaphor – living metaphor (Ricoeur, Rule, 344), metaphorized word, effaced 
metaphor (Derrida, White, 8), and determinative metaphor (as is outlined in chapter 
3) – whose connection and construction is determined by each of the four’s relative 
relationship with consent which in turn creates each type of metaphor’s relative 
effect in the world.  Although this schema organizes and suggests possible outcomes 
as determined by where, when, and by whom consent occurs, it does not limit the 
forms metaphor takes nor negate the question Gardner and Winner pose as to 
“whether various types of metaphor (cross-sensory, perceptual, psychological-
physical, predicative, etc) each require their own analysis” (123).  Rather, a vast 
multiplicity of metaphor can exist within this system and can be analyzed using a 
variety of methodologies.  In fact, in a discussion of Le Guin’s novella The Word for 
World is Forest, Ian Watson evokes the metaphor of “deforestation” as the Terran’s 
response “to the mysteries of the wood” (232), a metaphor that Watson claims 
represent the subconscious dream life that so terrifies them.  It seems clear that 
attempts to define metaphor generally act to limit the form metaphor takes reflecting 
just such a “deforestation” in its refusal of the broad spectrum and reach of 
metaphor.  Thus, the method of categorization this text argues does not limit those 
forms but does note that within each of those different forms exists a particular step 
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in the process, and that step is one of the central factors in understanding the effect 
of each individual metaphor on the environment in which it is implemented.  As 
such, the variety remains and not all of it can be answered rationally through simple 
equations.  After all, just like in the forests of Athshe, “there [is] no seeing 
everything at once, no certainty” (82) in metaphor, so we must avoid the instinct to 
attempt to “know” everything. 
 So, in order to use the form consent takes as the standard by which to 
categorize metaphor, we must begin with Paul Ricoeur’s text Freedom of Will and 
the embedded concept of consent.  Ricoeur’s “triadic interpretation of the act of 
will” breaks down the act of will into three separate acts: “[t]o say ‘I will’ means 
first ‘I decide,’ secondly ‘I move my body,’ thirdly ‘I consent’” (Freedom, 6).  For 
Ricoeur, consent becomes necessary after the decision is made, action has begun, 
and the agent is met with the involuntary facts of body and world: as such, consent is 
a necessity “that seeks to fill the gap which judgement opens up” (Freedom, 344).  
In other words, as the agent wills and acts only to be met with the facts that will 
change the result of that act of will – i.e. the “unbreachable limits” (Freedom, 345) 
of the world and the body – the agent is presented with a gap of information, a 
moment in which the agent must face her/his lack of control, that can only be met 
with a release of that control as embodied in the agent’s consent.  Because metaphor 
is an act of will that goes “beyond” what we know to be literally true in an effort to 
make reference to the non-literal and immeasurable, metaphor creates a gap – a 
“lexical lacuna” (Ricoeur, Metaphorical, 143) – in the known and thus requires the 
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consent that “fill[s] the gap” (ibid); without that consent – if the metaphor is refused 
as inaccurate – the metaphor fails.  
However, the consent embedded within every metaphorical interchange – the 
acceptance of one thing for another despite clear indications or knowledge of the 
difference that exists between the two elements of the metaphor, Richards’ tenor and 
vehicle (95)24 – is multifaceted and involves multiple agents: the transmitter’s 
consent to his or her own act of equivalency,25 the receiver’s consent that accepts the 
metaphor as viable, and an, often implicit, “acceptance” by the referent of the 
metaphor (as argued in the third and fourth chapters of this work).  This last 
statement seems unlikely as, although within some metaphors the referent is a 
sentient being capable of offering consent, often the referent of metaphor is an object 
or state incapable of giving consent.  Yet, we know bad metaphors and unacceptable 
metaphors exist.  Of course, many theorists would look to the word “unacceptable” 
and state that the failure is posited in the failure of recognizable similarities and 
parallel substitutions that a transmitter or receiver rejects or accepts within the 
metaphor in question; however, Le Guin’s work suggests unsuccessful metaphor is a 
result of a lack of “consent” from the context or structure of the metaphor itself that 
often prompts a refusal in the receiver.   
                                                          
24 Richard’s tenor and vehicle have become the accepted terms for the paired elements of a metaphor; 
however, the decentering of metaphor suggests that the tenor, which Richards defines as “the 
underlying idea or principle subject” (97), needs to be split into two distinguishable roles – referent 
and source.  As such, the term tenor will be used only occasionally in this discussion. 
25 Donald Davidson compares metaphor with dreaming and notes that as such it must be interpreted, 




As such, that need for a complete whole suggests both a lack of linearity and 
a structure profoundly implicated with consent, and in fact, Le Guin’s relationship 
with metaphor suggests not only that there is yet another kind of 
“consent/acceptance” that must exist, but as well, that there is a failure in the linear 
conception of metaphor: i.e. tenor to vehicle to use or, as Lakoff and Johnson would 
have it, a “concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically 
structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured” (5).  Theirs 
is an equation that suggest a completely linear causal relationship; however, Le 
Guin’s work suggests that metaphors are not, in fact, linear, and that what appears to 
be a linear format is a product of our position within the metaphor, and that, in fact, 
changing the moment of consent creates a different form of metaphor and a different 
effect. 
The first superset is “living metaphor,” a form of metaphor that is often 
referred to as “novel” metaphor, although Ricoeur’s term “living metaphor” is more 
apt for this categorization because of the dynamic construction suggested by the 
word “living.”  The attribute “dynamic” is important because living metaphor is so 
varied as to seem not to be a set at all in that, according to Le Guin’s constructions, it 
can take nearly any form as long as the metaphor remains immediate and particular 
and consent is given in each new interaction.  In other words, living metaphor is a 
form that must be re-constructed with each new usage and each new interactor, and 
as well, consent must be offered by all elements of the metaphor with each new 
usage.  Living metaphor exists in all Le Guin’s work, but in this text, the form will 
be considered most closely in the first two chapters’ analysis of her texts The Left 
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Hand of Darkness and The Dispossessed, and somewhat differently in the final 
chapter on The Telling.  As will be discussed, these texts suggest that living 
metaphor is a complex, multi-directional, layered form that creates particularity; i.e. 
it cannot be universal and must be consented to with each new usage such that the 
consent is always an immediate element to the interaction.  The next two forms of 
metaphor evolve out of living metaphor but shift the moment of consent and thus 
change the designation of the metaphor. 
The superset of metaphorized words includes words that have become 
literalized – or lexicalized (Ricoeur, Rule, 344) – or have become dead metaphor,26 
and any other form of metaphor in which the moment of consent has sunk into that 
embedded moment of consent that exists in general language.  If one considers 
language an agreed upon code which, according to Nietzsche, figures all language as 
metaphorical – “One designates only the relations of things to man, and to express 
them one calls on the most daring metaphors” (4) – than the consent – that moment 
of agreement in the agreed upon code – to language is a consent to metaphor that is 
no longer considered a metaphorical engagement: examples would include 
statements like “my stomach is burning,” reference to the legs of a chair, etc.  Even 
if one does not agree with the conception of language as an agreed upon code, 
moments of consent in language are inescapable as made clear in the existence of 
dictionaries, language classes, grading rubrics, etc.  In the schema this text is 
proposing, all cases of lexicalized metaphor fall into the first category of metaphor in 
                                                          
26 The term “dead metaphor” is something of an oxymoron if one considers the metaphoric nature of 




which the consent was received historically and is deemed no longer necessary either 
because of homonymy (a case in which an additional meaning has become a new 
word – buttressing a building vs buttressing an argument) or abstraction (i.e. an 
extension of the original meaning that no longer needs to be questioned) (Lakoff, 
Metaphors, 106).   In each case, despite any original moment in which the 
lexicalized word existed as a living metaphor, the moment of consent is long past 
and sunk into the history of the language itself, a state that creates the assumptions 
that are necessary for general use in language such that the interchange is 
streamlined.  Metaphorized words are most relevant to the discussions of Pravic in 
Chapter Two. 
The third superset is that of effaced metaphor, which will be dealt with in 
detail in chapters two and three using the texts The Dispossessed, The Eye of the 
Heron, The Left Hand of Darkness, and “A Woman’s Liberation.”  Effaced 
metaphor, as discussed in Jacques Derrida’s text “White Mythology: Metaphor in the 
Text of Philosophy,” is a metaphor that has lost contact with the material referent of 
said metaphor yet is too complex to be lexicalized or metaphorized: a form of 
“metaphysics which has effaced in itself that fabulous scene that brought it into 
being” (11).  Derrida notes that effacement, in this case, refers to “erasure . . . but 
also ‘usury’” (7), suggesting that the disconnect of the metaphor from its material 
referent allows for the misuse of metaphor.27  It is through that disconnect between 
form and referent that metaphor becomes a free agent and thus subject to misuse, 
                                                          
27 In fact, specific to law, Justice Cardoza states that “Metaphors . . . though starting as devices to 
liberate thought . . . often by enslaving it” (qt by Winter, 363).   
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and the disconnect is possible because the moment of consent is given once and then 
borrowed for subsequent usage.  Borrowed consent is not the same as assumed or 
historical consent in that the assumptions that underlie metaphorized words and 
language in general are necessary such that we are able to move through the world 
and language efficiently; whereas, borrowed consent is used when the consent given 
earlier is no longer absolutely applicable and might not be appropriate to the present 
interaction, and consequently, the transmitter would be unlikely to gain the 
necessary consent if it were sought.  As such, borrowed consent is often at the base 
of the metaphors that create stereotyping and cultural bias.  The implicit assumption 
(both convenient and insidious) is that if the metaphor once received consent as a 
living metaphor, that metaphor must be valid despite the loss of contact with the 
referent and the moment of consent.  Effaced metaphor is everywhere and is often at 
the base of many forms of abuse.28 
The fourth and final superset is composed of a form of metaphor that I have 
termed determinative metaphor.  Determinative metaphor is quite different from the 
other three supersets in that it is not an outgrowth of living metaphor in that it has no 
experientialist referent in the material world that – if one is thinking linearly29 – acts 
as source of or inspiration for the metaphor.  Rather, in a determinative metaphor, 
the “source” of the metaphor is entirely founded in the desire of the agent to create 
                                                          
28 Here, there is an overlap with Lakoff and Johnson’s work on conceptual metaphor.  I suspect that if 
conceptual metaphors exist they occur in both the grouping of lexicalized metaphors and effaced 
metaphors, but as Lakoff’s term is not central to this work, I will leave that consideration to the reader 
who wishes to follow it up. 
29 It is difficult to avoid linear thinking in metaphor and there are times when it is unavoidable 
perhaps because of our position within the form; however, as will be discussed in the third and fourth 
chapters, although our position requires a linear approach at times, the awareness of the more 
wholistic existence of metaphor needs to be kept in mind. 
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or enact an ideology that requires the figuring of the Other as object.  In other words, 
the “source” of the metaphor is not the referent or an attempt to express or explain 
the referent but a desire to refigure the referent of the metaphor such that it supports 
the transmitter’s ideology and view of the world dependant on that ideology, an 
example of which would be the refiguring of a person as beast or slave.  The term 
“snowflake” functions as a determinative metaphor.  What determinative metaphors 
do share with the other supersets is the need for consent; however, because of the 
need to service a desire instead of communication, that consent must be limited and 
manufactured.  Because consent will not be guaranteed or even likely if open to all 
elements of the metaphor, the transmitter of a determinative metaphor limits the 
offer of consent only to those who will agree and then forecloses the process of 
consent to ensure that the necessary metaphor is completed even if in a truncated 
fashion; the transmitter then continues to repeat the metaphor in hopes that the 
repetition30 will produce a resemblance in the material referent; again, see the term 
“snowflake.”  Determinative metaphor is necessary to all programs of class-based 
societies and is both brutal and clumsy, but it is not unusual.  Le Guin’s text The Eye 
of the Heron is an enactment of Orientalist methodologies and within that context an 
exploration of the functioning of determinative metaphor. 
Such are the theoretical infrastructures of the following work, and although I 
have already mentioned the various foci of the chapters, below is a brief summary 
statement concerning each.  Chapter One is a consideration of The Left Hand of 
                                                          
30 Metaphor here acts similarly to or in tandem with performative speech acts; as such, Derrida’s work 
“Signature, Event, Context” becomes important in its discussion of repetition. 
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Darkness and the living metaphor that posits the unknown as productive field and 
the source of all life.  Chapter Two centers around The Dispossessed and explores 
the methodology and effect of effaced metaphors returning (as Le Guin’s work 
always does) to the important living metaphors on which the text is based, that of 
utopia as a state that exists only in utopic actions – a position that reflects living 
metaphor’s existence as particular and in need of re-enactment.  Chapter Three is a 
three-part chapter that explores metaphor’s relationship to various other theories 
including Orientalism, Feminist theory, and Queer theory; as such, determinative 
metaphor is a central topic.  The final chapter, Chapter Four, is a discussion of Le 
Guin’s text The Telling and its use of a specific form of living metaphor that I have 
termed materialized metaphor, a term Suvin occasionally uses to delineate a meeting 
of the literal and the figurative (Ain’t, sect 2.2) that is related to David Hills’ term 
“twice aptness” (147) in which literal meaning and metaphorical meaning layer over 
each other to create stratification.  Specifically, materialized metaphor refers to those 
metaphors in which the material moment directly reflects the metaphorical reference, 
an example of which is beautifully illustrated in Nella Larson’s text Passing, in 
which the protagonist wishes to metaphorically push her friend (Clare) out of her life 
and ends up pushing Clare out of a window.  In fact, because materialized metaphor 
are material constructs layered over by directly matching metaphorical extensions 
from which they cannot be separated, the literal meaning and the figurative meaning 
can exist simultaneously without one cancelling the existence of the other as is the 
case in mis-identified symbols.  As such, the layering of material and abstract goes 
beyond the basic orientation metaphor of Lakoff and Johnson and beyond Hills’ 
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“twice aptness” in that the combination of both forms occur in temporal sync 
creating an expansion that is more than a mere doubling.   
 The relationship between words and the world is complex and multi-
directional.  As Jutta Weldes points out in her text “Popular Culture, Science Fiction, 
and World Politics” literature is not just a “window on the world” (Gregg qt by 
Weld, 12) but rather is “implicated in producing and reproducing the phenomena 
that Gregg and others assume they merely reflect” (12).  And of course, the same can 
be said of metaphor; as such, the construction of that metaphor and the implications 
of that construction in regard to respect for the Other are of the utmost importance.  
Metaphor exists between – at least – the transmitter and the receiver (the role of the 
referent will be discussed later) and the inclusion of consent constructs an 
engagement in which all participants act as agents, the only infrastructure by which 
living metaphor and the resultant respectful engagement can exist. 
 In using the placement of consent as the standard by which to organize 
metaphor, our conception of metaphor itself is changed from a linear process that is 
imposed by the transmitter onto the receiver to a collaborative construction that is 
non-linear, suggesting a productive interconnection with the elements that make up 
our interface with the world.  As such, metaphor becomes a joint act, a position that 
changes our relationship with language, the world, the unknown, and the Other to 
one that requires respect, and in fact, pinpoints the moment when that respect fails 
subverting metaphor to an abusive form.  In SF, requiring consent within the 
metaphor that is SF removes prediction from the equation because the need for 
consent presupposes the gap that is present in the acknowledgement of the unknown 
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and the unknowable; consequently, interactions that fail in that acknowledgement – 
i.e. the claim to knowledge that exists in the act of prediction – produce corrosive 
constructions rather than productive collaboration.  As metaphor is an attempt to 
access the unknown and the unmeasurable, to approach that attempt with anything 
except a profound sense of respect is a foolhardy act, and Le Guin models the 
dangers inherent in the hubris that prompts any such disrespectful interaction, but as 
well, her own approach to the process of storytelling and the embedded metaphor 
reiterates and posits within our world the astoundingly brilliant hope embodied in all 




The Edge of the World:  Making Peace with the Unknown in Le Guin 
 
 From the first page of her novel The Left Hand of Darkness, Ursula K. Le 
Guin’s discussion of truth and lies, fact and fiction, opens a discourse31 on the text’s 
epistemological position: that the act of knowing is not a conquest of the unknown;32 
rather, to “know” anything requires a respectful and fluid relationship that includes a 
recognition and appreciation of both the unknown and the unknowable.  Le Guin’s 
position is a form of “complex holism” that Robert Galbreath suggests is produced 
by her “distinctive values” (36) (in particular her relationship with respect) in his 
discussion of Le Guin’s use of the occult, including the observation that her 
expression is not only literal and ironic, but necessarily metaphorical.  In fact, it is 
from within this complex holism that the relationship between these positions of 
“knowing” – the known, the unknown, and the unknowable – can be recognized as 
producing a need for metaphor, and as well, a recognition of the way in which 
metaphor functions in that necessary role.   
                                                          
31 The word “discourse” has two definitions and both are at play in Le Guin’s text.  Obviously Le 
Guin’s style suggests the knowledgeable consideration implied by the second definition, but as well, 
and despite the fact that reading appears to be a one-sided interaction in that the author is not 
available to hear the reader’s response, through the first-person narration, the unanswered questions 
asked by the multiple narrators, and the fact that there are multiple narrators, this text suggests a 
discussion is in progress.  Martin Bickman notes that the “variety of voices and perspectives [. . .] 
create a certain dimensionality and heft” (43). The implication of discussion matters because in a 
discussion one must synthesize what one “knows” with the unknown of the other perspectives 
involved. 
32 In this chapter and throughout this text unless otherwise specified, Le Guin’s “unknown” does not 
specifically reflect Lacan’s unknown – the unknown self/other – and neither is it reflective of any 
particular belief system as will be discussed later in the chapter.  Le Guin’s unknown is broader and 
less defined, and is specifically disassociated with the idea of belief. 
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In fact, Le Guin’s exploration of our relationship with the act of knowing can 
be considered an exploration of metaphor itself in which the presumptive structure of 
metaphor is placed in question: i.e. the “root” of the metaphor, the material standard 
from which any metaphor is presumed to spring, is decentralized through the need 
for consent/acknowledgement, creating a more interdependent construction that 
gestures to the immaterial and the immeasurable – i.e. the unknowable, if to know is 
to provide empirical evidence.  In other words, although that empirical connection is 
an important component of metaphor, by interacting with metaphor as if the 
empirical is the center and core, we lose sight of the productive, powerful and 
dangerous force that is harnessed in the use of metaphor.  Le Guin’s suggestion that 
the unknown – the “darkness” – is a foundational metaphor33 that must be 
approached neither as a deity nor through human comprehension, magical or 
material, insists that metaphor is not linear at all; rather, one can adapt Gerard Klein 
and Richard Astle’s claims about the way Le Guin’s work’s changes our relationship 
with history and time, and suggest that Le Guin’s use of living metaphor exists as “a 
                                                          
33 Although some of the metaphors this text terms as “foundational” could be considered conceptual 
metaphors as defined by Lakoff and Turner – “metaphorical language is simply a consequence of the 
existence of conceptual metaphorical thought” (138) – the idea that metaphors are conceptual rather 
than figures of language and the insistence on an absolute departure point and the linearity on which 
the team insists is in direct opposition to what Le Guin is attempting.  Le Guin’s metaphor is a 
carefully constructed complex system that repeats and reflects turning around multiple departure 
points, as well as one that is embedded firmly in language as will be seen in the construction of 
Pravic.  So, although several of the metaphors in Le Guin’s are in fact metaphorical structures that 
underlie the civilization of the various texts, and thus could be considered “conceptual metaphor,” the 
term conceptual seems less appropriate than foundational; as David Hills points out in reference to 
Lakoff and Turner’s claims, “if conceptual metaphor is real and pervasive, even if it is at work in 
every instance of verbal metaphor, even if it’s the thought that counts in ever so many ways, there is 
something verbally distinctive about verbal metaphor” (142), and I would continue beyond Hills’ 
claim to say that cognition – and in fact consent in that cognition – is important in all metaphor, but 
metaphor resides most commonly in language both spoken and written and to attempt to create a 
linear and territorial construction that elides the complex interchange that exists within metaphor as a 
whole is a simplification that fails to reflect the interchange.  Thus, this text will be using the term 
“foundational metaphor” to refer to both metaphors that underlie the text and the societies discussed. 
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confrontation of experiences” in the moment, each metaphorical moment working as 
a whole, despite the manner in which our position (existence in the material world) 
“appears to invite linearity” (288).  The suggestion is that Le Guin’s work not only 
makes use of metaphor, but mirrors and parallels the structures of metaphor in its 
suggestion that, despite our perspective which invites an assumption of linearity, our 
relationship with the unknown exists as a contingent whole embedded in a vast field 
of interconnected context rather than as a causal string of events.  So, it is not that Le 
Guin suggests we cannot “know” any given fact (she offers many such “facts” in her 
traditionally structured stories); rather, in her choices and style, she places in 
question the value of limited and non-contextualized knowledge, while suggesting 
that all human knowledge is limited and non-contextualized.  In other words, any 
“known” fact is surrounded by immeasurable influences, patterns and far-reaching 
effects, and acknowledgement of (consent to) those influences, patterns and effects 
is the only respectful – and sensible – position, making metaphor completely 
necessary in any interaction with said forces.   
 
FINDING A STANCE 
Unlike Samuel Delaney’s radicalized form of storytelling in which narration 
is often decentralized and ambiguous, Le Guin’s prose is usually told in fresh but 
recognizable story structure,34 using that structure as a familiar passage that allows 
access to the profound alterity of her view.  In The Left Hand of Darkness, despite 
the narrative’s traditional form, the meaning is radical and that radical statement is 
                                                          
34 There are a few notable exceptions including Always Coming Home and Searoad. 
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founded in the structure of the metaphors which resist a synchronic reading or, as 
Paul Ricoeur notes in The Rule of Metaphor, structures that produce a “semantics of 
discourse” which “is not reducible to the semiotics of lexical entities” (76).  With 
Genly Ai’s statement on the opening page, that “truth is a matter of imagination” (1) 
combined with Le Guin’s statement in the introduction that “[s]cience fiction is 
metaphor” (np),35 Le Guin founds her claim that facts alone are of limited value in 
determining “truth.”  Thus, as imaginings are subject rather than object, facts fill 
only the non-variable position in the equation of resulting knowledge, and in terms 
of language, the position left as variable must often, if not always, be filled by 
metaphor.  In other words, right from the outset with her statement on truth, Le Guin 
sets the tone of the text, creating the foundation of the relationship with the unknown 
that this text requires:  that is, if one is to be successful in directed movement into 
the future, one must allow room for the hunch, the guess – i.e. the unknown – and 
synthesize that which one does know with what may be true or may occur, all while 
staying cognizant of the fact that one can never know everything; as such, living 
metaphor becomes a primary methodology.   
As a narrative style in the genre of science fiction, Le Guin’s approach offers 
respect for all sorts of relationships (the most important of which is respect for the 
unknown).  Le Guin’s is a position antithetical those claims to prophecy and 
tendency to militarism of SF discussed in the introduction, and her work was and 
                                                          
35 Science fiction has long been considered a genre in which the familiar is replaced by the possible, 
or as David Seed puts it, “an embodied thought experiment whereby aspects of our familiar reality are 
transformed or suspended” (2), and as such, exists as the most basic form of metaphor, Aristotle’s 
interconnection of rhetoric and eikos (the possible) (Ricoeur, Rule, 10). 
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remains a profound change of direction:  as Zina Petersen notes in her essay 
“Balancing Act: Ursula Kroeber Le Guin,” in The Left Hand of Darkness “[a] 
concern with the balancing of difficult dualities replaced the drive for conquest as a 
theme” (66).  Although Petersen is specifically referring to the text’s discussion of 
interactions with the alien Other and the sociopolitical interactions of an alien 
society, both situations that Golden Age writers of Science Fiction consistently 
handled in their narratives by promoting aggressive or manipulative methods of 
control (see Asimov’s Foundation Trilogy and Heinlein’s Starship Troopers, or later 
in Frank Herbert’s Dune), Petersen’s statement is equally valid in discussions 
concerning the dualism of the known and the unknown.  The interactive and 
cohesive nature of the dualism is made clear in a consideration of the binary 
relationship of the two religions of Gethen (Karhide’s Handarra and Orgoreyn’s 
Yomeshta), and as well, through Le Guin’s use of metaphor in that consideration.  
Although one springs from the other, the two religions are diametrically opposed in 
their relationship with the unknown in that the Handdara accepts and engages with 
the unknown and the unknowable and the Yomeshta deny the unknown and negate 
the unknowable.  Although both play a part in the conception of Gethen’s 
ontological constructs, of the two, the precepts of the Handdara are more central to 
the themes of the overall text.  
According to the Handdara, to learn which questions are unanswerable and 
not to ask or answer them (70) is a necessary skill if attempts to negotiate a complex 
world are to be effective.  This position reflects Ricoeur’s discussion of the 
voluntary versus the involuntary, in which he notes, “[t]o explain means to move 
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from the complex to the simple” (Freedom, 4); thus, explanation requires the 
foreclosure of the unknown and points to Ricoeur’s argument that consent is a 
necessary step in any act of will in order to avoid simplification of the complex or 
the unmanageable; in other words, one must consent to the lack of control that is 
inherent in the involuntary.  According to Ricoeur, an act of will requires the 
recognition of what is unchangeable – the “absolutely involuntary” which occurs in 
“the form of character, of the unconscious, of biological life” (Freedom, 7) – and 
application of the voluntary by consenting to that which cannot be changed while 
continuing the act of will.  For Ricoeur, this consent is the “terminus” to those acts 
of will (ibid).  In The Left Hand of Darkness, the primary force requiring consent is 
the darkness or the unknown, and Estraven’s relationship with that looming “space” 
is posited first and foremost in his consent to his inability to know.36  That is, he 
knows which question should neither be asked nor answered, continuing his act of 
will in each case through engagement with the situation through metaphor because 
metaphor produces movement but does not require nor allow for the (false?) 
assurances or the apparent guarantees of the measurable.   
In his essay “On Truth and Falsity in an Extra-Moral Sense,” Nietzsche 
questions whether language is “the adequate expression of all realities” (3) and notes 
that in interacting with the world, one “forgets that the original metaphors of 
perception are metaphors, and takes them for the thing themselves” (4).  In doing so, 
                                                          
36 Kenneth Roemer “suggests that unimaginability is an integral component of her [Le Guin’s] 
utopian project” (Adams, 35), a statement that tips its hat to the unknowable and the unknown that 
inhabits many of Le Guin’s text but is most directly engaged with in LHD despite the fact that the 
concept of utopia is only implicit and fragmentary within this work. 
Sheckler 51 
 
one loses track of one’s position in relation to what is known and what can be 
known.  Le Guin suggests that one must retain a firm conception of both, and as 
such, on metaphor, its forms and its effects.  Only from such a position can one 
construct a functional relationship for the task of negotiating the world because from 
such ground, one can both act as if one knows enough to make a decision about the 
future (i.e. one can commit an action), while recognizing one’s lack of knowledge 
(i.e. consenting to what is unknown).  It is a fraught relationship that requires 
balance, balance that is constructed through metaphor.  Because of metaphor’s 
diachronic state (Derrida, White, 16), as a non-linear interconnection, it fills a 
“semantic lacuna” (Ricoeur, Rule, 52); thus, the act of metaphorizing is an 
ineluctable recognition of that space or gap, a recognition which requires a solid 
foundation from which to act – that is a well-founded comprehension of the ground 
on which one’s knowledge or awareness of a lack thereof is based – a position that is 
exemplified in the mythology and wisdom of the Handdara in The Left Hand of 
Darkness.   
Le Guin’s own profoundly nuanced and respectful relationship with 
knowledge is best exemplified in her construction of the Handdara, in that, the 
religion, with its respect for and interactions with the unknown, takes part in a 
discourse which allows for recognition of the respective size and scope of the two 
fields: the known and the unknown.  When Genly contemplates the efficacy of 
foretelling (the Handdara’s accurate prediction of the future) as a means for 
mediating that future, Faxe responds by stating that foretelling, which seems so 
oppositional to the precepts of an order that espouses ignorance, is performed in 
Sheckler 52 
 
order “[t]o exhibit the perfect uselessness of knowing the answer to the wrong 
question” (70), suggesting that many if not any question without context and scope is 
the “wrong question.”  The idea is brought home in the tale of Lord Berosty’s futile 
and tragic attempt to escape death through the foretellers (43).   
Berosty’s tale suggests foretelling is costly in a multiplicity of ways but that 
it is important because, although a question may or may not be answered, the choice 
to ask or not determines and defines one’s relationship, not just with that which is 
unknowable (in the case of Berosty, the time of his death), but also with what is 
immediately significant, e.g. that which we are able to know (for Berosty, that his 
partner supports him).  Highlighting the fact that what one knows is a very small part 
of a very large picture, most of which is beyond the scope of either a single 
individual or a national consciousness, the act of foretelling illustrates the fact that 
answers to questions about the future (through foretelling or any other means) are 
always too limited to act as a means by which to direct one’s actions.  Berosty’s 
failure is in his refusal to “consent” – not just to death – but to the risk that is 
inherent in not knowing the time of that death.  Returning to the conception of will 
in Ricoeur’s text Freedom and Nature, as discussed in the introduction, the equation 
that underlies any action requires that consent: “To say ‘I will’ means first ‘I decide,’ 
secondly ‘I move my body,’ thirdly ‘I consent’ (ibid).  Berosty’s failure to consent to 
the unknown of the future results in his locking himself in a room and ending in 
madness and in the undirected and thus chaotic action of madness that is the 
antithesis of an act of will (he kills his lover who attempts to aid him) (Le Guin, 
LHD, 46).  The answers, which are partial (as answers always are), leave him unable 
Sheckler 53 
 
to move and then drive him to madness and destructive action.  Both the inability to 
act and the madness are rooted in the inescapable fact of the limitations of 
knowledge (as exemplified in the partial answers) and his refusal to accept – to 
consent to – the fact that all knowledge is partial.  Berosty’s relationship with 
knowledge defines and directs his actions and life, a fact that Le Guin suggests is a 
result in which all of Gethen shares, i.e. one that is reflected within both of Gethen’s 
nations. 
 
THE HANDDARA AND KARHIDE 
 The temperaments of Gethen’s two largest countries are related to and 
reflected by the two primary religions such that each religion acts as both 
infrastructure to and metaphor for the community of which it is a part: the Handdara 
and the Yomeshta form an interconnected binary which defines the relationships of 
Gethenians with the unknown and acts as a foundational metaphor for the 
superstructures of the communities.  To broaden the interaction of Berosty to the 
religion as a whole, one must consider the complex net of Handdaran practices:37 
most importantly that of an espousing of ignorance as fundamentally desirable and 
necessary to a functional relationship with the world and the Other.  The Handdaratta 
practice an active awareness of ignorance enacted as the state which most perfectly 
reflects one’s relationship with the world, within which they perform the practice of 
                                                          
37 Many literary critics have linked the Handdara to Taoism because of Le Guin’s interest in the 
religion, and there are certainly many similarities.  Douglas Barbour compares Genly Ai’s description 
of the Handdara as a “religion without institutions, without priests, without hierarchy . . .” (LHD, 55) 
to the Tao-te ching’s description of Tao as “eluding and vague” and “deep and obscure” (Whole, 27).  
Certainly the similarities are notable, but my focus here is on the structure of the metaphor and as 
such I will not be focusing on the likely link between the religions. 
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“Presence” or the “untrance,” a “self-loss (self-augmentation?) through extreme 
sensual receptiveness and awareness” (57) in order to access and determine that 
which can be known and thus imply the vast scope of that which is unknown and/or 
unknowable.  As Genly comes to recognize, the “ignorance’ prized by the 
Handdarata” that plays into “inactivity and non-interference” (60) not only underlies 
the religion but the attitudes of the nation as well: “Under the nation’s politics and 
parades and passions runs an old darkness, passive, anarchic, silent, the fecund 
darkness of the Handdara” (60).  It is worth noting that, despite its “passive” silence, 
Le Guin characterizes the “darkness” of the Handdara as “fecund” because rather 
than an empty void, the unknown is the source of everything – explainable or not.  In 
fact, in using the term, Le Guin reorganizes a very old metaphor.   
Darkness as a metaphor for danger, lack of knowledge, or loss is a figure that 
Hans Blumenberg would characterize as an “absolute metaphor” in that it acts as a 
foundation that is irreconcilable using strictly literal language, specifically using its 
partnered duality, light, as an example of an absolute metaphor, stating, “the 
metaphorics of light cannot be translated back into concepts” (7).  Such is the 
backdrop to Derrida’s discussion of the heliotrope, the metaphor that underlies all 
other metaphors, the metaphor for the sun which is “more than essential: it produces 
essence” (43).  Christy Wampole calls such metaphors “root metaphor” in her text 
Rootedness (5), and Lakoff and Johnson refer to them as “metaphorical concepts” or 
conceptual metaphor (Metaphors, 10).  Specific to darkness, Jason Haslam, in his 
discussion of Tarzan of the Apes and In Darkest Africa, suggests the foundational 
metaphor of darkness or blackness is a necessary backdrop to whiteness because it is 
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against darkness that whiteness stands out.  As such, metaphorical darkness is a 
fraught term that figures in both racial and identity politics, and has been used to 
highlight whiteness, knowledge, and purity, or as Haslam puts it, the metaphorical 
understanding of darkness is partially constructed through “‘whiteness’ semiotic and 
performative reliance on the existence of blackness and the nonessential nature of 
the connection between economic privileges and whiteness” (Gender, 115).  As 
such, metaphorical “darkness” has a full slate and a shady history; however, in using 
the word “fecund,” Le Guin expands the metaphor in that she reorganizes our 
conceptions of darkness as a necessary and valuable (if risky) space, important to 
more than just our metaphorical conceptions of whiteness; while at the same time, 
she reorganizes our conceptions of metaphor itself. 
The construction of Le Guin’s metaphorical use of darkness calls into 
question conceptions surrounding the teleological and linear production of metaphor.  
Aa mentioned previously, according to Lakoff and Johnson metaphor is a fairly 
direct cause and effect construction: a “concept is metaphorically structured, the 
activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is 
metaphorically structured” (ibid).  Their use of the word “consequently” determines 
metaphor as a chronologically linear interaction with each stage as a product of the 
previous one, but Le Guin’s metaphors call this simple equation into question.  
Although Le Guin’s semantics may be a product of her conception (and even that 
position poses a question most writers could not answer), it is the reverse for us.  It is 
the language – in this case the word “fecund” – that produces an alternative 
conception of darkness to that of the hegemonic norm, one that defamiliarizes an 
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assumption, transforming the threat to risk, and creates an alternative focalization 
that is filled with potential.  In the process, the metaphor becomes diachronic and 
layered through time rather than synchronic and immediate, suggesting that 
Ricoeur’s semic fields are more applicable than Lakoff and Johnson straightforward 
equation or even their more complex theory of entailments,38 in that the image of 
those fields takes into account the layers of meaning, and the interconnected and 
multidirectional metaphorical approaches which include the possibility of multiple 
points coming into play simultaneously, creating various points of focalization,39 
many to do with still fillable and productive space (“fecund”).  The imagery is 
useful, in that, by imagining the “field” rather than a linear cause and effect that is 
inescapable even in Lakoff and Johnson’s more complex construction “metaphorical 
entailments,” a concept which “characterize a coherent system of metaphorical 
concepts and a corresponding coherent system of metaphorical expressions for those 
concepts” (9), the interaction takes on and reflects the fluid complexity and 
multidirectional movements of a polysemic exchange that includes multiple agents.  
These multidirectional movements and simultaneous enactments of differing 
connotations inherent in metaphor introduce new predications, which transform from 
impertinent to pertinent and thus produce an “alteration in the language” (Ricoeur, 
Rule, 182) which in turn will produce an alteration in perception that can be returned 
                                                          
38 Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of entailments is similar to Ricoeur’s discussion of semic fields in that 
both underlie the metaphor.  I prefer the complexity of the semic field in that the single unit of 
meaning – the seme – allows more movement and suggests field theory, rather than the more specific 
and thus more static statements that the pair use – “time is money,” “time is valuable” – as examples 
of entailments (9), which in consequence limit range and require a more linear form. 
39 For example, if the seme beneath a metaphor is “consumption,” without the context of a 
surrounding phrase, multiple meanings of the word – multiple points on the semic field – can come 
into play simultaneously creating a vast interconnected network of meaning. 
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to change the original interaction as receiver becomes transmitter, and vice versa.  In 
other words, the imagery of semic fields disallows an obviously linear relationship, 
producing instead the suggestion of an interconnection that shifts and evolves with 
each usage and each user such that the source of each change is unclear and the 
interchange in constant motion. 
As such, in this novel, the darkness – the unseen, the unknown – is a kind of 
partner to be used and worked with (and Le Guin’s choice of the term “darkness” 
rather than “universe” or “cosmos” suggests a important lack of definition that any 
spacial metaphor with an automatic presumption of parameters and limits would not 
offer).  In fact, much of the narrative deals with Estraven’s (an adherent of the 
Handdara and thus an adept of the practices) interactions with the “darkness” or the 
unknown.  His interactions are respectful but not particularly fearful and include an 
awareness of his vulnerability, but as well, an active courting of or interactive 
relationship with that unknown future, insisting that this is no unidirectional 
relationship.  Specifically, he refers to dothe (Handdara super-strength) as the 
“strength out of the dark” (189), suggesting that although the Handdarata train in 
order to be able to access the attribute, and it is the body that pays the obvious cost 
in the thangen phase (79) (i.e. the trained body is a necessary receptacle) the source 
of dothe is both unknown and unknowable – i.e. “the darkness.”  Notably, to meet 
that potential one must prepare.  
In preparing for dothe, the future changes as dothe is reached and the body’s 
capabilities change and new potentials arise – all of which require a respectful 
realization of the inability to “know” the future even though one may be able to 
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foretell a single fact because dothe can only be reached by the Handdarata who has 
prepared, that is, has acted in such a way that the unknown future is now changed.  
As such, the Handdara is not a piecemeal religion but requires an interactive 
relationship between the adherent and the environment that includes practical 
material preparation and recognition of the unpredictable nature of the future (the 
unknown).  In other words, dothe goes hand in hand with respect for the unknown; 
one must consent to the unknown’s affect on the body to enact dothe.  One must 
allow the unknown access to the self/body.  This position that both takes into 
account and pays respect to the lack of control or understanding as to the source of 
dothe results in a relationship that is not based in possession; rather, as an indweller, 
one owns nothing but oneself, work is communal (Le Guin, LHD, 59) and as such, 
that self must be prepared to use what is to hand.  The relationship between an 
adherent of the Handdara and the religion as a whole is an interconnected and 
integrated relationship which recognizes one’s connections to the world, one’s effect 
within that world, the existence of the unknown, and the risk associated with that 
unknown, and above all, one that accepts the costs of that association.   
This central practice of the Handdara creates a constant awareness of the 
inescapable and uncontrollable nature of both the unknown and the unknowable, 
making most interactions with the “dark” similar to riding a great wave, that is, 
dangerous and temporary, but at the same time offering a perspective otherwise 
unavailable.  The act of foretelling is directly centered on that relationship, acting as 
a materialized metaphor for the community’s relationship with the future:  answers 
to questions produced during the ceremony are characterized as “intolerable” light 
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that comes out of the “darkness” (66).  The answers solve no problems (the light is 
“intolerable”) and come from an ephemeral and immaterial source, and the voyage is 
one that requires consent – as do all metaphors.  As an act of predication – 
specifically fluid predication that moves from impertinent to pertinent, a position 
that is repeated with each new usage or with each semantic event and continues to 
happen with each new perception – living metaphor is an act of will and falls under 
the same construct as other acts of will; as such, consent is an unavoidable step.  In 
terms of the material ceremony of foretelling, consent continues to be an ineluctable 
condition; not only are all positions in the foretelling circle filled only with 
volunteers, the weaver will ask no question until s/he has considered whether that 
question is answerable.  When Genly asks what will happen if he asks an 
unanswerable question, Goss responds, “The Weaver will refuse it” (60).  Consent of 
the participants is necessary, but so too is the consent of the group as a whole, as 
presented in the Weaver’s assessment and acceptance of any proffered question.  In 
fact, the Weaver’s consent is an absolute requirement of the process, not merely 
because of some abstract idea to do with respect, but because the success of the 
process requires it.  That requirement is made clear in the tale of the Lord of Shorth 
in which an unanswerable question was asked and the foretelling ended in a scene in 
which the Celibates were “catatonic, the Zanies were dead, the Pervert clubbed the 
Lord of Shorth to death with a stone,” and the Weaver – Meshe – left the Handdara 
to create a religion whose precepts are an exact reversal of the Handdara’s 
acceptance of the unknown and the unknowable, one which has created a totalitarian 
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government in which no foretelling exists (Le Guin, LHD, 60).  As with all acts of 
will, in foretelling, consent is necessary to succeed. 
As such, Le Guin’s construction directly reflects Ricoeur’s theory of will, but 
goes beyond, suggesting that consent is a necessary component of both the material 
act and the metaphor in foretelling, in that foretelling includes both an immediate 
action (the concrete) and an overall relationship with the future (the abstract), 
layering the two together in a material metaphor.  In fact, one can parallel the idea of 
consent as a component of an act of will with a conception of the need for a question 
to be determined as answerable as a kind of consent from the darkness/the unknown, 
while maintaining an awareness that Le Guin’s unknown is not an entity with 
intention.  In fact, Le Guin’s construction of the unknown specifically elides any 
personification or intentionality that would be suggested by a religion with a deity or 
a magical affiliation such as Christianity or transcendentalism.  Rather, the Weaver’s 
assessment of whether a question is answerable has more to do with a reading of the 
metaphorical “weather” and a following of the “hunch,” a subject which will be dealt 
with in a later section of this chapter.  But regardless of the source, without the 
Weaver/the unknown’s consent, the process of foretelling fails; without consent the 
metaphor falls apart, and in that potential failure exists the need for consent from the 
object of the metaphor not just the transmitter and receiver.  In other words, 
foretelling is a kind of metaphor in that it is what it is not – it sees a future without 
seeing the future, just as metaphor states the nature of an object without stating the 
name of the object itself – and only in the acceptance of the layered existence 
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implied by a combination of both acts does the information become accessible – and 
useful. 
Another interconnection that defines the relationship between the world and 
the unknown lies in the repercussions of foretelling.  Trips into the darkness are paid 
for at the cost of the body insisting on the intertwined and inescapable nature of the 
relationship between material and immaterial.  The specific example of the 
ceremony of foretelling described in the novel takes place with a physician present 
and ends with him kneeling beside “the zanies, the frailest ones, the fuse-points” 
both of whom “lay huddled up on the floor.  The Kemmerer lay with his head on 
Faxe’s knees, breathing in gasps, still trembling” (66).  The costs are heavy for the 
participants, and as noted earlier, the answers are useless except in that they define 
the only rational relationship possible with the unknown: a relationship that includes 
the recognition that the unknown is unavoidable, uncontrollable, and beyond 
encompassing (thus the impossibility of a deity).  As such, the engagement is costly 
in the extreme, even more so for askers who fail to offer the respect and flexibility 
necessary to all interactions with the foretellers, as made clear in the tale of Berosty 
referenced earlier, in which a tragic death for both King and Kemmerer is the result 
of a failure to note that cost.  Because the costs are heavy and the most visible ones 
are paid for in the material world (both in the immediate circumstances of the 
ceremony and as well, in the potentially changed life of the asker), it is easy to view 
the relationship as primarily founded in the material world, yet, the Handdarata (and 
Le Guin) suggests that a successful foretelling requires that one decentralize that 
material result.  Rather than focusing on the question, “Is the material result worth 
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the material cost?”, the crucial information is in the awareness that these material 
costs do not produce material gain; rather, the material costs of a successful 
foretelling result in the immaterial gain of a more balanced relationship with the 
unknown and the consequent improvement in the functionality of the recipient.  All 
of which results in the following equation: the darkness is unknown and to a very 
large degree unknowable, and to pretend otherwise or refuse to acknowledge its 
relevance leads to a limited relationship with the world that is doomed to repression 
of self and others, as suggested in micro in the story of Berosty and in macro in the 
way the Yomeshta interact with the world. 
 
MESHE AND ORGORYN 
The Yomeshta, the other major religion on the planet, has sprung from the 
Handdara but takes what is ostensibly a directly oppositional view.  The Yomeshta 
believe that Meshe, originally an adherent of the Handdara and a Weaver (the 
“filiament” (67) in the practice of foretelling), exists at “the center of time” and sees 
all (162), a belief that disavows the Handdara’s value for ignorance which promotes 
a reflection of and respect for the immensity of the unknown and acts as recognition 
of the existence of the unknowable.  There are a number of interesting precepts in 
the Yomeshta’s conception of our relationship with knowledge, including the lack of 
a linear relationship with time, but for the purposes of this argument, the most 
important supposition embedded in this ideology is the foreclosure of the 
unknowable, for, as stated previously, Meshe sits in the center and “sees all.”  As 
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such, the universe becomes no larger than a human40 as one individual can know – 
that is encompass – all.  As with all ideologies, the relationship is not exclusive to 
the religion but rather, plays out in many interactions within the society, acting as a 
condensed and metaphorized version of the nation’s social structures.  Specifically, 
this placement of Meshe at the center is directly related to Orgoreyn’s system of 
government because, as opposed to the Handdara, the Yomeshta, as monotheists, are 
a cult of a solid, knowable personality but also (perhaps in consequence) a system of 
hierarchy – thus, as there is a center and so there must be a margin,41 and that 
theoretical margin translates into a marginalized population.   
Ostensibly a communal format,42 Orgoreyn’s government is actually 
hierarchical and repressive, and is based on the control of knowledge, a position that 
is obviously a direct reflection of the precepts of the Yomeshta religion and is 
enacted in Genly’s treatment, once he is recognized as an envoy, as compared to the 
other refugees (113).  Peopled by inspectors and clerks, the government keeps track 
of everyone’s movements, dictating those movements whenever the government 
deems it necessary, and practices thought-control by limiting information to the 
general populace.  Certainly not devoid of metaphor, Orgoreyn’s metaphors are 
                                                          
40 In Le Guin’s Hainish series all planets have been seeded by Hain, and thus all are inhabited by one 
form of human or another.  The various groups are in some cases radically different – as in the dual-
sexuality of Gethen, which the text suggests has been a form of experimentation – but all are human. 
41 The resulting question the text seems to suggest is whether all religions with deities are hierarchical 
by nature in that they place a single being above others. 
42 Le Guin has on several occasions experimented with the idea of socialist/communist governments 
in her fiction, and more than one critic has noted the implicit commentary on the failed communist 
experiments extant in the mid-century including John Huntington’s categorization of Orgoreyn 
government as “totalitarian-collectivist” that is even less successful than Karhide’s feudal system 
because of its lack of “flexibility” (239).  LHD’s Orgoreyn is a particularly bleak version, but with the 
switch to anarchy in TD, the communal gains the particularity that Le Guin so values. 
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effaced and determinative metaphors that are dangerous because they simplify and 
elide rather than expand knowledge.  As followers of Meshe, the Orgota seem to be 
creating a government that attempts to replicate Meshe’s position, i.e. all information 
(knowledge) is kept available to the center (the government).  However, a 
relationship with information (i.e. what can be known) is also a relationship with the 
unknown.  
Orgoreyn’s style of government – as well as its religion – suggests that 
through collection of information, one can know all, an attitude that is in direct 
opposition to Karhide’s, whose mad king (all the kings of Karhide are mad [3]) 
inevitably stumbles under the pressure of trying to rule a people and a country while 
fully aware that the unknown is a primary variable in all outcomes.43  Therefore, 
although Orgoreyn also seems to understand that, as Michel Foucault notes in The 
History of Sexuality, Vol I, power (and Foucault is referring to a multiplicity of 
powers – hegemonic, institutional, political) “comes from everywhere” (93), unlike 
the more passive (respectful?) Karhide who would add to that list the “darkness,” the 
Commensals of Orgoreyn endeavor to encompass that “everywhere” in attempts to 
control their population through various methodologies, beginning with control of 
information.  However, that information is collected in an attempt to implement 
other types of control, specifically through recent advancements in methodologies in 
control of the body, that is “knowledge regarding sex” (Foucault, History, 92) and 
                                                          
43 It is also worth noting that the anxiety as to the scope of Karhide’s situation may be one of the 
reasons the populace is vulnerable to the new move toward war, as well as the reason that the 
movement fails – although Tibe seems to be more in the style of an Orgoreyn schemer than a Karhide 
fatalist, as suggested by his implications that Genly is lying about his alien status (9) and his 
manipulation of the king in regard to Estraven. 
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the repression of sexuality in select populations because, as Foucault also notes, the 
“relationship between sex and power [exists] in terms of repression” (History, 6), a 
new and disturbing development on sexually free Gethen.44   
In opposition, in Karhide, despite the brooding milieu that Genly notes in 
everything from the gossiwars’ “disconsolate bellow” (3) to the “reddish gloom” of 
the throne room (31), historically there has been no attempt to control the population 
as a whole.  Rather, despite feuds and disagreements, respect for the Other and the 
other’s privacy is assumed as a norm, including an assumption that some 
information about the other will remain “unknown” and the Other’s state is his or her 
own business.  This assumption of privacy is reflected in the response of the village 
to Estraven’s clear signal that he is an outlaw when Genly and he enter the small 
village after leaving the glacier: “One person might be outlawed in Karhide, another 
in Orgoreyn” (273).  The villagers’ response, that is, to accept the strangers at the 
hearth and to feed them, indicates the belief that privacy – the unknown state of the 
unknown other – must be accepted, much as any other unknown.  All of this to say, 
the difference between the countries lay in their conception of the size of Foucault’s 
“everywhere,” just as that difference is reflected in the two countries conception of 
“all.”  Orgoreyn’s everywhere is founded in collectible facts and repression of the 
movement, actions and state of the bodies of its citizens, whereas Karhide’s 
conception of everywhere is so large it drives the kings mad but offers those who 
                                                          
44 Control over the field of sexuality occurs in Orgoreyn through the use of drugs to control Kemmer 
(Gethenian’s sexually active state) in prisons populations. Like many repressive states that claim to 
have their citizen’s best interest at heart, Oregoreyn makes changes within invisible populations.   
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accept the unavoidable relationship a less insular position from which to make 
decisions resulting in a more open society and a more generous community. 
 
MADNESS AS AN UNKNOWN 
Karhide’s attitudes surrounding the madness of their kings are also a direct 
result of their relationship with the unknown.  That the king is mad is an accepted 
fact to be discussed with no equivocation because, as Estraven makes clear in his 
discussion with Genly over dinner, some situations produce or require madness:  
Well, Mr. Ai, you’re not insane.  I’m not insane.  But then neither of us is a 
king, you see . . . I forgot, being too interested myself, that he’s a king, and 
does not see things rationally, but as a king.  All I’ve told him means to him 
simply that his power is threatened, his kingdom is a dustmote in space. . . 
(17) 
If one’s existence as a king is circumscribed and determined by one’s power, then 
the position requires a prioritization of that power to the exclusion of all else;45 all of 
which, constitutes a madness that is both necessary to and the result of that 
relationship in which the single being is all, for “[m]adness is really a manifestation 
of the ‘soul’. . . the unconscious part of the human mind” (Barchilon, viii).  For King 
Argaven and all the kings of Karhide, such madness is inevitable when that “soul” 
(singular) is met by a paradoxical and thus irresolvable awareness of an infinite 
                                                          
45 This prioritization is the foundation of the King’s response to Genly in that as Ronnie D. Lipschutz 
notes “[a]liens are regarded as a threatening presence, possessed of a drive or force that, if not 
stopped, will absorb, consume, or subvert and transform the body politic” (80).  Although in this case 
the King seems more concerned with a change of scope – from one country of three to a country 
among 80 plus planets – that change of scope is frightening in its general transformative potential. 
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unknown (as must be in a Karhide based on the Handdara) that cannot exist 
according to a structure in which the king is “all,” made worse yet because that “all” 
has continued to expand with the knowledge of the Ekumen.  It is a paradox that 
constitutes the unavoidable nature of the King’s madness under the Handdaran 
religion.  However, if awareness of the unknown is paradoxical for the king, for the 
populace, the madness of the king is yet one more form of the unknown which can 
be recognized and accepted as all other forms of the unknown must be recognized 
and accepted, for “[t]o explore madness we must renounce the convenience of 
terminal truths” (Foucault, Madness, ix) and to exist within the unknown of the 
Handdara is to “[p]raise then darkness and Creation unfinished” (246).  Unfinished 
Creation clearly presents a field the scope of which belies any conception of a 
“terminal truth,” or an encompassing deity, and as such, requires a balance that must 
be handled through methodologies that recognize both positions within the paradox 
– that is –through metaphor. 
 Madness in Karhide, as in all populations, exists beyond the king (or any 
other authority figure) and throughout the society; the people of Karhide make room 
for madness, even going so far as to including the “mad” in active roles in the 
religion.  Two of the positions in the circle of the foretellers are filled by the 
“zanies,” the “time-dividers” (63), which Genly notes the Ekumen’s research 
suggests means schizophrenics.  Rather than categorizing the zanies as ill, that is 
creating a division “which relegates Reason and Madness to one side or the other” 
of the normal (Foucault, Madness, ix), and treating or institutionalizing them (as is 
certainly the case in Orgoreyn), in Karhide – and specifically within the Handdara – 
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the zany is a crucial segment of that central materialized metaphor/ceremony, 
foretelling.  Their state is considered as alternate but not separate; in other words, in 
foretelling, madness exists as the “undifferentiated experience” that existed in the 
Middle Ages (Foucault, Madness, ix), and when Genly asks whether there is any 
“cure,” Goss answers, “Cured? . . .Would you cure a singer of his voice?” (63).  The 
metaphor suggests a community which sees no need to foreclose that which they do 
not understand.  Rather, the response to this unfamiliar state is the same reaction 
offered to any unknown – acceptance and engagement – not unlike Estraven’s calm 
response to the erratic nature of the king.  Just as the relationship with the general 
unknown produces the interactions between individuals and communities that are 
more respectful and less repressive, in this specific case, in the interaction with the 
unknown that is madness, metaphor allows for enough interconnection to the 
familiar (we all use our voices) to allow the necessary space for and acceptance of 
the unknown that is madness.  But the text also presents an example of a community 
which refuses an interconnected relationship with the unknown and thus with 
metaphor, resulting in a more repressive society. 
 
SHIFGRETHOR AS METAPHOR 
Orgoreyn’s refusal to deal with the alternative and the different is reflected in 
the Orgota’s interactions with language and the ancient social structure of 
shifgrethor, a structure of reputation/honor maintained and enacted through codes 
embedded within metaphor, subtext, and ceremony.  For Karhide, shifgethor (an 
unmeasurable and necessarily metaphorical social construct) is the foundation of all 
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social and communal interaction, but in trying to solidify the known, the 
Commensals of Orgoreyn have moved away from shifgrethor in an attempt to lock 
down the known.  As Estraven, in his first meeting with Oblse and Yegey, uses 
metaphor and analogy (partially through habit, partially in accordance with the rules 
of shifgrethor, and partially because the subject discussed is to some degree 
unformed and unmeasurable) to explain not-fully-formed theories and not-yet 
materialized fears about the newly militarized Karhide, Obsle – and later many other 
members of the Commensal – immediately waive shifgrethor (85) both allowing for 
and demanding clear and literal statement.  Although Genly will later read their 
approach as a form of the transparency he longed for in Karhide until he finds he is 
mistaken when his seizure and arrest in the house of his “host” makes clear that the 
interactions have been anything but transparent, this refusal of metaphor and subtext 
is actually a loss of a field of exploration and depth of comprehension.   
As such, one can consider it a loss of access to philosophy for, as Derrida 
states, “It [the literal] becomes metaphor when put in circulation in philosophical 
discourse” (9).  In fact, philosophy is dependent on metaphor in that philosophy is 
engaged in discussion of the unmeasurable and the abstract and the loss of metaphor 
limits the discourse to the literal in its inability to address such unquantifiable and 
abstract subject matter.  Thus, as Obsle and Yegey demand the material and the 
literal, the abstract and the philosophical fall away, resulting in the brutal 
pragmatism of the Orgoreyn state which deals with subjects as objects, each person 
becoming merely one body among a number of other bodies that must be given 
work, housed and fed, or, in the case of the noncompliant, imprisoned, drugged and 
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used as slave labor.  Both communities suffer from losses produced by both the 
direct costs as well as the opportunity costs associated with their choice of system, 
and as Genly finds in his attempts to open diplomatic channels with first Karhide and 
then Orgoreyn, neither nation is fully functional; however, Le Guin makes clear that 
in the end, it is Karhide with its awareness and respect for the unknown and its 
willingness to incur/accept the risk inherent thereof and its consequent expertise in 
the use of metaphor, who will be able to face “the void” (32) that is space and alien 
life.  Because that void is unimagined and unimaginable until brought to the planet’s 
attention, Gethen’s approach to this new idea requires metaphor in that it is metaphor 
that bridges the known and the unknown through an exploration and inhabiting of 
the relevant semic fields (Ricoeur, Rule, 240).   
Ricoeur’s approach to metaphor through layered and interconnected semic 
fields that underlie and combine multiple points of focalization in the material world 
to create a new response allows for comprehension of an idea that is either too large 
or too new to be dealt with in literal language, i.e. comprehension that allows the 
imaginer to go beyond the present moment, the present space.  In the case of 
Karhide, whose practices incorporate the unknown and the unknowable, those semic 
fields are extended so that they can address an area beyond the empirical, material 
world because, as what is known lies within a greater expanse of what is unknown 
and unknowable, those semic fields must include or at least interconnect with those 
expanded spaces. As such, without an awareness of the unknown the field narrows, 
narrowing as well the options allowed to the community involved.   
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Within Orgoreyn’s conception of a universe in which everything is knowable 
and everything is seen, combined with the limitations of a nation which up until the 
present moment has had no interaction with any life beyond the planet, there is no 
position which allows for anything as large as the Ekumen.  Within Orgoreyn’s 
belief that “Meshe sees all” (ibid) there exists the unspoken suggestion that there can 
be nothing beyond what is seen or that nothing beyond what is seen can be relevant.  
As a result, no one in Orgoreyn includes that which is beyond his/her own concerns 
in her/his consideration of any decision.  In fact, the position creates an inability to 
own the act of decision making, as is made clear in Genly’s interaction with the 
dying prisoner at Pulfen farm who dismisses Genly’s tales of his own world with the 
response “Ah well . . .Ah well . . . We none of us choose” (183).  It is a necessarily 
fatalistic view for a cog in a system rather than a person in a community, as Arya 
clearly views her/himself.  But more importantly, in a political sense, Genly must be 
reduced and seen only as a single being rather than a representative, becoming a 
pawn of the commensals or the factions rather than an envoy from the unknown (the 
great unseen).  Certainly, when a world and a universe is one in which one can know 
all, the size of that “all” counts, and thus, the expansion that occurs with the arrival 
of the Ekumen creates a universe that is no longer manageable and must be 
condensed or ignored.  On the other hand is Karhide’s attitudes in regard to the 
stranger, with its awareness of the unknown both as posited in the individual and 
source, which may be fraught and result in madness for some but also allows others 
to prepare to respond to the unimaginable.46 
                                                          




SELF, OTHER, (AND SHIFGRETHOR)  
Although there are material representations of the unknown and the 
unimaginable everywhere in the text including the expanse of space and the fields of 
ice, Le Guin’s most profound enigma is the unknown Other as presented in the 
differences between the Gethenian and the Terran.  It is a difference that becomes an 
almost insurmountable stumbling block for Genly in his adherence to the standards 
of gender within which he was raised.  Genly’s fallibility is a new development in Le 
Guin’s fiction or, as noted by Darko Suvin in his essay “Parables of De-alienation,” 
it is the first time the central “stranger is shown as fallible” (265) rather than strictly 
heroic.  In fact, Genly’s failure to accept the differences between the two groups, 
which are myriad and immense despite the fact that they are not noticeable at a 
glance, almost ends the mission in failure.  Regardless of all Genly’s training as an 
envoy, without Estraven’s experience as a Handdarata and his consequent 
willingness to face the unknown, the proposed relationship with the Ekumen would 
fail at the outset.   
Superficially, Genly, a Terran, is only slightly different than the Gethenians, 
as Genly notes when he says that he has “never had any trouble passing as a native” 
(56), but the difference in sexuality – the two separate sexes in separate bodies of the 
Terran’s vs the dual and ambi-sexuality of the Gethenians – creates a gulf for many 
on Gethen, (thus the references to Genly as “the pervert” [183]) but as well for 
Genly himself.  For most of the text, Genly is unable to accept the duality, falling 
prey to what de Beauvoir would call ideas of the “Eternal Feminine” (1407), 
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characterizing women in general as inexplicable Others whose definition is 
determined by imposed standards, and specifically the female half of Estraven as 
irritating and untrustworthy, or non-existent.47  When Estraven asks if women are 
like a different species, Genly’s negative reply is unconvincing and ends in the 
statement “[i]n a sense, women are more alien than you are” continuing with “[w]ith 
you I share one sex, anyhow” (235), a statement that suggests that, to Genly, sex and 
gender are a nearly insurmountable and primary difference.  Meanwhile at any sign 
from Estraven of the stereotypical behavior that Genly attributes to women, Genly 
becomes morose and suspicious: “at the table Estraven’s performance had been 
womanly, all charm and tact and lack of substance, specious and adroit.  Was it in 
fact perhaps this soft supple femininity that I disliked and distrusted in him?” (12).  
                                                          
47 The discussion of gender in LHD is a fraught one, which I can only touch on in this chapter.  Amy 
M. Clarke notes that early feminists claimed Le Guin as making “sexist comments” (6), which one 
can only presume is a conflation of author and protagonist/narrator as those statements are made by 
Genly.  Le Guin was also criticized for Genly’s use of the male pronouns and nouns in his translation 
of discussions that must necessarily have taken place in the languages of Gethen; however, both 
choices (word and statement) are valid in that they produce character coherence and, through 
character coherence, plot.  As a character driven writer, Le Guin describes her process in character 
creation as less rational and more instinctive, one in which “[t]he place is there, the person is there.  I 
didn’t invent him, I didn’t make her up: he or she is there [sic]” (On Fantasy, 107) or as Bernard 
Selinger notes “inspiration for an artist often comes by means of an aural or visual image” quoting Le 
Guin as saying that a “book does not come tome as an idea, or a plot, or an event, or a society, or a 
message; it comes to me as a person” (52), and such “person”s must be coherent.   
Although there is no question such a system will embed the writer’s subjective position, such 
a system also requires that the character have autonomy in order to maintain coherence.  As Lisa 
Hammond Rashley puts it, Genly “has a pronounced tendency to read these people through his own 
gendered lens as men or women, according to his own preconceptions” (23).  Rashley goes on to note 
that Ai’s presentation does affect the perception of the reader, but as a writer, knowing the way 
character driven writing works, my position remains that the choice is valid.  There is no question that 
Genly, as we know him, would make those statements and apply the male pronoun.  In terms of the 
presentation of the characters in largely male roles, it is a book largely about politics, and viewing 
politics as primarily a male position says more about the reader than the writer.  Much of the criticism 
falls into an “I would have written a different book” form, a form that is highly suspect and less than 
reasonable in that it reflects George Steiner’s statement that a model can never include all of (in his 
discussion) linguistic phenomena because “If it could, the model would be the world” (117).  That 
said, as mentioned earlier, Le Guin herself has reassessed and adjusted her approach to work and her 
relationship with feminism, moving on to less traditional gender roles in later work (Clarke, 6). 
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For Genly, despite his desire and choice to approach the alien Other with respect, the 
more familiar Other – the female – is a threat; it is a paradox that Le Guin suggests is 
connected to a less exotic unknown – the unknown and uncontrollable within one’s 
own home, that is, the metaphor that is the shared state of “I and thou” (Le Guin, 
234) – a conundrum that is met in many societies through the codification of social 
intercourse, in the case of Gethen, through shifgrethor. 
Genly’s refusal to accept the unknown that is posited in the female side of the 
Gethenians (not to mention his negative response to his version of the “Eternal 
Feminine”) is also reflected in his struggle with shifgrethor.  The complex system of 
reputation and protocol characterized as one’s “shadow” is a sublimated form of 
competition, and thus, could also, according to Genly’s view, be considered 
feminine.  So, despite Estraven’s commitment to the Ekumen’s attempts to make 
contact, and thus his commitment to Genly, until Genly is finally able to 
acknowledge the unknown female in Estraven, to see what he by his own admission 
“had always been afraid to see and had pretended not to see” (248), the interaction is 
limited and the chance of success compromised.  Genly’s refusal to deal with the 
implicit that is the feminine and his frustration with shifgrethor – for him, an 
alternate form of the unknown – suggests a failure in his own relationship with the 
unknown and is, consequently, a continuous stumbling block as it produces his 
distrust, skewing his reading of situations and motives.  His failure to read others is 
particularly problematic in his only ally, Estraven, who eventually says, “It is 
strange.  I am the only man in all Gethen that has trusted you entirely, and I am the 
only man in Gethen that you have refused to trust” (199).  The distrust that Estraven 
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refers to is a result of the close contact that has resulted from Estraven’s attempts to 
assist Genly and has made it impossible for Genly to entirely ignore the feminine in 
Estraven that he so distrusts, amplifying Genly’s negative and biased response.   
It is only through facing and accepting the unknown, that is in this case the 
feminine in Estraven, that Genly is fully able to work effectively with Estraven – i.e. 
cross the Gobrin, a materialized metaphor that stands for the unknown in the text.  It 
is a relationship that James Bittner claims is shared by Le Guin herself in that “by 
moving away from herself to an aesthetic distance” she “gets at the truth” while “Ai 
himself, can survive and exist only in a cooperative relationship with a ‘Thou’ (111) 
– all of which positions are a move into the unknown.  In other words, only on the 
ice can Genly “learn to treat difference as a resource” and recognize his own need to 
develop rather than acting as a teacher/purveyor of civilization (Inayatullah, 58), an 
ability Naeem Inayatullah notes is lacking in any colonizing force.48  The Ekumen is 
a force which always waits to be invited, and for the Ekumen to be successful, Genly 
must step into that unknown to make the discovery he makes on the ice: “Alone, I 
cannot change your world.  But I can be changed by it” (LHD, 259).  As such, the 
suggestion is that for Genly to face the general unknown, he must first face the 
unknown that lies closest: himself, specifically his relationship with gender.  
Consideration of self is an idea that will be discussed further in chapter two – but it 
                                                          
48 Inayatullah’s discussion of colonialization in Star Trek and the shift from imposition to proposition 
in the first contact attempts of the series is interesting in its relation to the way the Ekumen advances 
any contact and notes the inevitable costs of that contact.  Inayatullah’s discussion of the pronounced 
shift to proposition in the second Star Trek series links the change with Todorov’s discussion of 
consent, a requirement that is also represented in Le Guin’s Ekumen and – of course – Le Guin’s 
relationship with metaphor: that consent is a mandatory step that cannot be ignored or removed. 
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is also relevant in direct connection with Genly’s overall relationship with the 
unknown and the results of his failure to be fully accountable.   
Just as in Genly’s dislike of the lack of transparency in Karhide, a preference 
that seduces him and causes his imprisonment in Orgoreyn, Genly’s refusal to view 
Estaven as ambiguous, as a combination of genders, and as a fluid identity is a 
refusal of the risk that is inherent in the unknown and is encompassed in the 
variability and unpredictability of each next moment.  Genly’s unspoken demand 
that everyone must have a gender if they are to be trusted – and specifically a gender 
he understands and can predict – is a familiar position that theorists working in 
Queer Theory and Gender Studies have attempted to address in the past decades in 
both their discussion of the performative statements and hegemonic sources behind 
the determinative categorizations and the need for fluid spaces in which change can 
occur.  The demand for determinative categorizations of gender in order to interact 
with the other is broached in Judith Butler’s discussions of the ways in which drag 
expands those categorizations and the need to accept the risk inherent in that fluid 
state in order to move forward.  Butler argues that drag disallows the requirement of 
static and determining categorizations for human behavior and socially normative 
roles in its production of gender as an imitative act: “It [drag] is a production which, 
in effect – that is, in its effect – postures as an imitation.  This perpetual 
displacement constitutes a fluidity of identities that suggest an openness to 
resignification and recontextualization” (188).49  It is just such fluidity that is 
                                                          
49 Discussions of Queer Theory and Feminist studies as reflected in Le Guin’s oeuvre, including 
LHD,  will continue in Chapter 3. 
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disturbing to Genly, and the resulting unpredictability that creates his distrust of the 
one person who is entirely devoted to his attempt, and it is only in accepting that 
unknown within Estraven, “[a]cceptance of him as he was,” that the two are able to 
work in the full accord necessary to complete the trip successfully: “it was only from 
that sexual tension between us, admitted now and understood . . . that the great and 
sudden assurance of friendship between us rose: a friendship so much needed by us 
both” (248), a position that, as Selinger puts it, allows them to be “[i]solated and 
together” (52).  This team of two, who just barely make it off the glacier, is founded 
in a clear recognition of what cannot be entirely known (thus the continuing isolation 
in their state of togetherness) and consent to that limited state of knowledge.50   What 
cannot be known exists as a difference within the Other that requires engagement 
with a specific, a particular, Other in order that connection be made – that 
metaphorical and necessary bridge – and the need for the continuation of metaphor 
in connecting the particular to the general.  It is through metaphor that Genly’s 
connection to Estraven is converted to a connection to Gethen: his metaphorical 
position as “messenger-boy” allows him to span that gap and allows for the 
comprehension of the Ekumen as a “body mystic” rather than a “body politic” (259) 
beginning with the unmeasurable nature of love and friendship.  Their success is 
profound and poignant, but facing the unknown is a continuous process, and even 
Estraven, who has faced it many times, struggles with the scope of what is required 
in order to fully commit to this interaction. 
                                                          
50 Thomas J. Remington notes that “[n]o deep relationships develop from the involuntary contact in 
the van” (164) when Genly is on his way to Pulfen Farm, suggesting that the lack of consent creates a 




THE SELF AND THE WORLD 
Of all the characters in the text and all the inhabitants of Gethen, Estraven is 
the one who is “ready” to face the unknown when Genly arrives, as Genly himself 
finally recognizes (203), and such readiness is a result of Estraven’s relationship 
with the unknown and unknowable – and thus – with metaphor.  Although speaking 
of material response to a moment, Genly’s comment that he “never knew a person 
who reacted so wholly and rapidly to a changed situation as Estraven” (203) is 
indicative of Estraven’s relationship with the unknown future as much as the known 
moment to which he is responding.  This relationship is best presented in his 
characterization of himself as “stupid” under threat (76) and “slow-thinking” (203), 
which would seem in anyone else false modesty or, alternatively, paradoxical when 
considering his quick responses.  After all, how can anyone as astute and direct as 
Estraven misjudge himself in terms of this one attribute?  However, the answer lies 
in understanding the terms of the comparison.  For the statement to make sense, 
Estraven cannot be comparing himself to other people,51 so he must be comparing 
himself to the speed and complexity of unfolding situations.  His statement that he is 
slow only makes sense as compared to the immediate need to understand and act; 
from this perspective, Estraven’s attitude is indicative of his relationship with the 
                                                          
51 Estraven does originally compare himself to others saying, “Some rise to present danger” 
continuing with “but I grow stupid and sit on a bag” (76).  I would argue (as Estraven comes to a plan 
to continue his action within a few moments in that scene) that in sitting on that bag, he is taking time 
for a reassessment.  The argument above holds true, as consistent action suggests Estraven is anything 
but non-responsive, and when considering his own characterization of his relationship with 
foreknowledge and luck on page 189 when he refers to his ability to know when “the great wheel 
gives to a touch.” His sensitivity to the moment – that is “the great wheel” – suggests a moment to 
moment connection to the material world as discussed on the next page. 
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unknown.  As opposed to the Orgoreynians – who ignore the unknown, Argaven – 
who fears it, and Genly – who trains in order to be able to approach it, Estraven 
chases after the unknown trying to catch up.  In consequence, he is breathtakingly 
successful in his attempts.  In his chase, he depends on the hunch, i.e. how his “luck” 
is “running” (203): 
I never had a gift but one, to know when the great wheel gives to a touch, to 
know and act [. . .] A great delight it was to feel that certainty again, to know 
that I could steer my fortune and the world’s chance like a bobsled down the 
steep, and dangerous hour. (189) 
Estraven’s metaphorical description of what it means to be able to respond to the 
hunch can be considered as a non-mystical sensitivity to the material world.  If one is 
observant, every moment offers new information that can direct one’s actions, but Le 
Guin/Estraven writes/speaks of the trait as if it is more ephemeral and immaterial, a 
wise choice considering the direction and the results the two national attitudes 
suggests.   
The two oppositional relationships with the unknown espoused by Gethen’s 
dominant nations construct the day to day lives of their inhabitants.  Consider, if one 
regards the ability to recognize the moment for what it offers through observation 
(admittedly a very acute form), then all knowledge is knowable – and useable – a 
position that resembles Orgoreyn’s limited and clumsy efforts to know all facts and 
data regarding citizens.52  However, Karhide takes a different approach for good 
                                                          
52 Aida A. Hozic’s discussion of Tardovsky’s film Stalker as a consideration of the relationship 
between “The Zone” as a necessary “extra-juridical space” (128) and the controlled world is relevant 
to Orgoreyn’s attempts to control information.  Although Hozic is most interested in the effects of 
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reason; Estraven’s comment about how the “great wheel gives to a touch” implies 
the need for respect for unknown forces (including the apparently non-cognitive 
consideration of a situation – his taking time to stupidly “sit on a bag” [76]) and a 
willingness to accept the limitations of one’s control in situations over which one has 
little influence.  His reference to the “wheel that gives to a touch” suggests the 
manner in which a captain must maneuver a boat within the forces that are the 
currents of a huge body of water, a series of action dependent on information 
comprised of only a glimpse of a very limited portion of a situation.  As such, even if 
given all the information about all the changing variables of that body of water 
including moment to moment changes in the windspeed, temperature, currents, etc. 
one would have to be able to sort and synthesize all the possible outcomes – an 
impossible task for a human, and likely even for AI unless we deem AI as godlike in 
capability.  Donald Theall notes in his essay “The Art of Social-Science Fiction” that 
the Foretellers answers “do not cover enough of the future contingencies” (259), so 
Estraven’s relationship with the world reflects the lesson of the foretellers: that one 
cannot know or sort all of the information even if it were available, suggesting that 
not all knowledge is knowable if to know is to comprehend, and thus, metaphor 
becomes the mode by which the information must be accessed. 
                                                          
The Zone on sovereignty, she makes the point that The Zone is a space in which “order has been 
suspended.  Neither chaotic nor idyllic, zones – paradoxically – do not abolish or challenge the law 
but affirm it” (130).  As such, recognition of the different spaces is important, and Estraven and the 
Handdara differ from the Orgoreyn and the Yomeshta in their recognition of The Zone/the unknown, 
as reflected in Faxes statement that “the only thing that makes life possible is permanent, intolerable, 
uncertainty” (71).  In Orgoreyn’s refusal of the unknown (Meshe sees all), it fails to recognize its 
position within the very structures that underpin its world, seeing only the ordered world within the 
bubble of civilization, and thus, when those structures change, the commensals cannot adjust to 
changing circumstances.  Thus, The Zone is a material metaphor that represents the unknown that 
makes life possible. 
Sheckler 81 
 
As such, Estraven’s Handdara style approach, including a metaphorical style 
of comprehension of the need for that light touch that allows him to steer the 
“world’s chance” like “a bobsled” on a steep track, reminds us of our limitations, 
that we cannot know all of any situation even if those facts could theoretically be 
“known,” that we are not brokers of power or masters of the universe, that our 
influence is slight but at times determinative, and must be accessed at the speed at 
which a situation changes.  In fact, without a respect for the unknown and a 
comprehension of a need for metaphor to access that unknown, we are like the 
Commensals of Orgoreyn who leave shifgrethor behind while they jockey for 
position always at the cost of others and misread situations such that, in the end, the 
least that happens is sending innocents to their deaths to preserve a modicum of 
power.  The irony and limitation of this view is made particularly clear when Genly 
– the envoy of the Ekumen – is sent to Pulefen Farm to preserve the power of the 
Commensal’s and protect the shifgrethor of Orgoreyn (184), power that is, in fact, 
only at risk because of a loss of personal shifgrethor produced by the games of cloak 
and dagger the commensal’s play at to enhance personal power.  As such, 
Orgoreyn’s system elides the complex nature of knowledge and can succeed only in 
the most limited of ways within a sealed system.  After all, if one desires to control 
all knowledge, that knowledge must have a finite “mass” that can be encompassed 
by the parameters of a human brain.  Estraven does not presume that capability and 
is successful because of his constant awareness of his limited access and control.  
That said, even Estraven struggles to characterize the unknown – or as he calls it – 
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“the dark” (189) and in consequence, always resorts to (living) metaphor in his 
attempts to discuss that which is unknowable. 
Estraven uses figurative language in his references to the unknown in order 
to both create and characterize his relationship with a complex world.  According to 
I. A. Richards figurative language changes how the world is “perceived and 
conceived” (Abrams on Richards, 163), and thus, acts as a performative agent in the 
conception/production of that world through words, but as well, as an access point to 
the unknown or the not yet extant. In other words, in its very existence, figurative 
language is an acknowledgement of the unknown, a tip of the hat to those invisible 
relationships which cannot be fully accessed through a consideration of fact and 
literal wording.  A.S. Byatt translates Foucault as saying, “To name is 
simultaneously so give the verbal representation of a representation and to place that 
representation in an overall picture” (17).  This linkage from signifier of the material 
to the idea of the material to the idea of a position that structures our relationship 
with the material is already a slippery and treacherous business – already 
metaphorical – in the most basic, the most Nietzschean, sense (a word is not an 
object or an act).  So, where does figurative language fit into an already fraught 
relationship?   
In fact, the choice to use language less secure and literally exact when the use 
of language is already inexact, already a “truth” only in the “fact that man forgets 
himself as subject, and what is more as an artistically creating subject” (Nietzsche, 
8) who claims the material fact for what is actually a metaphor – i.e. a signifying 
word – and suggests both extreme courage and a need/attempt to reach other types of 
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comprehension and/or knowledge.  Thus, the use of and need for the figurative must 
communicate the existence of other information than does literal language, or it 
would not exist.  In the case of Estraven, whose success is based in a 
hyperawareness of his position in relation to the world and the Other,53 in order to 
discuss his relationship with a complex and unknowable world, he necessarily 
speaks of wheels and bobsleds, extending54 the language through metaphor, just as, 
through Genly, Le Guin equates facts with pearls (1), stating that neither is “solid, 
coherent, round . . . But both are sensitive” (1) in an attempt to remember that one is 
Neitzsche’s “artistically creating subject” (ibid) and thus perspective, word choice, 
and a nearly infinite number of variables can change both the transmission and the 
reception of a metaphor.  As with all figurative language, Le Guin’s metaphor is an 
arguable statement because there are no tangible facts to which to point and instead 
only a recognition of resonance and a reach beyond the known; all of which suggests 
that all figurative language requires precision and courage in the speaker’s attempt to 
cross the gap between minds by means of a resonating image and the “misuse” of 
language.  It is a method which Estraven attempts over and over again, with courage 
and aplomb and a fair amount of success; however, even Estraven falls into fear 
when faced with the unexpected cost of communication from an abject state. 
 
                                                          
53 In Robert Galbreath’s essay, “Le Guin’s use of the Occult” he notes that Le Guin’s dislike of the 
occult seems to be based not in the unexplainable but in occultism “as the organizational equivalent 
of a church that mystifies its adherents” (37 emphasis mine).  This dislike of mystification is a central 
precept of the characterization of Estraven and his ability to sort and place himself and his 
surroundings while leaving room for the “mystic”.  Thus her dislike of the occult does not elide the 
existence of the unknown. 




THE SELF AS UNKNOWN 
Paraverbal speech is the primary gift that the Ekumen brings to Gethen, but 
the unfamiliar skill is, for Estraven, a gift that is profound yet horrible in that the 
process breaches the boundaries of his subjective state, a boundary that he has never 
considered as vulnerable.  Estraven’s response mirrors Julia Kristeva’s concepts in 
her text Powers of Horror, or, as Dino Felluga summarizes Kristeva, “the abject 
refers to the human reaction [. . .] to a threatened breakdown in meaning caused by 
the loss of the distinction between subject and object or between self and other” 
(n.p.).  When Estraven is faced with Genly’s call through the voice of his 
(Estraven’s) dead brother within his own head, the breakdown of boundaries creates 
a liminal position he has never imagined: “‘This is more terrible than I had thought.’ 
He shook his head, as a man will do to shake off a nightmare, and then put his face 
in his hands” (253).  The whole that is created through the specular I in Lacan’s 
mirror stage is no longer the “fortress” with its “inner arena and enclosure” (Lacan, 
1288); rather, that sense of wholeness has become disorganized, and he has been 
presented with “his own body and ego as most precious non-objects” yet now “they 
are no longer seen in their own right but forfeited, abject” (Kristeva, 5).  Up until 
this point, although Estraven has courageously faced the unknown, he has done so as 
a complete and separate whole, i.e. a subject that is distinct from the objects it 
considers;55 paraverbal speech changes his relationship with that unknown as it calls 
                                                          
55 Frederic Jameson’s discussion of the dissolution of self in his essay “World Reduction in Le Guin” 
is interesting here as he notes that “[h]eat is . . . conveyed as a kind of dissolution of the body into the 
outside world, a loss of that clean separation from clothes and external objects that gives you your 




into question his “self” as contained and impenetrable.  That self has been the 
foundation from which he has managed his relationship with the unknown by 
extending his conception of the world from what is knowable – i.e. himself and his 
position.  Now, with paraverbal speech, the self he has counted on his whole life 
loses shape and becomes permeable.  In other words, in dealing with the alternate 
language of mindspeak, he is attempting “to step outside [his] own skin of 
consciousness, a vital cover more intimately enfolding, more close-woven to human 
identity than is the skin of our body” which, as George Steiner describes, “mediate 
thought about language” (115), and in doing so, Estraven runs the risk of loss of self. 
In Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the cogito, he writes that “transactions 
between the subject and the objects around about it are possible only provided that 
the subject first of all causes them to exist for itself, actually arranges them round 
about itself, and extracts them from its own core” (169); when Estraven faces 
“mindspeech,” the distinction between the subject and object is breached and thus 
Merleau-Ponty’s “arrangement” is no longer valid.  If one arrangement of the 
structure of metaphor can be (and often is) viewed as using the material object as a 
point from which to extend in order to communicate the immaterial and the 
unmeasurable, then Estraven has used his separate and impermeable self as a 
foundation from which to address the darkness.  The fact that, faced by this 
vulnerable and less distinct self, Estraven is still able to overcome his horror and step 
past that threshold on the basis of a now unrecognizable position and self to continue 
his commitment in the face of his abject terror, is in part a statement of just how 
profoundly his carefully constructed relationship with the unknown serves him and 
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his world, for this is an unknown that invades even the self.  However, that ability 
also hints at the fact of an extant unknown and immaterial state which requires and 
acts as source to the figurative language necessary for any interaction that is not 
merely an extension of the material thus decentering the material as source for 
metaphor.  In fact, Estraven’s training must be profound and effective, but as well, 
based in more than an ability to extend from the recognizable, in that he is willing to 
allow the invasion and will not turn away from the awareness of an unrecognizable 
and immaterial unknown that has been brought to his attention despite the failure of 
himself as subject.  In doing so, he is able to allow contact to occur – to offer the 
necessary consent – but only because his relationship with the unknown includes his 
position within what can be known, a realization of the limitations of that known, 
and an ability to recognize the existence of an unknown immaterial state that can 
only be accessed through alternative language – that is, metaphor. 
In other words, through Estraven’s relationship with his abject self, Le Guin 
has opened an ongoing discussion and her most radical suggestion about metaphor.  
It is in the interconnection and limitations of the known and the unknown, the 
material and the immaterial, the provable and the unprovable that Le Guin shakes the 
ideas at the very base of our conceptions of the way metaphor is structured.  In 
Estraven’s methodologies in dealing with the unknown, the “known” is shown up for 
what it actually is – a highly subjective, unstable perception rather than a solid, 
knowable fact: or as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “I can know nothing of this factual 
existence” (168).  In preparing for their trip over the ice, Estraven uses his past 
experiences to determine just how much food and what tools and supplies will offer 
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the pair the best odds in crossing the ice, but even with all his expertise, when Genly 
asks whether they will succeed, Estraven can only answer, “I think so, with luck” 
(201).  Although, Genly takes this statement for an assurance of success (after all, 
everything that Estraven has predicted thus far has come to pass), Estraven means 
exactly what he says.  In Le Guin’s/Estraven’s unknown there is no magical 
shortcut; there is no intentioned deity to which to turn; there is only one’s 
recognition of what one can know (and a recognition of the subjective and unstable 
nature of that information) and what one cannot, and the speed and accuracy such 
knowledge lends the subject.  In other words, there is the hunch.  Estraven’s 
response and interactions in planning the trip are examples of what Genly calls 
Gethen’s skill in having “tamed and trained the hunch” (203) but not in increasing 
“its certainty” (204) – and note that the hunch is not categorized as thought with its 
necessary inclusion of “self-consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty, 170).  Rather than a 
promise, the taming of the hunch as figured in both Estraven’s guesses and in 
foretelling is “the power of seeing everything at once” (204) as it exists in the given 
moment – but the position from which everything is seen is not thought and the 
subject is not the center, it is merely the position at which one stands at that moment.  
As such, in its connection to the future, it is a metaphor. 
Even in the work of some of the most radical theorist dealing with metaphor, 
the language surrounding the figure consistently suggests that metaphor is centered 
on and produced by the material.  Monroe Bearsdley writes that “[w]hen a predicate 
is metaphorically adjoined to a subject, the predicate loses it[s] [sic] ordinary 
extension” (74, emphasis mine); Lakoff and Johnson’s use of that “consequently” in 
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their step by step representation of the structure of metaphor discussed earlier (ibid) 
is even more demanding of an unequivocal position on the material world as source 
of figurative language.  Even in Derrida’s radicalized discussion of metaphor “White 
Mythology,” he too uses language that suggests metaphor is created from the 
material world as source, that it is “an eruptive extension of a sign proper” (Derrida, 
57 emphasis mine).  The exceptions lie in Models and Metaphor in which Max 
Black does move in the direction of Le Guin’s style of metaphor in his statement that 
“metaphor creates the similarity” (37) continuing the ambiguity with his conclusion 
that “common characteristics” act as “ground of the metaphor” (39) which at least 
suggests a shared source, and of course, Ricoeur’s discussion of impertinence 
presupposes a pertinence we cannot yet see.   
The discussion is a difficult one because literal language is constructed in 
relation to the material world and as such we make associated assumptions about 
language in general, but if we add in Merleau-Ponty’s work in phenomenology in 
which he characterizes the combined body and mind as a “subject committed to the 
world” (1962:viii) noting that the subject is “never simply object nor simply subject” 
(Grosz on MP, 87), he suggests an interconnection between mind and body as a 
“condition and context through which I am able to have a relation to objects” a 
condition that is both “immanent and transcendent” (Grosz on MP, 86).  If we apply 
those transcendent relationships to metaphor, we can restructure the relationship. 
With the addition of Merleau-Pontuy’s necessary extension of the subject in order to 
interact with all exterior elements to our discussion of metaphor, and if we extend to 
the immaterial (in what is admittedly a slight “misuse” of Merleau-Ponty’s work) we 
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can see that extended subject as an extension that could bridge the material and the 
immaterial with both acting as source in an interchange that produces a new 
predication.  Le Guin’s work suggests such an extension (another form of her 
“complex holism”? [ibid]) reorganizing the subject such that the individual becomes 
less central and as well less hierarchically valued.  In other words, with Merleau-
Ponty’s statement that the body is “the general instrument of my ‘comprehension’” 
(235) the material becomes an important but incidental center rather than a center 
that indicates hierarchical value.   
As such, Le Guin’s use of metaphor in constructing Estraven’s interactions 
with the unknown from an abject state gestures to a position much of the language 
around the theory of metaphor overlooks but Merleau-Ponty’s construction of our 
mind/bodies as tool and position parallels, that is, our situatedness within the 
relationships produced in metaphor.  So, when Estraven becomes aware of a 
heretofore unconceived and profoundly unfamiliar situation and is consequently 
unable to position himself, he is still able to respond to the situation because he is a 
tool rather than the center, and his response is founded in figurative language that is 
founded in the immaterial rather than from an expansion of what is already familiar.  
In other words, what Le Guin’s work suggests is that the source of the metaphor is 
not the subject and the subjects known, but instead it is the whole, including the 
unfamiliar/the unknown, that acts as generator.  
Words create the world.  As Martin Bickman notes, many writers have 
suggested that the world is “created primarily by language” (46).  Obviously Le 
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Guin’s words create the world of Gethen, but as well, Estraven’s figurative words 
create his profoundly functional relationship with the unknown to the point that even 
in a state of abject terror – a state in which he is no longer centered on the self – he 
can consent to that state and move in his chosen direction with only a hunch to guide 
him.  In doing so, he must rely on that relationship with the unknown to create the 
necessary metaphors.  It is important to note that the word that is most relevant in 
creating Le Guin’s/Estraven’s world is respect.  It is respect for Estraven that allows 
Genly to move past his preconceptions, and respect for the unknown that allows 
Estraven to continue on a most exhilarating but terrifying course.  As such, Le Guin 
suggests the relationship between words and respect is a particularly vital one – that 
to move into the future with an Other requires a form of Hegelian third stage 
recognition that incorporates respectful interactions with that Other, consent and 
acknowledgement of that Other, if we are to reach that imagined but unknown future 
which Le Guin notes, must always exists as a metaphor because “truth is a matter of 
the imagination” (n.p., Le Guin, Introduction).  We must be able to imagine 
ourselves and that Other living together in that unknown future in order to have any 
future at all.  As such, this discussion of the unknown must act as the opening foray 
in the discussions of the following chapters, each of which presents a particular 





Only Means:  Governance and Metaphor in The Dispossessed 
 
There was a wall.  It did not look important.  It was built of uncut rocks 
roughly mortared.  An adult could look right over it, and even a child could 
climb it.  Where it crossed the roadway, instead of having a gate it 
degenerated into mere geometry, a line, an idea of boundary.  But the idea 
was real. (Le Guin, TD, 1) 
 
Ursula K. Le Guin’s relationship with metaphor is one that has been 
consciously constructed and results in the way metaphor permeates her texts and acts 
as a foundation for that text and the resulting themes.  In particular, in the case of 
The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia, it is through metaphor that Le Guin 
outlines the relationship between ownership and time, a relationship that insists on 
anarchy/utopia as a “malleable and elastic concept” (Greene, 2).56  In the case of The 
Dispossessed, a text that centers on a planet/state in which the concept of property is 
illegitimate, that relationship results in a situation that cannot be owned as the very 
precepts of the state resist stasis and control on every level, creating a conception of 
a utopia that must be reinvented in each moment of its existence.  To do so, The 
Dispossessed begins unapologetically with a metaphor because for Le Guin, 
metaphor constructs our relationship with the abstract, and thus, in order to avoid 
                                                          
56 Le Guin’s relationship with anarchy is equally interesting, in that she claims it as “the most 
idealistic, and to me the most interesting, of all political theories” (The Day, 285). 
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becoming a form of limitation – an effaced and thus rigid force in the world – 
metaphor must exist in a fluid state that includes informed consent.  For, even if the 
metaphor itself does not change, our relationship with it must as the context 
surrounding the metaphor shifts and adjusts.  Thus, The Dispossessed is the tale of a 
utopia, but, as the subtitle states, only an ambiguous one as many of the inhabitants 
of that utopia struggle to enshrine, standardize, and systematize their own version of 
what is utopic – thus converting utopia to dystopia in that single act.  As such, we 
are immediately presented with the polarized relationship that acts as a lynch pin for 
much of science fiction: the move between utopia and dystopia, or the problem 
inherent in More’s construction of utopia as a commitment “to the common good” 
based on “the sharing of everything” (Miller, xviii) when such a society is in fact a 
community of subjects with subjective desires.  
 
UTOPIA AND STASIS  
In Le Guin’s text, the utopian community spends much of its time claiming 
that the material components of the metaphorical constructs that surround its 
ideology do not exist in order to be able to insist that the resulting relationships are 
universal within the ideology and determined by a set of simple rules that are easily 
followed. The result of this claim is stasis, a state that Philip E. Smith, in his 
discussion of Kropotkin’s work and its influence on Le Guin, notes is one that both 
writers’ texts decry, stating, “both Kropotkin and Le Guin agree that their [anarchic] 
societies must never become static” (84).  In the case of The Dispossessed, that static 
state is one that exists as a frozen form of a series of single subjective conceptions of 
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what is utopic.57  Such a state of being calls into question whether the anarchic 
utopia of Anarres is a utopia at all.  In fact, as Darko Suvin has noted, “Interests and 
values decisively shape all perception: it was Marx’s great insight that no theory or 
method can be understood without the practice of social groups to which it 
corresponds” (Circumstances, 536).  In other words, context is necessary in that it 
allows us to recognize that in identifying the results of the actions of the community 
as a whole as well as those of specific individuals one can recognize the likely 
motivations of such actions and realize that the universality many inhabitants of 
Anarres claim for the rules determining their behavior does not exist as separate 
from the act or the actor.  In fact, rather than the rule as a producer of universality, 
those rules are metaphorical extensions that create subjectivity and deny the very 
universality they claim.  As each subject advances their subjective act, regardless of 
any expansion of that act into a general rule, the possibility of a universal truth drops 
away – not to deny the possibility of utopia – but to suggest that each moment in 
utopia is both subjective and in need of constant re-creation by the subject.  So, in 
constructing her “Ambiguous Utopia,” Le Guin makes note of the need to “preserve 
a dynamic of continual social change” (Smith, 84) and insists that even the most 
compromised attempts at utopia must be created as stratified temporal landscapes – 
moments and timelines that exist simultaneously – and ones that must be understood 
as engagements in metaphor. 
                                                          
57 It is the idea of a frozen utopia in stasis that Donna R. White suggests allows for criticism of the 
critics who follow in her discussion of Bulent Somay’s “Toward an Open Ended Utopia.”   
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  Utopia has been a staple in SF58 for as long as the genre has been recognized, 
with a false utopia built into what some consider the first text, H.G. Wells’ The Time 
Machine.59  That said, it is a conception that has waxed and waned as one writer 
after the next found the potentially insurmountable stumbling blocks, including that 
multiplicity of subjects and the resulting subjectivity within each imagined utopian 
community that limits and becomes rigid shifting utopia to dystopia almost from the 
moment of inception.  Even assuming the possibility of overcoming the subjective 
nature of utopia, the great problem with utopia – stasis – is still extant because, as 
Naomi Jacobs puts it, “Utopia was once quantifiable, material, and inorganic, its 
superiority could be seen, in the symmetry and clarity with which it imitated an 
elegantly balanced and stable divine creation” (Beyond, 109).  But of course, that 
symmetry is dependent on stasis, as made clear in Jacob’s later comparison to da 
Vinci’s human figure within a circle, noting that “we can see both the lovely 
symmetries of the classical ideal and its ultimate falseness,” ending with “This is not 
a figure in movement” (109).  It is within that missing movement that utopia must 
exist if it is not to become dystopia. 
                                                          
58 Concepts of Utopia have existed for centuries and have long been considered both an element of SF 
and a separate genre that exists under categorization of Utopian Studies. In Donna R. White’s 
incredibly useful text Dancing with Dragons: Ursula K. Le Guin and the Critics, she notes the 
different opinions as to which is the precursor to the other and that the “middle-of-the-road opinion is 
that some utopias are science fiction and some are not, depending on whether or not the work 
incorporates scientific progress or is set in the future” (82).  Jane L. Donawerth and Carol A. 
Kolmerten also discuss the “overlap” in “the notions of utopia, science fiction, and fantasy” (2), 
noting Suvin’s similar language – his use of the term “estrangement” – in discussing utopia and SF 
(3). 
59 I do not say since the genre has existed because, as previously discussed, there is little agreement 
on when and with which text the genre began.  Wells’ text is considered the beginning of the genre by 
some (those who require technology as a hallmark that determines inclusion in the genre) because of 




Because the very foundations of utopia include personal choice, any utopia 
that requires stasis will by definition shift to dystopia, as implied by Le Guin’s 
subtitle – “An Ambiguous Utopia” and her single reference to Anarres as “a prison 
camp” (2).  What makes Le Guin’s utopia ambiguous rather than false is a 
combination of the reorganization of the way in which pleasure is shifted from a 
defining feature of utopia – a “germ of obsession that infects so many detailed 
descriptions of the ideal society” (Jacobs, Beyond, 109).  Instead, pleasure holds a 
single position as one of many decision-making scales and determiners.  But even 
more to the point, in dealing with the idea of stasis in utopia in The Dispossessed, Le 
Guin’s most important shift is in setting the conceptual structures of the text within 
Shevek’s conceptual quest to understand the interaction between simultaneity and 
sequence that restructures our understanding of the nature of utopia’s relationship 
with time.  As such, we must consider the metaphors that produce both stasis and 
movement within the text. 
As previously discussed, in her introduction to the 2003 edition of The Left 
Hand of Darkness, Le Guin writes, “All fiction is metaphor.  Science fiction is 
metaphor.  What sets it apart from older forms of fiction seems to be its use of new 
metaphors” (np),60 going on to include W.S. Di Piero statement that “truth is a 
matter of the imagination” (intro LHD, np).  Although simple statements, the 
referenced metaphors are not simple concepts; rather, they require a multi-faceted, 
phenomenological approach to objects and constructs which we tend to treat as solid 
                                                          
60 This idea is mirrored both by Nietzsche discussion of language as metaphor and Suvin’s statement 
that “every theoretical explanation is thus also a metaphoric redescription” (Novum, 5).  
Sheckler 96 
 
and knowable, such as narrative, knowledge, and our relationship with time.  The 
ability to project possible outcomes that will occur in the future as a result of present 
actions, to imagine a timeline that stretches forward and back, or construct a 
narrative from language all require a move into the abstract and the philosophical, 
i.e. the ability to layer a metaphorical understanding onto a material interaction.  As 
discussed previously, according to Jacques Derrida such a move is by nature a 
philosophical one, one in which metaphor and philosophy are linked so thoroughly 
that a move to philosophy must include a move to metaphor (ibid).  By evoking 
metaphor in ideas that we take as facts and interact with in material ways, like “the 
future” and “fiction,” Le Guin insists that the relationship between object/action and 
metaphor is repositioned within the philosophical, as we “mark, organize, and clarify 
temporal experience” (Ricoeur, Rule, 3).61  In an automatic and overt move to the 
philosophical, we expand our conception of each relationship and the resulting 
perception in order to situate the resulting information within the confusing world 
that is our “temporal experience” (ibid).  From this position, for the reader, metaphor 
becomes indispensable – in particular, within narrative – a part of what Jim Jose 
calls “collaboration between the author and the reader . . .crucial to a story’s 
success” (181), and we apply those metaphorical clarifications almost without 
thinking, creating a complex and layered grid of interaction that allows for “the 
disclosure and creation of new forms of meaning” (Theodorou, 3/23).  Thus, 
                                                          




considering Le Guin’s statements, her work is most effectively accessed through a 
consideration of the foundational metaphors of any given text. 
In The Dispossessed the foundational metaphors are the wall with which the 
opening scene begins, the promise as not a metaphor itself but a structural 
relationship with society within time that mirrors the structures of metaphor, the 
ansible (the technology that allows for instantaneous communication regardless of 
distance) made possible by Shevek’s “General Temporal Theory” with which his trip 
to Urras ends, Shevek’s open hands, and of course, as in most Le Guin novels, the 
journey that spirals around to end in a parallel position to where it had begun.  These 
acts/objects and their metaphorical extensions create the conceptual arc of the text, 
reflecting the Odonian62 precept that “To be whole is to be part; true voyage is to 
return” (Le Guin, TD, 84).  The claim sets up a circular conception of both time and 
interaction, an interconnection of repetition that includes the understanding that each 
of those repetitions must remain fluid and is, in consequence, a new creation in each 
new moment of its existence.  In other words, according to the text, to function, to 
organize, to govern oneself with respect for the Other, one must balance that which 
separates with that which connects, understanding that to manage that balance 
requires full ownership of personal action in simultaneous juxtaposition to 
communal existence in which the present moment and the potential future both exist; 
as such, the relationship exists as a multifaceted and metaphorical connection in 
which respect for the self and the other is balanced. 
                                                          




Self and other is the relationship that is most central to The Dispossessed, 
whether that other is one’s neighbor on Anarres, an anarchic and communal (in that 
there is no personal property ownership) society, or the “propertarians” of Urras who 
the inhabitants of Annares refuse to see as relevant in any form but that of a threat.  
The relationship between the two oppositional communities63 is fraught both 
historically (the inhabitants of the moon/planet64 Anarres are exiles/emigrants from 
the planet Urras) and within the contemporary timeline of the text because the 
resources of the moon are necessary to Urras and still mined by the Odonians of 
Anarres only because of the threat Urras poses to the pacific community that inhabits 
the moon.  As such, contact is limited, as is represented within the first major 
metaphor of the novel introduced in the first words of the narrative, i.e. the wall that 
surrounds the space port of Anarres.65  The wall is a figurative representation of 
most – though not all – of the citizens’ attitudes as to the most effective relationship 
between the two worlds but is doubly important in that it signals the existence of 
those invisible, metaphorical walls within the text that are attempts to regulate others 
within an anarchic system that officially denies the right to regulate anyone.  
However, regardless of those claims, those regulations – those walls – do exist and 
                                                          
63 Donald Theall notes that the placement of the “capitalist aggressive and competitive . . . world of 
Urras” and “the anarchist satellite world of Anarres” is a move that reflects More’s “juxtaposition of 
Books I and II” (Theall, 256), a move that is continued throughout utopian fiction through Swift to 
the present day. 
64 Whether Anarres is a twin planet or a moon is a shifting reference within the text, a fact which 
suggests and mirrors the problem of subjective position that underlies so many of the interactions of 
The Dispossessed; after all, a twin planet appears as a moon when standing on the surface of its twin,  
just as a position on a polarity privileges whichever end one views from allowing only a rigid and 
limited view of all the elements caught within the relationship. 
65 Here I would like to direct the readers’ attention back to Philip E. Smith’s text on Le Guin and 
Kropotkin as a useful subsidiary text.  His discussion tracks an interesting reading of the metaphor of 
the wall which is, while not entirely relevant here, worth considering. 
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as such, create one stratum within the layers of the metaphor of the wall in that they 
are invisible and thus un-addressable limitations to various forms of access.  But to 
begin we need to address that single physical limiting wall around the space-port. 
 
THE WALL 
The figure of the wall in The Dispossessed is a doubly effaced metaphor 
from which both the material referent and linguistic figure has been removed leaving 
the remaining conceptual metaphor to act as a highly adaptive and damaging free-
agent within the society, a force which is both radical and slippery, and functions 
through borrowed and manufactured consent.66  In general, walls exist to separate 
and communication exists to connect (whether that connection is well-intentioned or 
not – after all, one needs to connect in order to control), and as such both exist as 
master tropes and materialized metaphors.  Thus, to consider the use of metaphor 
and its connection to governance in The Dispossessed one must begin with the wall.  
The wall – in fact any wall – is, as Le Guin writes, “ambiguous, two-faced” because 
“[w]hat was inside it and what was outside it depended on which side of it you were 
on” (1), a statement that evokes the ways in which walls command, restrict, and 
define – i.e. govern – people, or as Winter Elliot puts it, “walls . . . isolate and 
regulate” (150).  In each case, whether one is protected or denied by a wall, walls are 
a matter of governance, and walls are central in determining who is a stranger and 
                                                          
66 The concept of manufactured consent begins with Antonio Gramsci in his statement that the “State 
does have and request consent, but it also ‘educates’ this consent” (527).  The idea has been used by 
other theorists, including Noam Chomsky, and is applicable in this text specifically to determinative 
metaphor, but as well, is relevant to effaced metaphor. 
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who is a legitimate inhabitant as made abundantly clear in the materialized metaphor 
that exists in Donald Trump’s conception of border security between the United 
States and Mexico.   
In the novel, although there is only a single, official wall on Anarres (despite 
that plethora of unofficial walls which will be discussed later) which exists to 
separate the community from its nemesis, Urras – a capitalist oligarchy – the 
presence of that single wall around the Port of Anarres offers a suggestion as to the 
reason the community is in the process of failing as an Odonian/anarchic system at 
the start of the novel.  It is the existence of this wall and the accompanying 
metaphorical constructs that indicate the failure to enact the basic Odonian precept 
of allowing space for the new and the alternative – that much-touted freedom of the 
Odonian (45) – the space for both personal choice and “mutual aid” (61),67 i.e. 
respect for self and the Other.  In fact, that single wall limits that space both 
materially and ideologically.  Existing both on the ground and in the minds of the 
failed Odonians of Anarres (not all Odonians are failed), the wall is an indication of 
the problems Anarres has attempted to leave behind, and it is ignored, in part, 
because of its innocuous nature: “An adult could look right over it and even a child 
could climb it” (ibid).  As well, the fact of its single existence allows the people of 
Anarres to believe they have created a free state, that the refusal indicated by the 
wall is only a refusal of interaction with that which is outside the wall, the “thousand 
                                                          
67 Here Kropotkin’s influence is quite explicit in Le Guin’s repeated use of “mutual aid” as a 
foundation of Anarres society.  Mutual Aid is, of course, the title of Kropotkin’s response to Huxley’s 
claim that social Darwinism was and is unavoidable, a response in which he argues that cooperative 
groupings are more successful than strictly competitive ones. 
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million” others who would “wipe us out” (44).  As such, the wall becomes a 
“necessity” and an unavoidable anomaly; except, of course, it is not an anomaly at 
all.  Rather, it is a sign that signals the hidden infrastructures that have evolved 
beneath the appearance of anarchic “brotherhood.” 
Although Anarres is a self-described anarchic community based on shared 
resources and work, one in which there is no property, the fact of that single wall, 
despite its humble form, signals the existence of something within the wall that must 
be protected – i.e. something that can be owned? – a position which is always a static 
state.  In creating that single, material wall, what is also created is the metaphorical 
extensions of separation and protection/ownership in an interconnection of the 
corresponding semic fields that include limitation and definition, and in 
consequence, the community must create other invisible walls to maintain the 
“owned” state created by this one wall.  Once the need to protect one’s “property” – 
be that property material or abstract – exists, the metaphorical extensions of that 
relationship cannot be avoided.  The resulting system is one that supports a kind of 
“property ownership” in that belonging to that system allows ownership/rights to the 
community, and of course, such a system automatically creates a series of 
“strangers” – i.e. those who are noncompliant or unwilling to support the series of 
lies necessary to the continuance of the system as is.  Thus, in that one material 
construct, that one action, the state of Anarres as an Odonian anarchy fails.  
 The fact that Anarres is failing seems incontestable when one considers the 
corrupt system Shevek faces throughout his attempts to continue his non-partisan 
research in physics as well as the violent resistance his trip to Urras receives (any 
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contact with Urras is seen as a threat).  The violence is not a reaction to Shevek 
himself; rather, it is a general response to any question regarding changes to the 
status quo and the invisible hegemony.  This response can be seen in the way in 
which the Music syndics “can’t hear” (175) Salas’ complex, non-linear, non-
progressive music and the response to Tirin’s “anti-Odonian” comedic play and his 
resulting “punishment” that is never categorized as such, but rather, is presented as 
an arbitrary result of Divlab’s (Division of Labor) nonpartisan organization of work 
assignments.  Over and over again, Tirin is set to work on a road crew rather than as 
a mathematician (169), the position which reflects his passion and his training.  
These responses, as well as Sabul’s refusal to allow Shevek to share his (Shevek’s) 
work in theoretical physics or communicate with physicists on Urras unless Sabul is 
named as coauthor (an example of the ways in which Sabul “steals ideas from 
others” [Jaekle, 87]), suggest that, despite claims to anarchy (constantly open to 
change and personal choice) and a society without property, Anarres has become 
embedded in a system that is ruled by the invisible hand of the norm by “experts.”  
These “experts” go unquestioned because the “property” they own is abstract rather 
than material, and the walls with which they protect said “property” are also abstract 
and exist only as effaced metaphors that have been loosed from their material 
counterweight, ideas that exist despite having been worn away yet are not fully 
metaphorized.  As such, the consent required by these metaphors is no longer 
informed consent but instead borrowed from the consent offered in the past to those 
earlier living metaphors that act as foundation and source to the effaced metaphor.  
As such, the effaced metaphor offers both the presumptive power of the 
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metaphorized word that we accept with the same unquestioning acceptance as we do 
the literal while also offering the extension of the figurative without the need for the 
informed consent of the receiver.  Such are the invisible walls that exist at every turn 
on Anarres, walls that are cared for and used by that horde of “experts.”   
The experts of Annarres exist in multiple forms and inhabit a variety of 
positions that comprise the organizing – and de facto regulating – institutions of the 
community.  Despite claims that there is no governing body on Anarres, that system 
can be worked against the non-cooperative by those already in power; in the case of 
Shevek, by Sabul.  Sabul, whose “man” Shevek must be if he is to move to the more 
prestigious university at Abbenay (58),68 is attempting to maintain a status quo in 
which he retains his position as expert.  The fact that he is not an expert at all but 
rather a plagiarist makes the situation worse.  His fraudulent state creates his 
profound sense of vulnerability (in Jaekle’s work, discussion of Sabul’s 
machinations is categorized under the section on “fear” [87]), resulting in Sabul’s 
refusal to allow the publication of any new idea that he cannot claim (own) through 
appropriation or even understand, as is true in the case of Shevek’s research and 
theories.  In other words, as Sabul cannot or will not retain his position as expert 
through advancing his knowledge, in order to retain that position, he must attempt to 
keep the state of that knowledge in stasis – a direct contradiction to anarchy, which 
is defined by a state of change.  As Laurence Davis writes in his essay “The 
                                                          
68 This moment is mirrored in the Urras sections of the text when the professors of Ieu Eun University 
speak to Shevek of “his man” (the servant Efor) (69), and Shevek is confused.  The repeated words 
serve to connect Sabul to the “propertarians” of Urras, a connection that is made directly by Takver 
later in the novel.  
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Dynamic and Revolutionary Utopia of Ursula K. Le Guin,” anarchy must exist as “a 
genuinely dynamic and revolutionary utopia in which the past never assumes a final 
shape and the future never shuts its doors” (4).   So Sabul’s need to hold the study of 
physics in stasis (his rewriting and truncating Shevek’s theories where possible and 
claiming those theories as his own where not) forecloses all avenues of advancement 
because he himself cannot advance along with the study of physics, or – as Jaekle 
puts it – Sabul builds “walls around physics” (87).  Although the study of physics 
may not seem to directly impact society, the precepts of anarchy do not apply only to 
the everyday choices but act as an interconnected system and may fail in any number 
of spaces or moments; as such, Sabul’s truncating of Shevek’s theories is an 
interaction and a moment in which the Odonian anarchy fails.   
In fact, Sabul’s control of Shevek’s theories is directly linked to his control 
of the means of communication with the physicists on Urras as he builds a 
metaphorical wall (the only access through which he controls) that can be directly 
linked to the material wall around the Port of Anarres that stands between Anarres 
and Urras, and between Shevek and other physicists.  If Sabul does not 
“recommend” a theory for publication, the state will not publish the theory; as well, 
the theory will not be passed on to Urras (with whom the scientists of Anarres are in 
semi-illicit contact) (159).  Even letters to other physicists are stopped if Sabul does 
not approve them, and “[h]e will not approve those that deal with subjects outside 
his own brand of Sequency physics” (159).69  As such, (that is, as a barrier that limits 
                                                          
69 Sequency physics is a term coined by Le Guin which argues for a linear time line and a cause and 
effect-based material existence.  Sabul is an “expert” in sequency physics and baulks when Shevek 
moves into simultanaiety. 
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the movements of ideas) the wall around the Port of Anarres, that small circle that 
seems to leave free access to all but those enclosed meters, seen as a metaphor rather 
than an innocuous, material barrier, allows comprehension of the size of that which 
has been cordoned off.70   
In setting off the space port of Anarres, what has been disallowed or set apart 
is the universe – both material and abstract – and because the scope of even the 
material “universe” is too large and amorphous for anyone to claim full 
comprehension, the universe must be viewed metaphorically.  Only metaphorically 
can most of us (mathematicians and cosmologists may be the exceptions – but likely 
even they are not exempt) understand the universe as a whole.  In that recognition, 
we must also recognize that the whole includes Anarres, and in including Anarres, 
we must include Shevek’s work and his need to be in contact with other physicists – 
a right that is denied by both Sabul and the community.  Accordingly, when Anarres 
shuts away the universe, that single act expands to create other limitations that occur 
over and over again within the text in the invisible walls that are extensions of the 
material wall that surrounds the port.  Those walls, like many other metaphors in the 
text, are effaced and decentered metaphors constructed through a disconnect from 
the material component of the metaphor, but also, through Annares’ relationship 
with language. 
As Shevek notes, in moving to Anarres, the Odonian settlers were romantics 
and idealists who felt that to deconstruct old systems in which all were indoctrinated 
                                                          
70 The repositioning of view point from inside Anarres to outside Anarres is likely the reason for Le 
Guin’s single characterization of Anarres as a “prison camp” (2) despite the text’s overall 
characterization of Anarres as a noble – if flawed – experiment.   
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a new language was necessary: the language Pravic.  What is most interesting in Le 
Guin’s conception of Pravic, for the purposes of this essay, lies as much in the 
exclusions as the inclusions.  For instance, possessive pronouns do exist, but are for 
the most part unusual and unused within daily interactions in Pravic:  
The singular forms of the possessive pronoun in Pravic were used mostly for 
emphasis; idiom avoided them.  Little children might say “my mother,” but 
very soon they learned to say “the mother.”  Instead of “my hand hurts,” it 
was “the hand hurts me,” and so on; “to say this one is mine and that’s 
yours” in Pravic, one said, “I use this one and you use that.” (Le Guin, TD, 
58) 
In their attempt to change the citizens’ relationship with property, the community 
begins with the foundations of interchange, excluding the words that allow for 
expression of that particular emotion or association.  Such a removal – such a 
method in constructing a language – can be construed as a removal of that important 
step that is informed consent.  In this refusal to allow for any but approved 
relationships in the language, the need for consent to that refusal fades into the far 
past of the original conception of the language.  In this case, that restriction of 
consent only allows for the measurable, the material and the communal, an act which 
creates an erasure of a multiplicity of interconnected semic meanings including the 
idea of belonging – i.e. hand to body – in the erasure of the idea of possession.  As 
well, in Pravic, all swear words are borrowed from Iotic (the language of Urras) 
because “Farigv [presumably the linguist in charge of the process] didn’t provide 
any swear words when he invented the language, or if he did his computers didn’t 
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understand the necessity” (Le Guin, TD, 234).  Swear words, whether they are direct 
metaphors (usually analogies) or not, are closely related to metaphor in that they 
provide for expression of the immeasurable.  The statement that the “computers 
didn’t understand the necessity” can be directly connected to that exclusion from the 
measurable as the decision of a computer must be based on what can be measured.  
That said, Pravic does, of course, include metaphor. 
Pravic’s metaphors are ever-present and exist primarily within discussions 
between the characters as to whether or not something is acceptable, likely because 
decisions as to what is acceptable or not are nearly always subjective and the 
standards by which one decides that acceptability are too often invisible.  In other 
words, such discussions are seldom presented as measurable, and thus, such 
conversations in Pravic are filled with references to whether an idea or statement is 
“organic” (45) or “excremental” (162).  Clearly these usages are metaphors, but the 
metaphors used most commonly in Pravic are metaphorized words that create 
“cultural coherence” (Lakoff, Metaphor, 22) and, as such, are unrecognizable to the 
speaker and require no consent because the decision as to meaning exist only in the 
past within the origins of the language.  Only when stepping into new or forbidden 
territory do Shevek and his friends use blatant and unapologetic metaphor, as in their 
discussions of the “wall.” They use the expression because the literal statement is 
both unavailable – there cannot be oppression on Anarres because the community is 
the answer to oppression – and immaterial – subjective terms presented as objective 
terms (such as “good” and “bad”) are impossible to question because their position 
as subjective has been denied.  As such, metaphor itself is regarded as a perverse 
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force; on a planet which exists within the regions of marginality, excess is 
“excremental” and metaphor is tainted by that hint of excess.  This dislike of 
metaphor matters because it adds to the construction of effaced metaphors within the 
society as a whole. 
 If, as stated previously, Anarras denies the metaphors that construct the 
central ideology and governing factors of the system by removing the physical 
examples of those metaphors – the wall being the obvious and ubiquitous example – 
that position is immediately reified in the creation of the idea of the metaphor as less 
legitimate.  Not only are their no walls on Anarres, but there is also no legitimate 
position from which to explore the idea of those metaphorical walls within the 
language – no metaphorical metalanguage as discussed by Roman Jakobson as 
necessary (Aphasia, 235).  In other words, the position Le Guin presents us with is a 
double effacement of the metaphor, but she makes clear that, effaced or not, 
provisions within the language or not, the metaphor remains extant.  The idea is 
profound because it suggests that a metaphor can exist regardless of the existence of 
material component, and as well, without the linguistic form of metaphor as an 
accepted figure, suggesting that a metaphor is not linear as the simple cause and 
effect structure of Lakoff and Johnson quoted earlier insists.  Instead, the removal of 
the linear cause and effect construction suggests that living metaphor is an 
interconnected whole that exists in necessity, produced by an idea that will be 
expressed in one way or another.  That said, and as the text makes clear, a doubly 
effaced metaphor is a dangerous metaphor indeed, as suggested by the way 
metaphorical walls limit the movements of the people of Annarres. 
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 The invisible state and the consequent unmeasurable effects of the 
metaphorical extensions of that wall on Annarres make the resulting limitations 
difficult to surmount because that invisible and unmeasurable nature allows for 
attacks from both sides limiting both the will and the need to act.  As Claire P. Curtis 
notes, “The death of hope is found in both the pessimism that says nothing can be 
done and the complacency that says nothing needs to be done” (277).  To return to 
Derrida’s concept of the effaced metaphor (that disconnect from the material 
component of the metaphor), Anarres’ relationship to demands and requirements 
which claims walls (objects) and commands (actions) no longer exist within the 
Anarres social order has been cut loose from – or has “effaced”– the object of the 
wall and left the metaphor itself as unattached.  Meanwhile, using a language that 
delegitimizes the figure of metaphor creates a second level of effacement.  As such, 
effaced metaphor becomes a free, agent, making the question of how to handle the 
invisible walls both irrelevant and impossible to tackle (thus setting up Curtis’ 
equation) while the situation denies the need for consent, and as such, manufactures 
the very consent it denies as necessary.   
The very lack of walls and rules on Anarres “break[s] the link with the sense 
of a particular being, that is, with the totality of what is” (Derrida, White, 9), leaving 
a system which is dis-organized through a disengagement between the word and 
act/object – in this case restrictive walls as objects – and as well, delegitimizes the 
very notation of the figure by which the phenomena can be discussed (metaphor) and 
thus leaps the moment that in a living metaphor would include consent.  However, 
despite these refusals of a metaphorical relationship, the metaphor does not cease to 
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exist; rather, it becomes rigid as the metaphorical gears fail to mesh.  In its doubly 
effaced state, the metaphor becomes static in its disconnect from its context – both 
material and linguistic – and with only the immaterial portion of the metaphor 
available, consent from the receiver of the metaphor can no longer be a variable as 
the relationship between material and abstract is no longer apparent.  The 
construction makes informed consent impossible, putting in its place a borrowed 
moment from a distant past.  As such, the system is immovable, a “white mythology. 
. . which has effaced in itself that fabulous scene which brought it into being” 
(ibid),71 and as such, vulnerable to abuse.  Because the wall only definitely exists in 
a material form around the Port and is consequently out of sight and because 
metaphor itself is an illicit linguistic act, the invisible, metaphorical walls can exist 
at every turn, particularly in the repeated claims that there are no walls/government 
while claiming the right to limit Shevek’s choices because he has “adopt[ed] a 
course harmful to others” (355).  Such a statement/wall is particularly effective as it 
presupposes the definition of the word “harmful” as a solid fact rather than a 
subjective opinion, the presumptive “fact” creating a fallacious and invisible 
limitation that disallows any action the person in the position of power deems 
“harmful.”   
As such, facing both the politics of the University in Abbenay and the 
disapproval of the community, Shevek is mired in inaccurately categorized fields of 
conflict and unable to effect progress in his work or, when he does manage to 
                                                          
71 Note that Derrida’s construct of the “fabulous scene” does not include the elision of the figure 
within the language.  As such, I am expanding the “fabulous scene” to include the linguistic forms.  
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progress, is unable to share that work.  When Shevek cannot identify what has gone 
wrong on Anarres, his friend Bedap identifies the cause of the frustration as “[t]he 
wall.  You’ve come up against the wall” (164).  Accessing that illegitimate figure, 
metaphor, Bedap is speaking about the way in which public opinion in combination 
with insidious corruption of Divlab (Division of Labor) and the PDC, who 
“recommend” postings for the citizens of Anarres, determine what is done or not 
done on Anarres and thus in people’s lives.  Both departments are intended to create 
a fair and neutral decision-making system for necessary work division but are, in 
fact, used to punish and quell those who are not willing or able to comply (as made 
clear by the Tirin’s repeated posting to road crews and Shevek’s posting away from 
the University and his family when he will not comply with Sabul).  As Shevek 
finally comes to see, “We’ve made laws, laws of conventional behavior, built walls 
all around ourselves, and we can’t see them, [sic] because they’re part of our 
thinking” (331).  The walls have become effaced as the hegemonic influence of 
community opinion spirals becoming ever more rigid and punitive in adherence to a 
status quo that reflects and reifies a systemic fear of change which will only consider 
the pragmatic and the measurable. That refusal of the abstract and unmeasurable 
creates a state which Jaekle notes is an “internal threat” to “[a]n anarchy based on 
the complementarity between individual freedom and social responsibility” (85), and 
one which – of course – creates limitations and dictates behavior and choice.   
The laws and walls of which Shevek speaks and the resulting rigidity of the 
community is a direct reflection of the policy on Anarres to refuse contact with 
anyone other than the population of Anarres.  This refusal is most easily attributed to 
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a fear of the Other, specifically figured as “strangers” and links Anarres back to 
Urras because only a form of “propertarian” ideology suggests some belong and 
others do not.  As such, it is also a response that can be figured as an attempt at 
ownership.  As previously discussed, those laws/walls must be, as Shevek notes, 
invisible in their effaced, silenced, yet metaphorical state because the ideology on 
which Anarres is based casts such desires regarding possession and stasis as 
unacceptable.  However, the overarching refusal of contact that exists in the material 
wall and the metaphorical extensions of that wall is an attempt to possess an 
unchanging utopic state, as are the attempts by Divlab and the PDC to control the 
movement and work of dissenters.  Sabul’s desires to “own” his position at the 
University (his mini-utopia) rather than fill that position as the ablest to do the job (a 
fact stated overtly by Takver in her exclamation that Sabul is a “profiteer!” a “petty-
minded, envious little Odo-spouter!” [239]), and that desire is both a result of and a 
contributory factor to the corruption into which Anarres has fallen in its attempts to 
“own” utopia.  It is Sabul and Rulag’s (Shevek’s biological mother and main 
combatant in his attempt to travel to Urras) and the community’s belief that “the 
future is something which . . .  has been attained” (Ferns, 258) and thus completed – 
i.e. static – while they claim adherence to the precepts of Odo (change and freedom), 
and their additional belief that that future can be maintained in a static state that 
creates the failure of the very state they claim to have achieved.   
The moment one believes the anarchic state attained (i.e. completed), the 
desire to maintain (i.e. own) that state refutes anarchy through the rejection of the 
change that defines that ideological state.  “Propertarian” instincts come in all sorts 
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of disguises.  Sabul and Rulag and co.’s refusal to admit to and relinquish their 
“propertarian” instincts (that is, control over choices made on Anarres and the 
definition of what it is to be Odonian) combined with their desire to be able to make 
the claim that Anarres places no limits on its citizens creates the effacement of the 
material walls while reifying those walls in a metaphorical and invisible state, all of 
which makes change difficult to effect.  As such, in its refusal of the necessary 
fluidity of anarchy, i.e. in the multiple attempts to disrupt any change in the way 
utopia is realized, the community’s relationship with time is also disrupted, as 
Shevek’s discussion of the relationship between a promise and one’s existence 
within time denotes. 
 
THE PROMISE  
Despite an abstract facet to their make up that creates a form of 
postponement reminiscent of the distance inherent in metaphor, promises are not 
metaphors; they are too literal and to overt to be considered as figurative. That said, 
Le Guin/Shevek’s discussion of the promise and its relationship to time both reflects 
and sheds light on the way acts of will and metaphors function, reifying the 
existence of the role consent plays in each interaction, and as such, creating a 
parallel between the two forms.  In order to consider a promise a metaphor, one 
would need to return to Nietzsche’s characterization of all language as metaphor.  
Language takes on a presentation of “truth” in that when a word has been understood 
as a direct stand-in for an object, action, or idea over time, the replacement of one 
for the other takes on the appearance of a kind of inevitability, as Nietzsche states, 
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[I]f a precept has been reproduced millions of times and has been the 
inheritance of many successive generations of man, and in the end 
appears each time to all mankind as the result of the same cause, then 
it attains finally for man the same importance as if it were the unique, 
necessary precept and as if that relation between the original nerve-
stimulus and the percept produced were a close relation of causality. 
(Nietzsche, 8) 
As such, all language exists as a form of effaced metaphor; however, in order to 
make use of language one must attempt to move past language’s metaphorical state 
and accept the presumptive response to language as a causal reaction in which the 
object and the word are automatically accepted as interchangeable.  From this 
standpoint and within such a configuration of the relationship, promises are not 
metaphors.  However, in that overt equation of “I promise” to “I act to complete the 
promise” is an entirely visible production of Ricoeur’s discussion of acts of will.   
As discussed previously, Ricoeur breaks down any act of will into three 
steps: decision, movement, and consent.  The equation is interesting in that it breaks 
down the method by which we make decisions, but also in that it reflects – almost 
directly – the structure of metaphor, except that, for a metaphor to be a living 
metaphor, i.e. constructive and functional, the moment of consent is shared and 
repeated in each interchange.  Both the person who vocalizes and the one who 
receives must consent to the impertinence of the predication in order that said 
predication becomes pertinent and the metaphor be successful.  In a promise, that 
equation is reorganized: “I decide” is followed by “I consent” – that is, “I promise” – 
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to “move my body” some time in the future.  But again, even if the promise is to 
oneself, the extension into the future means that there is a double moment of 
consent, either the consent of another person, or the consent of another self – the self 
who will enact the promise in the future.  Shevek’s discussion of the relationship 
between promises and time – a discussion that ironically and importantly takes place 
during Vea’s cocktail party in which the social roles are played out in their 
multiplicity of power positions; the “shyer man” speaks “not at all shyly” while out-
going Vea seems “relieved to be put in her place” (224) – suggests that consent in 
this position acts as a foray into the unknown, if only the limited unknown of one’s 
intentions in a different time and space.   
In fact, Shevek claims that a promise is both a recognition of the past and a 
commitment to the future,72 and a broken promise “is to deny the reality of the past; 
therefore, it is to deny the hope of a real future” (225).  In Anarres, the promise is 
supposed to have taken the place of governmental structures; both the grand promise 
of anarchy and each individual promise of each individual member of the 
community to freedom and “mutual aid” (61) act as a relationship with the 
                                                          
72 This construction of a promise reflects the more general idea of a performative speech act. Theory 
of performative speech acts begins with J.L. Austin’s coining of the term to delineate speech acts that 
“act,” that are “constative” (3), a promise being one form of performative speech act: “the uttering of 
the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described 
as, or as ‘just’, saying something” (5).  The most direct example of a performative statement are 
pronouncements such as marriage or guilt.  From Austin the theory moves on through Jacques 
Derrida’s essay “Signature, Event, Context” in which Derrida broadens the scope of influence of the 
performative statement through repetition and public display, suggesting far-reaching, uncontrolled 
implications: “In such a typology, the category of intention will not disappear; it will have its place, 
but from that place it will no longer be able to govern the entire scene and system of utterance” 
(Signature, 18).  From Derrida we move to Butler, whose discussion of gender as a performance 
created by performative speech acts rather than a natural state an individual is born into and the ways 
in which change must be effected as a result of that hegemonic force is where we rejoin the current 
chapter.  There is a full discussion of Butler’s work in Chapter Three. 
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community as a whole.  The promise acts as a governing structure in that within the 
concept of an Odonian society, in which all is shared and the greater good is 
prioritized, a systematized governing body is not necessary or productive if the 
individual and the community consent to and enacts her/his/their promise.  In acts 
like Sabul’s “propertarian” ownership of physics as produced by his invisible 
“walls” that determine who is published and where publications appear (i.e. whether 
publications make it into the limited mail slot on freighters destined for Urras), that 
promise is broken, but it is also broken in the existence of that single boundary that 
is the wall around the Port of Anarres.   
The wall that surrounds the port denies the promise of an Odonian 
community; in fact, for the promises that construct the Odonian conception of 
society to continue, those promises must be structured in layers that work in multiple 
forms.  Shevek’s discussion of promises presents the promise as a form in which 
sequency and simultaneity must exist together: in other words, a promise is an act 
that is constructed through linear, causal relationships – I desire such and such an 
effect and make a promise to achieve that effect – but as well, is simultaneously 
extant in that the statement and act are simultaneously interconnected.  In other 
words, the promise is an act that is created through a series of interconnected and 
sequential decisions, but to exist as an unbroken promise, the promise must span – 
exist simultaneously – in the moment in which it is stated, and as well, the moment 
in which it will be completed.  As such, the promise of an Odonian anarchy must be 
enacted repeatedly, must “become a permanent revolution” (Theall, 82).  But, as 
Theall notes, “because circumstances are always changing, the return to founding 
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principles always takes society to a new place” (82) because time spirals rather than 
circles.  Or, as Le Guin notes, because time spirals, “You can go home again . . . so 
long as you understand that home is a place where you have never been” (55).  Thus, 
each new day in the revolution is a new revolution (changing state) and a next 
revolution (turn of the spiral) which exists as both the next step and a new beginning. 
So, if Shevek’s discussion of promises is correct, then promises have multi-
temporal existence in which the statement that “I will do such and such” exists in the 
moment of the statement but also in the moment of the act itself.  As such, if kept, 
the promise exists as present and future but also, in the moment of completion, as 
past at the moment when the completed act refers back to the original statement.  A 
promise that does not exist as a multi-temporal fact, is not a promise at all.  In fact, 
if, as Shevek suggests in his discussion of perspective as to whether time “flows past 
us” or whether it is “we who move forward from past to future” (221), within a kept 
promise, we exist simultaneously through the various stages of that promise, none of 
which can be left behind, suggesting that both simultaneity and sequency produce 
our lives.  In terms of the society on Anarres, each move of a member to lock down a 
particular belief or state (Rulag’s belief in the need for the wall to ensure a form of 
Odonian structure that is familiar to her, or Sabul’s desire to keep the study of 
physics in a state fully available to and controlled by him) exists as a moment in 
which the Odonian anarchy fails.  In fact, if one considers the Odonian ideology as a 
kind of promise, in order for that promise to be kept, the precepts of Odo must be 
enacted such that the anarchy can be constructed over and over again, so that each 
revolution contains a promise that loops forward to the action that in turn loops back 
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to the statement.  It is a fascinating pattern, and one that is evident within the 
structures of metaphor. 
In Le Guin’s living metaphors the same pattern occurs.  Just as the promise 
determines the action in the future, a successful metaphor determines the newly 
constructed comprehension of an abstract thought in that future with each usage 
employing language to loop between the material object or action and the abstract 
conception of the newly pertinent predication.  With each revolution – each new 
participant – a non-effaced/living metaphor returns to a new position on the spiral, 
creating new meaning that includes all the new context that exists within the new 
position of each next moment within the living metaphor.73  Because the effaced 
metaphor has lost contact with the material portion of the equation, the loops are 
disrupted and the moment of informed consent is replaced with borrowed or 
manufactured consent, all of which creates stasis – a circle rather than a spiral – that 
in turn produces the aberration of the “free agent.”  So, if we follow the metaphor of 
the wall throughout the text, the opening paragraph quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter sets up but does not limit the existence of the figure of the wall within the 
text.  Each result of a collision with the figure of the wall – Tirin’s madness, Bedaps 
despair, and Shevek’s dismissal – acts as a negative promise.  A statement, that until 
it is refused or defused, appears innocuous but blocks access to change, all the while, 
                                                          
73 This conception of the constantly reified and recreated metaphor brings a new dimension to 
Ricoeur’s conception of a living metaphor, as the metaphor must evolve and change like a living 
being – or like any utopia that manages to evade the nearly inevitable resulting dystopia.  Of course, 
this fluidity can be figured as negative – as “contagion” – as does Peta Mitchell in her text 
Contagious Metaphor, in which she makes the statement that “metaphor not only picks up the 
attributes of contagion, but also sends some of its own” (21).  The only answer to such positions is 
that all contact can be considered contagion; however, contact is inevitable and unavoidable. 
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as with all effaced metaphors, those walls must be recognized and circumvented 
before any further movement can be considered.   
 
POSSESSION: OPEN HANDS 
Although most citizens of Anarres have no interest in possessing goods, 
many are attempting to “possess” a utopic/anarchic state creating another doubly 
effaced metaphor in which possession of material goods becomes invisibly 
metaphorized in the possessive relationships enacted by the failed Odonians.  
Possession and the drive to possess is the morally repugnant converse of Anarres and 
the holy grail of Urras, and it is the lack of balance between the two that is causing 
the respective failure on the two worlds;74 however, on Annares, the desire for 
property has been transmuted, disguised and hidden through a double effacement 
within the dogma of the ideology employed by both community and state such that it 
limits the actions of those who seek change.  The dogma acts as a refusal of 
difference, in particular the difference of individuality both human and situational – 
one of the much-predicted outcomes of utopic structures, as discussed by myriad 
writers such as George Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-Four and Aldous Huxley in Brave 
New World.  Le Guin too looks at what may be an inevitable response to the need for 
constant change that is anarchy in her discussion of the communal shaming of those 
who seek privacy or demand personal rights, but she does so in a nuanced discussion 
                                                          
74 Urras’ failure is complex and would requires another chapter to discuss in full but can be 
synopsized through the repression and poverty in which a large number of the population exists while 




of the need and existence of particularity, and of where and when those rights create 
a necessary space in which to expand rather than a territorial and “propertarian” 
response.   
The foreclosure of the question of what is “propertarian” behavior falls into 
the void left by the eliding of the linguistic unmeasurable as well as the outlaw status 
of the possessive form.  When, as a young child, Shevek reacts to another child who 
has intruded into his space and blocked the sunlight he has been enjoying with a 
shove and the words “Mine sun!” (27), he is not claiming possession of the sun; 
rather, he is requiring space on the planet as well as expressing a personal need but is 
reprimanded as a budding “propertarian” (58) because of the use of the possessive 
pronoun.  Anarres has made a fetish of a refusal of the right to own property, and in 
doing so has elided the conception of self and belonging.  Just as discussed earlier, 
mothers are “the mother” and anyone’s hand is “the hand”; the idea of personal need 
has been elided, so much so, that Shevek responds uncomprehendingly to his 
professor Mitis’ statement that “you [Shevek] will be his [Sabul’s] man” (58).  The 
lack of personal pronouns is perceived as creating a fluid and mobile relationship 
with the environment including the bodies of the citizens of Anarres.  In referring to 
one’s hand as “the hand,” ownership is negated, the body is dispossessed of the 
hand, reconfiguring the hand – and consequently the body – as yet one more kind of 
tool for the organism that is the community.  Yet Le Guin suggests some kinds of 
possession are inescapable and necessary to the definition of self, and as such, the 
existence of the community.   
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Shevek’s failure to “own” his own ideas result in damage to his work, an 
“emasculated abridgement” (241) that is the result of Sabul’s blackmail and 
extortion.  As Mark Tunic notes in his essay “The Need for Walls: Privacy, 
Community and Freedom in The Dispossessed,” “without privacy and without 
property one risks losing one’s individuality” (140).  In the case of Shevek’s work as 
a physicist, he is able to do his first great work on simultaneity because he is free: 
“Lack of physical labor, lack of variety of occupation, lack of social and sexual 
intercourse, none of these appeared to him as lacks, but as freedom [sic]” (112).  The 
work comes easiest when Shevek is “unattached” allowing him to prioritize the 
work.  It is a position that only takes him so far, but even so, it does allow him the 
original gains, and in fact, later, after that first work is done and he has failed to 
claim himself and his work publicly, the results are disastrous.  Whether those 
claims are the claims of Anarres community, who demand the denial of self, or those 
of the “propertarians” of Urras, who wall Shevek in in order to harvest his work for 
profit, the ability to retain his self definition is of the utmost importance to the 
Shevek’s integrity as a physicist and a human being, and as such, to his work.  
On Anarres, at the university, Shevek suffers because his needs do not reflect 
the simplest understanding of Odonian mores.  He finds he must evolve his ideas 
beyond those of that degraded and fetishized version of Odonian ideology that 
standardizes instead of equalizes, or as John Feteke puts it, has “congealed into 
doctrine” (132), all the while being careful not to fall into a simple rejection of his 
own comprehension of what it means to be Odonian, in order to continue his 
“journey.”  It is not for nothing that we metaphorize comprehension of knowledge as 
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ownership;75 until Shevek can create or determine the defining lines of himself, he 
cannot work effectively, as made clear in his need for a private room which he 
considers as “excremental” and a “moral thorn” (110) yet finds indispensable to his 
work.  Here Le Guin returns to the question of individual and community and the 
necessary balance between the two in creating a functional interaction.   
For Shevek, talent and knowledge bring privilege, a relationship which he 
first greets with shame and guilt but comes to understand as unavoidable in his 
attempts to do work that is only available to him.76  Still, he does find balance in 
that, although he must maintain ownership when necessary, his final response to the 
work is communal in that he makes clear that the product of the work for which he 
requires privilege is not personal property, delineating the difference between 
journey and result.  Over the course of the novel, he moves from astonishment at his 
discovery that Sabul wants to “keep the new Urrasti physics private – to own it, as a 
                                                          
75 The interconnection of capitalism and the academy is a complex discussion which requires its own 
paper, but even in the most basic way, we feel we own the knowledge that we gain and/or produce.  
As a writer of both fiction and non-fiction, I have no wish to see copyright laws disappear, but their 
very existence both defines and produces a relationship that makes clear the concept of ownership 
within the structure of knowledge production. 
76 Nadia Khouri states in her text “The Dialectics of Power: Utopia in the Science Fiction of Le Guin, 
Jeury, and Piercy” that “power is usually closely interconnected in SF with knowledge itself” (49), an 
interesting statement in that it reflects the fact that Shevek’s story is not that of any other anarchist 
because his access to knowledge that is available to no one else creates a position of alterity.  Le Guin 
tends to discuss “heroes” (specifically male heroes) in her early work – less so in the more recent 
texts, in fact, Amy M. Clarke puts The Eye of the Heron as the turning point in Le Guin’s relationship 
with both feminism and the male Hero – a fact/problem she herself (Le Guin) addresses in her text 
“Places Names” in Dancing at the Edge of the World: Thoughts on Words, Women, Places, and in 
focusing on protagonists whose positions are unlike other positions, there is the danger of creating the 
very class system she is trying to critique.  That said, I have to point out here that Khouri’s text is 
itself problematic in that it fetishizes tragedy and pain, refuses to address the multiplicity of positions 
in Le Guin’s text focusing only on the polarized binary, and includes a number of inaccuracies as to 
the facts of the plot and within her logical constructions.  Most importantly, her dismissal of the 
importance of an “individual’s awareness” (53) when all change is built exactly on that primary 
position transforms her discussion into a desire for the unattainable – her specific complaint about Le 
Guin – leaving her work of limited usefulness. 
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property, a source of power over his colleagues” (109) to the statement about his 
simultaneity theory that “I am that book” (240) (a sort of personal conflation that is 
related to ownership), to his final position of offering his General Temporal Theory 
to all.  Here it is worth noting that Shevek’s is an “all” that includes Anarres, Urras 
and the Ekumen, despite Sabul’s original acquisitive/protectionist response and the 
various scientists of Urras’ urgings to give/sell the information to whichever faction 
they belong.  In fact, throughout the text, Le Guin’s most interesting living 
metaphors evolve; however, in each case, their spiraling on to the next incarnation of 
meaning only becomes fully apparent at the end of the novel in which Shevek’s open 
hands that conclude his journey become the final representation of his relationship 
with both knowledge and his community.  It is a position that results in the 
production of the ansible, a communication device that both materially and 
metaphorically changes the shape of space and time, but also a position that is 
representative of the way his “journey” – his construction of self – reflects his 
general temporal theory in that it is both sequential and exists simultaneously. 
 
COMING HOME: THE JOURNEY 
 If the effaced metaphor of the wall begins The Dispossessed, the text ends 
with the primary, foundational living metaphor – the journey.  The journey is a 
figure that exists temporally, spatially, and metaphorically in simultaneous grandeur 
produced by Shevek’s acknowledgement of and consent to a universe well beyond 
comprehension.  Like all living metaphors, the journey exists both sequentially and 
simultaneously in ever-evolving particularity that creates a fluidity that continues to 
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respond to the changing moment with its changing players and consequently never 
falls into a universalist form.  Le Guin has been interested in journeys throughout her 
career, thus creating the infrastructure of the Hainish Cycle with its need to 
reconnect the many worlds of Hain and the creation of the Ekumen.  Rather than an 
imperialist dream of colonization that a tale told about the original Hainish Empire 
would have been, Le Guin’s texts take place in a gentler moment of the interaction, a 
moment after failure, a moment already containing the tragedy of loss both of the 
colonized (WFWF) and the colonizers (LHD), as those communities – those colonies 
– have lost touch and even knowledge of one another, and are only now offered the 
opportunity to reconnect and reconstruct.77  As such, the pattern of spiraling 
movement that circles only to return to the old that is new exists, not only in each 
text, but in the conception of the series of tales, and in fact, in the structure of The 
Dispossessed itself with its two timelines and their doubled forward movement 
                                                          
77 The unequivocal postcolonial connotations of the Hainish Cycle require an analysis of their own 
which will be addressed later. What I will note here is the fraught, potentially convenient choice of 
the loss of knowledge embedded in this series.  Ekumenical agents and mobiles in various texts 
comment on and respond to the more brutal past of Hain including Gethen’s history as a genetic 
experiment in LHD and the destruction of the culture of Athshe in WFWF, as well as to other untold 
cost to the planets swallowed in the expansion.  Le Guin has chosen a point in the history of Hain 
which includes a community that promotes a much more respectful yet still intrusive reconnection 
with the human communities that are a result of that brutal past. Although the Ekumen only ever 
invites each planet to an engagement with the organization, as Genly notes in LHD, the Ekumen is at 
an advantage.  If the planet refuses the invitation, the Ekumen need merely to retreat to space and 
return days later for the mobile but generations later on the planet to try again.  That said, it is 
important to note, the landing is never forced, the Ekumen will retreat permanently after the second 
refusal, and the past is never denied. As such, the series can be considered as existing safely behind 
the blind of a kind of social amnesia/loss of information that might very well change the reader’s 
position, while taking into account Le Guin’s insistence that the past be acknowledged and 
understood as a part of the present moment.  Slightly reminiscent of E. M. Forster’s much-condemned 
and (I would argue) misconstrued statement that “We are not concerned with the very poor” (39) 
which, rather than acting as a moral statement or a social position, acts as a delimiting structure about 
the parameters of the story, Le Guin chooses her own parameters within the actions available after the 
great destruction in order to focus on the methods by which reconstruction is possible rather than the 
means by which we are destroyed.  
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through time.  As such, this section deals with the journey as a construction that 
mirrors Jacques Lacan’s desire “to leave the reader no other way out than the way in, 
which I prefer to be difficult” (as quoted by Leitch, 1278) such that we must 
understand that it is “the experience and path of difficulty that are significant” 
(Leitch, 1278).  As such, the journey and journeyer combined construct the highly 
complex metaphor that intertwines journey, acquisition of knowledge, and 
construction of self. 
 Like all the foundational metaphors in this text, the metaphor of the journey 
is layered and multifaceted, the underlying semic fields of movement, the new, and 
the unknown (to name a few) creating an interconnected web between space, time, 
and identity.  Within this web the connections create implications that suggest 
journeys exist materially, but as well, within numbers, theory, and self.  But, in order 
to work one’s way down through the layers, one must begin by noting the material 
journey Shevek makes through space, as he moves from work post to work post, first 
as a child with his father, and then as an adult in a community the mores and 
expectations of which require all adults to lend a hand where needed despite 
preferences or family connection, while claiming that all citizens have the freedom 
to choose according to their own desires.  This social requirement is important 
because the journey that takes place in the even chapters (and the past, which is – 
importantly – according to the theory of simultaneity occurring continuously) is 
often determined by those requirements.  For instance, it is because of those 
requirements that Shevek is moved to Abbenay to work on physics – because his 
capabilities are considered as valuable to the community as a whole – and it is 
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because he refuses to comply and thus threatens Sabul that he is turned away to 
return to a general work detail that separates him from his family for four years.  The 
social pressure is powerful, if oblique, and creates a need to return to the question of 
ownership of self.  Certainly, Shevek and Takver question the value and justness of a 
system that leaves less and less room for the fundamental Odonian right to freedom 
of choice: “we’re ashamed to say we’ve refused a posting.  That the social 
conscience completely dominates the individual conscience, instead of striking a 
balance with it.  We don’t cooperate – we obey.  We fear being outcast.” (330).  One 
could characterize the problem of endless movement (journey) for the sake of the 
community, as an ending to or at least as a stepping away from the journey that is 
Odonian freedom.  Because of the loss of balance, the individual has lost any 
position within an ideology that began with the individual.  In trying to continue that 
Odonian journey, Shevek must take his other great material journey within the text – 
his journey to Urras – despite the extreme social disapproval which calls even his 
physical well-being into question. 
 This second material journey is multi-layered in that it is his voyage to Urras 
that allows Shevek to complete his theory (yet another extended journey that 
stretches over months to years), but as well, to complete his return to Anarres with a 
new conception of Odonianism.  Despite Khouri’s complaint that all Le Guin 
manages is a moment of singular “awareness” of “a sounder perception of Truth” 
(53),78 for Le Guin a personal connection to the community is the point and the 
                                                          
78 “Truth” with a capital T is Khouri’s word – a concept unfitted to Le Guin’s work.  In fact, in The 
Telling, Le Guin uses the word Truth with an uppercase T to indicate a fanatic and simplified 
ideology (184) and later specifically calls into question the usage of uppercase letters to indicate 
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foundation on which everything else is built: “The Revolution is in the individual 
spirit, or it is nowhere” (Le Guin, TD, 359), what N.B. Hayles calls Le Guin’s 
consistent “refusal to sacrifice the personal to the abstract” (105).  In fact, for Le 
Guin, the individual journeys with the group and the group with the individual or the 
journey fails because in the disconnect each experience becomes “a closed cycle” 
(335); as time exists sequentially and simultaneously, the journey is sequential, but 
each moment continues to exist and influence the journey as a whole.  The spiraling 
movement through community and time is made clear in Shevek’s recognition of the 
way he is a result of all the time that seems to have been wasted doing manual labor 
away from his family, that “[t]he thing about working with time, instead of against it 
. . .is that it is not wasted.  Even pain counts” (335).  This relationship with time, is 
reflected throughout the text from his childhood thought experiment concerning the 
way a ball thrown at a tree can never reach the tree because it must always travel the 
next half distance and yet paradoxically does reach the tree, and as well in his 
discussion with Sadik, when he notes that “You can be four and almost five at the 
same time, too” (318).  All of this to say that the most important journey in the text 
is a metaphorical confluence of time, action, and self which Le Guin states matters 




                                                          
authority: “good was always an adjective, always: good food, good health, good sex, good weather.  
No capital letters.  Good or Evil as entities, warring power, never” (TT, 105). 
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OPEN HANDS: JOURNEY’S CULMINATION  
Shevek’s discovery and resulting choices reflect his relationship with his 
science in the way his General Temporal Theory suggests that time is both linear and 
circular, exists both in sequence and simultaneously.  In doing so, he incorporates 
both the objectivist’s view that an idea/concept/fact exists and thus belongs to all 
(circular time’s existence and effect whether humans observe it or not) and the 
perspectivist’s view that suggest the viewer is an active creator of what is being 
viewed (Burns, 196) (linear time as a perspective of the human who travels forward 
along a linear timeline).  As such, even in accepting the objectivist position, the 
viewer has a claim and must choose to give, incorporating both facts “into a 
logically self-consistent harmonious whole” (Burns, 202).  But the combination also 
indicates one’s comprehension of self as individual – as acting subject – combined 
with humankind as whole, or Jaekle’s complementarity: “a specific form of 
containing difference within unity” (77).   
Shevek’s evolving and metaphorical relationship with his work as self and 
acting subject suggests that, again, multiple forms of existence are simultaneously 
extant: one must own oneself such that one maintains definition enough to interact 
with the world, whether that interaction be the cognitive process necessary to create 
a comprehensive theory or the independence necessary to make a productive 
judgement, while remembering that one is a part of the whole with which one is 
interacting.  To be effective, one must simultaneously exist as independent and as a 
part of community, i.e. once the work is done, the effects must be shared by all – the 
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community (and according to Shevek/Le Guin that community is humankind) must 
be the joint recipient of all products:  
Do you not understand that I want to give this to you – and to Hain 
and the other worlds – and to the countries of Urras?  But to you all!  
So that one of you cannot use it, as A-Io wants to do, to get power 
over the others, to get richer or to win more wars.  So that you cannot 
use the truth for your private profit, but only for the common good. 
(Le Guin, TD, 345)   
Shevek’s repeated statement that he comes and goes with “empty hands” (70) is 
accurate only because his hands are open so that anything he holds is always in the 
process of being released.  As is true in the case of the journey, one cannot be in 
stasis.  So too, the open hands exist both in the moment of release and as a element 
of a on-going series of events; thus, those open, continuously releasing hands are 
constantly acting, constantly Odonian.79  On the other hand, regardless of their 
claims Rulag and Sabul are not enacting the precepts of Odo, but rather their own 
conception of what keeps them safe, a choice that places them in opposition to the 
foundational precepts of Anarres because to be truly Odonian is to be in permanent 
revolution, to understand that there is no “separation between means and end” (335).  
Odo’s precepts suggest that one must leave one’s hands open such that all that one 
has through the ownership of self is released to the community, and so, the single 
                                                          
79 The need to enact utopia expands James Bittner’s idea that Le Guin has changed utopia into a 
“uchronia” by changing the question from “where” to “when” (247), an idea discussed by White in 
her survey.  For, if, as I am arguing in this text, utopia exists only in the enactment of a utopic act, the 
question of “when” becomes predominant. 
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subject exists as individual and an inextricable portion of the group, all of which 
brings us back to that material wall that surrounds the Port of Anarres. 
In the Aristotelian conception of metaphor – i.e. the substitution of one thing 
for another – the wall around the Port of Anarres is a substitute for the idea of 
limitation, more of a sign than a metaphor, indicating the signified limit.  However, 
as a metaphor, that wall becomes far more influential, a limitation that can be 
morphed, transferred, and made invisible, one that, through Derrida’s effacement 
and Pravic’s elision of the figure, becomes a hegemonic force claiming rights to a 
consent that was offered long ago to an alternate interaction.  Such an effaced 
metaphor, such borrowed consent, is a force that determines lives and choices for all 
but the most clear-sighted and courageous, and even for those few, is an influence 
not to be ignored.  However, metaphor as a form is amoral and neutral, and works 
both sides of the issues.   
When Shevek is able to understand himself and his life metaphorically – that 
is, as a compounding of all that has happened in combination with his position as 
individual in that unique compound – both Husserl’s synthesized totality, a 
“unification” that “manifests itself in the metaphysical or continuous whole" and his 
(Husserl’s) non-synthesized rose in which all parts are only separate through “a 
distinct act of noticing” (quoted in IEP, Husserl, section 3., np) – he can begin his 
effective work despite both planets’ invisible, restrictive systems.  His recognition of 
his life as a construction, “the edifice that he and Takver were building with their 
lives” (335), combined with his return to an appreciation for the foundation of the 
Anarres society, the beauty that exists in those “other faces” (228) still extant 
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beneath the corruption, allows him to see the “reality” that “he [had] stared at. . . for 
ten years and not seen” (280).  Thus, Le Guin’s utopia does not exist in a 
“hiearchical” or “patriarchal” form that simplifies in the way it “projects male 
political goals and represses subjectivity” (Pfaelzer, 94).  Rather, it is constantly 
dynamic and allows for and requires simultaneous and interconnected interactions 
between subject and group regardless of position or gender that are completely fluid 
creating continuous change.  Such a scene is astounding in its size and variability, 
and thus, Le Guin points out that some patterns and constructions are on a scale that 
requires metaphor because some scales – even if theoretically measurable – exist 
beyond our ability to measure.   
For Shevek who works with ideas so large as to be only available through a 
combination of instinct and knowledge – ideas whose foundations are often “laid in 
the dark” but are still “well laid” (187) because of his skill and knowledge, metaphor 
is an absolutely necessary tool – one that cannot be avoided or ignored.  Whether 
discussing the vast ideas of time or his own construction as a physicist, he must deal 
in metaphor.  The need is to maintain those metaphor as living metaphor – metaphor 
that must be repeatedly enacted and consented to in each moment, constantly 
renewed in all its particularity in just the manner utopia must be re-enacted over and 
over again as it is made new in each new interaction.  As he considers his life, the 
realization that those years have not been wasted can only be understood through 
living metaphors of foundation and construction.  Only through seeing his life as a 
complex whole, his relationship as “thoroughly alive,” can he come to understand 
that “[h]is sense of primary responsibility towards his work did not cut him off from 
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his fellows, from his society, as he had thought.  It engaged him with them 
absolutely . . . It was a mistake to see himself as its vehicle and nothing else” (334).  
In that ability to incorporate his work and self – in other words, to enact simultaneity 
within his sequential life – he is able to make the leap and fully understand 
simultaneity and complete his General Temporal Theory which combines 
simultaneity and “sequency” and in the combining of the two, he and all else become 
a part of a grand pattern, an unavoidable metaphor existing in multiple forms that 
span the material and the metaphorical. 
 
THE UNAVOIDABLE METAPHOR 
Shevek’s discovery reiterates the relationship with Klein and Astle’s 
discussion of the appearance of linearity that is produced from the subject’s position 
and acts as a blind for the whole, disguising the nature of the relationship.  
Simultaneity behaves just as living metaphor behaves – with its layering of the linear 
sequence of cause and effect while insisting on the inclusion of multiple momentary 
forms to create an interconnected whole.  Again, as Nietzsche notes, it is only if one 
forgets/incorporates the position of subject fully into his/her relationship with the 
moment/world that one can interact with that world through metaphor – a necessary 
skill in dealing with anything unmeasurable: “in short only because man forgets 
himself as a subject, and what is more as an artistically creating subject: only by all 
this does he live to some repose, safety, and consequence” (8).  Living metaphor, as 
an “aesthetical relation” (8), allows for that peace, security, and consistency in that it 
translates one’s relationship with the world into a “schema” (6), a methodology by 
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which the world is comprehensible to the subject as a part of the whole.  The 
relationship is dangerous in that it must be kept fluid and particular, that it must exist 
in movement, as an “interplay of identity and difference” that do not “melt together 
but confront each other” (Ricoeur, Rule, 237).  Thus, as temporally unstable, living 
metaphor must be responsive to changes both situationally and temporally, and so, 
one runs the consistent risk of inaccuracy.  But to lose that fluidity is, of course, to 
run the risk of effacement, that moment when metaphor becomes a rigid, 
unconnected free agent with a manufactured or borrowed moment of consent that is 
highly susceptible to misuse and abuse.  That said, Le Guin suggests that metaphor is 
a risk that must be braved because in the loss of metaphor so much else is lost 
because with the loss of metaphor we must limit our world – both present and future 
– to the size of human material existence.   
As the incomprehensible and invisible world becomes comprehensible to 
Shevek, he is able to make choices, including the choice to refuse ownership of his 
theory, breaking down both metaphorical and material walls by offering that theory 
to all.  His gift exists in both metaphorical (theoretical) ways – another moment in 
which the linear movement of the theory through one group to the next is 
deconstructed such that there is a simultaneous moment in which all share in the new 
knowledge, a moment of utopia80 – and in the material reality of the resulting 
ansible, the simultaneous communication device that forever changes the space and 
                                                          
80 In his essay “From Anti-Abundance to Anti-Anti-Abundance Scarcity, Abundance, and Utopia in 
Two Science Fiction Writers” J. Jesse Ramirez describes the hand-made cup and knife in Philip K. 
Dick’s text “Pay for the Printer” as “utopian objects” (85) because they have been constructed by 
human hands.  However, Le Guin’s work seems to suggest that it is the act of constructing those 
objects that is utopian, not the objects themselves, just as it is Shevek’s act of giving that is utopic 
rather than the ansible itself. 
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time that separates humankind.  As such, he creates a whole within the moment that 
acts as a form of interconnected communication, crossing barriers of all types 
including the wall.  Only because Shevek understands the metaphorical 
interconnection between himself – or any self – and the whole (the community) can 
he release his grasp on a theory which according to the world of Urras – as noted, a 
capitalist oligarchy – belongs to him and can thus be bought and sold as a piece of 
property.  Shevek is able to view himself on both a “cellular” level (in which he is in 
the position of a cell) as a working unit within a community, and as a complex whole 
in and of himself, and as such, acts as the balance required by the two communities 
in which he works. 
There are many such wholes that must be resolved/recognized in Le Guin’s 
text, including the need to accept both simultaneity and sequency, the individual and 
the community, and leave taking and return as existing both simultaneously and 
sequentially.  Each of these relationships require the reader to see paradoxes as not 
paradoxical, but rather, as views from alternate positions using different tools with 
which to view in order to understand both the synthesized and non-synthesized 
wholes, whether they comprise a “natural” set or a constructed edifice.  However, 
what our attention returns to time after time is the way in which those wholes are 
never rigid.  To adapt Alice Jenkins’ statement about Always Coming Home as a 
“novel that offers home as a possibility rather than a guarantee” (330), Shevek’s gift 
is a utopic moment both because of what that moment includes and because of the 
possibility that moment offers.  This novel offers connection as that “possibility 
rather than a guarantee” – a possibility as long as that utopic moment remains fluid 
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such that it can be constantly reinvented.  When rigidity sets in, it does so because of 
an attempt at ownership of a state or a moment or because we have foreclosed the 
unknown and claimed it for a known.  That rigidity signals the death of the state or 
moment in question.  In terms of Ricoeur’s act of will, the failure comes with the 
refusal of the release that exists in consent – that moment when one accepts the 
unknown as unavoidable and fecund. 
So finally, Le Guin makes clear that there are no ends, that ends are 
mythology, pots of gold at the ends of rainbows that when reached turn into dross.  
Le Guin requires we accept a conception of anarchy that insists anarchy must be 
reinvented over and over again, and utopia exists in the moment of aiding one’s 
fellow travelers while retaining the freedom that allows one to choose the way in 
which that aid is constructed.  As such, anarchy exists in each moment within which 
one is courageous enough to be an anarchist and recognize that choices and promises 
organize the world, and that oppressive laws and conventions behave as a form of 
effaced metaphor in that they are linguistic attempts to create static ends, ideas that 
have lost connection with their material referent.  She reminds us that it is only 
through continuous, fluid process that we and our community as wholes exist, and 
that it must be means/process to which we pay attention rather than focusing on 
those sparkly finished products that are so enticing but exist only as mirages 
embedded within our false predictions that in order to exist create limitation.  In fact, 
Le Guin reminds us that, predict the ends as we might, plan and consult and organize 





My Sister, My Brother, My Other: The Alien in Le Guin 
 
 Ursula K. Le Guin creates characters that resonate, beings who move us 
remaining in our thoughts years after the book has been finished and placed on a 
shelf.  Some we love; with others we sympathize, and some we only understand, but 
comprehension of and connection to the individual are secondary to Le Guin’s 
project in that Le Guin’s primary interest is posited in the way relationships between 
both individuals and communities interact as a dialectic.  Meanwhile, those 
interactions are multi-directional as they repeat and return, each underpinning the 
next, creating patterns in which those individuals and communities are delimited as 
necessarily interconnected nations, cultures or species.  It is a project that both 
requires and decenters metaphor, suggesting we can neither avoid metaphor, nor 
assume that the source of metaphor is the material referent.  In fact, in discussing the 
metaphors that construct one’s relationship with the Other, Le Guin’s arsenal of 
styles of metaphor includes an alternative form of metaphor – the determinative 
metaphor – metaphor that, unlike other forms, is never connected to a material 
referent because it is constructed to serve a desire rather than as an attempt at 
comprehension.  Determinative metaphor can be a particularly dangerous form of 
metaphor in interacting with the Other especially when that Other is alien.  Le 
Guin’s project is both furthered and complicated by the conventions of SF, a genre 
John Rieder characterizes as “premised on its non-reference to the real” (v), and one 
that includes the fact that many of those characters are not inhabitants of Earth, and 
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all of those characters are temporal aliens even when they are not spatially so.  In 
fact, science fiction is a genre – a universe – filled with aliens, but in the end the 
alien of SF is not that unfamiliar because, of course, as Estraven in The Left Hand of 
Darkness points out, the other is always alien, and it is in that relationship, “I and 
thou” (234), that identity exists.   
Without the Other, the “I” cannot exist even – especially? – if that Other is 
Lacan’s “I” in the mirror, the I that allows us definition as unique individuals in the 
world while signaling the existence of the most personal realm of the unknown – that 
of the unknown self.  As an unknown and in many ways an unmeasurable entity, 
exploration and enfranchisement of the “self” – that moment when Hegel’s two 
“self-consciousness[es]” “recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one 
another” (631), a recognition that resonates back and forth between the two 
observers – requires metaphor. Whether it is the Ekumen reaching across the huge 
expanses of space to those lost planets and communities, or Genly Ai reaching 
across the tent to a new conception of the alien female in Estraven, or the Bosses of 
The Eye of the Heron who foreclose the identity of the People of the Peace through 
determinative metaphor, the interaction between I and thou is a relationship posited 
in all those differences that delineate separation, but it is also posited in what is 
shared.  As such, metaphor becomes necessary in that metaphor produces both 
defamiliarization and connection – that predicate that moves from impertinent to 
pertinent (Ricoeur, Rule, 182) – and so, although the differences between I and thou 
are often apparent, as the other becomes more alien, what is shared is often elusive 
and unmeasurable, and as such, metaphor becomes more important than ever. 
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Le Guin constructs identities using a huge variety of methodologies and 
formulations that touch on, make use of, and can be considered through a number of 
different theoretical foundations including – but not exclusive to – Post 
Colonialism/Globalism, Queer Theory, and Gender Studies.  As such, this chapter is 
organized in sections dealing with various theoretical determinants with a 
recognition of how those structures are realized in the various texts such that they 
interconnect through metaphoric overlay.  In employing the metaphors embedded in 
our relationship with the other, Le Guin explores the ways in which identity exists as 
a joint creation through power dynamics, sight lines, and performative constructions, 
returning always to the foundational theme of her oeuvre: that a mutual respect as 
determined by consent, particularly in moments of metaphoric interchange, is 
necessary for any functional relationship.  In other words, respect must always be a 
component of any relationship if oppression, death and destruction are not to be the 
inevitable result of the contact. 
 
THE OTHER AS OBJECT: ORIENTALISM 
 Edward Said’s revolutionary text Orientalism reconstructed our 
comprehension of the ways in which nation construction and national identity are 
fashioned, enacted, and disseminated, a process that can be interconnected to 
metaphor through the ways in which a nation’s conception of self can be 
reconstructed through substitution and replacement – two of the most basic of 
metaphorical maneuvers.  Although Said’s is a discussion dealing with a specific set 
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of players – Egypt and England – the methodologies by which the national identity 
and even self-knowledge are constructed within this relationship hold true in a 
plethora of other relationships in which one member is dominant and controls access 
to the institutions of canonization and dissemination.  Said’s concepts are fairly 
simple, if radical, and are based on the foundations on which Western dominance 
stands: observation and knowledge, and the means by which that knowledge is 
controlled and turned into culture production.  According to Said, it is through the 
eyes of the dominant observer standing on the foundation of national history and 
presence that identity of the dominated is realized, reconstructing not just 
perspective, but cultural space as well.  However, not only is identity produced and 
disseminated within the dominant nation, through the institutions of rhetoric and 
public pronouncement followed by canonization and dissemination of that rhetoric, 
those applied conceptions of the dominated return home to recreate the dominated 
nation, creating as well, what Homi K. Bhabha calls, “subject positions” (2).  As 
such the dominant eye constructs that which it views through “knowledge” of the 
dominated: Said quotes James Balfour as saying, “We know the civilization of Egypt 
better than we know the civilization of any other country.  We know it further back; 
we know it more intimately: we know more about it.”  Said goes on to connect 
Balfour’s/England’s “knowledge” to an increase in authority:  
To have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority 
over it.  And authority here means for “us” to deny autonomy to “it” – the 
Oriental country – since we know it and it exists, in a sense, as we know it.  
British knowledge of Egypt is Egypt for Balfour. (32)   
Sheckler 140 
 
As such, England’s knowledge construct’s England’s actions and influence, but also, 
it becomes the authority consulted in any consideration of the colonized space 
creating not just England’s understanding of Egypt, but the world’s understanding 
and knowledge of Egypt as well – inevitably including Egypt itself.  In just such a 
fraught interchange, Le Guin’s little-discussed text The Eye of the Heron81 presents 
the failure of interactions between two dichotomous cultures that have been left to 
survive on a distant planet after the destruction of Earth. 
 The Eye of the Heron is one of Le Guin’s less-noted texts, presenting a 
deceptively simple plot of a story we all recognize from a more familiar setting.  The 
planet Victoria, used as a prison world, is home to two separate groups: the first 
inhabitants sent from Earth, the organized criminals – families – of Brazil, a group 
organized around a patriarchal and violent set of standards that valorize male 
vitality, honor, and violence, and a second shipment of emigrants, a group of largely 
European, pacifist socialists, the organization of which resulted in a march tens of 
thousands strong.  In both cases, the authorities found export the simplest solution.  
Sent off in ships that only functioned for one trip – out to the prison planet – before 
being consigned to their fate as disemboweled monuments, the two communities 
exist side by side, but the conception, that is what will be the defining features of 
each community, is still under debate – and – under construction through words and 
the actions produced by those words. 
                                                          
81 What analysis there is of Eye of the Heron is summed up in White’s Dancing with Dragons; White 
suggests that this text is Le Guin’s evolutionary text in which she is finally able to move from the 
male protagonist to the female protagonist (63-64). 
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 The city, centered around “the house of Falco,” and the town of “Shantih,” 
inhabited by the “People of the Peace” (37) (the PoP), referred to directly as 
“Shanty-towners” and “peasants” by Falco and the other Bosses (21),82 are polarized 
and conflicted communities.  What is interesting in Le Guin’s construction is that the 
reader has equal access to the thoughts and conceptions of self and situation of the 
oppressed as to that of the oppressors – knowledge that is seldom visible in 
oppressive relationships around the world.  As such, both the city’s attempt to 
polarize, repress, and use the other community while viewing the pacifists as weak 
and enslaved, and Shantih’s conception of the relationship as a cooperative and, on 
their side, an infallibly respectful attempt to survive that has gone awry are on full 
display.  But, what is most on point for this discussion is Le Guin’s presentation of 
how language/metaphor constructs and adapts that which it references and describes.  
As noted, Le Guin presents language much the way Nietzsche does in “On Truth and 
Falsity,” that is, as an invisible metaphor that is converted to literality through the 
loss of recognition that words are not inherently connected to the material referent.  
Her position on language is directly posited in her discussion of the titular heron 
which outlines in vivid detail her conception of the way language functions:   
The Victorian heron was not a heron; it was not even a bird.  To describe 
their new world the exiles had had only words from their old world.  The 
creatures that lived by the pools, one pair to a pool, were stilt-legged, pale-
gray fish eaters: so they were herons.  The first generation had known that 
                                                          
82 Le Guin is clearly referencing oppressive and unequalised societies of the day, most clearly the 
South Africa of the late 20th century.   
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there were not really herons, that they were not birds, nor reptiles, nor 
mammals.  The following generations did not know what they were not, but 
did, in a way, know what there were.  They were herons. (52)   
Although at first the heron of Earth is still presented as the “true” signified referent 
of the word heron, Le Guin’s unequivocal final statement that the Victoria heron is a 
heron to the generations born and raised on Victoria calls attention to the fact that 
the word is not a title attached to a material referent; rather, the word is an inherent 
construct that exists as bridge – a means by which the people of Victoria interact 
with their world but one that is constructed by the receiver at least as much as by the 
transmitter who (supposedly) is describing the attributes of the referent: “Truths are 
illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions” (Nietzsche, 878).  But as 
time goes on, the structures of language disappear beneath the weight of daily use 
and the referent becomes conflated with the word itself. 
The interaction can also be considered a metaphor in that, for the first exiles, 
without a word for the long-legged creatures, they apply a word – Richard’s 
“vehicle” – that is not literally accurate, but one that reflects their understanding of 
the material facts of the situation before them – the “tenor” of the metaphor (95) – 
which then, as it is adapted by the community becomes metaphorized in their 
ontological interaction with the only world they know.  The excerpt presents three 
separate productions of metaphor: the living metaphor (Ricoeur, Rule, 344), the 
effaced metaphor (Derrida, 8), and finally, the complete metaphorization of the word 
heron in that the impertinent predication moves through impertinence to pertinence, 
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through effacement in the disconnect from the original referent, until finally, the 
assignment of the word becomes literalized.  Despite acting only as a brief segue 
discussing an animal that is only mentioned a half-dozen times in the text despite its 
status as titular, Le Guin’s discussion of herons is an important infrastructure to her 
exploration of the power structures between the two communities, one that reflects 
and reproduces Said’s conceptions surrounding Orientalism, reflecting the steady 
movement from an idea to a constructed identity to an ontological “truth.”  The 
People of the Peace are the herons of the above discussion as their identity is 
reconstructed, their original identity effaced, to end in a “metaphorization” as they 
are “orientalised” and reproduced as slaves. 
 The People of the Peace are the remnants of a socialist movement/march on 
Earth that began with a promise of space, land, and freedom in a future version of 
Canada, Canamerica, commencing in “Moskva,” what one can only presume is a 
future version of Moscow.  The march proceeded across Europe, gaining thousands 
as it went, then crossing the Atlantic only to be obstructed in Montreal.  After time in 
a concentration camp, two thousand of the People of the Peace were chosen by 
lottery and shipped away to the prison planet Victoria where (they were told) they 
would be able to build a society based on their precepts of mutual aid and equality, a 
planet already settled by Brazil’s exiles, a community of “thieves and murders” 
(163-164).   It is within these two disparate groups that the issues of identity and 
Orientalism play out.  Despite the clearly defined conception of community that is 
taught and enacted by the pacifists, the views of the “Bosses” who live in the “City” 
cannot be evaded or ignored.  Where one community sees the relationship as one of 
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trade and mutual benefit, the other sees a feudal interaction that insures their own 
position as lords of the land, so despite any hopeful beginnings the failure seems 
inevitable:  When the People of the Peace took “over the farming enterprise of the 
community. . . sharing the produce fully and freely with the City,” the City in 
response “provided them tools and machinery made by the Government ironworks, 
fish caught by the City fleet, and various other products” (58).  The relationship 
begins as one that is based on trade, but the institutions that create technology and 
knowledge are embedded within the city.  As such, when the “Bosses” decide to 
engage in an enactment of their conceptions of honor and status dependent on 
hierarchical relationships, they find those conceptions of identity require an 
oppressed people, and the infrastructure to refigure the PoP as such already exists. 
 Reconstruction of the People of the Peace as inferior through methodologies 
as basic as observation and statement is a constructed strategy, but one that can be 
converted into responses so instinctive as to fall within the dangerous zone of “the 
natural.”  The difference in perception becomes overt over a disagreement about a 
new settlement in a far-distant land that Shantih has sent a group of explorers to 
reconnoiter.  Because of their beliefs in cooperation and mutual aid, the town sends a 
group to City Counsel to explain the move which will include only Shantih 
inhabitants and no caste system because the “strain of trying to keep up two social 
castes, in such a situation, would be intolerable” (41).  But what the PoP see as 
sharing information, the Bosses see as a request for permission, their response to 
which is a ban on travel and to jail the visiting committee.  The words that have been 
used by the Bosses to discuss the other community – “peasant” (ibid), “rabble” (ibid) 
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– now become particularly important as the discussions move to a new conception of 
“[b]ig farms. Large fields planted in one crop, for efficiency” in which the “excess 
population in Shanty Town will be put to work, and kept under control, to prevent 
any more talk about independence” (73 emphasis mine).  At first the words seem to 
be merely name-calling, which the PoP are unable to take in because they fall 
outside the terms of engagement of their understanding of community, but the caste 
system embedded in the language of the Bosses discussing the movement and rights 
of the pacifist suggests the gap between the communities is massive, a gap that 
produces a severely polarized interaction despite all the PoP’s attempts to negotiate.  
The PoP do manage to avoid the first of the forced work details by simply walking 
away from the labor site in the middle of the night, but that action is not without 
response, and it is at this point that the authority of the Bosses comes into play.  The 
authority enacted through the newly conceived structures is necessary to serve – not 
the community – but the system imagined by the inhabitants of the city that allows 
the Bosses to retain their desired position or, as presented by Isiah Berlin, the 
“pyramid which they [each object in an all-inclusive hierarchy] collectively form” 
(quoted by Said, 70).  However, as all positions within that pyramid are not 
considered equally desirable, “authority” – in this case force – comes into play. 
 Authority comes in all sorts of guises, and although the word is often 
conflated with “respect,” respect is only one form of authority.  Colonial history (and 
contemporary interactions) makes clear that in some situations authority can be 
created – at least temporarily – through violence, and a style of violence that is not 
only presented as necessary but can be figured by the oppressors as a demand 
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imposed by those who have been violently oppressed rather than said oppressors.  
Said makes the case clear in the following tautology: “England knows Egypt; Egypt 
is what England knows; England knows that Egypt cannot have self-government; 
England confirms that by occupying Egypt” (Said, 34).  England’s circular logic 
creates Egypt as the source of its own oppression, producing a construction of the 
past that suggests that the hierarchy is and has been unavoidable.  Le Guin’s Bosses 
are still at the point where they admit to using the “peasants” of Shantih/Shanty-
Town for their own ends (unlike England), and those ends are a production of the 
characters’ value system that constructs the other as either object to be used or 
female (object) to be protected.83  However, despite present knowledge, the need to 
restructure the beliefs of the inhabitants of Shantih is an important and necessary 
element to the restructuring of the relationship for the PoP and the reification of the 
relationship for the Bosses.  As such, a “re”structuring of the PoP is actually a 
“con”struction of a necessary “other” which in Orientalism allowed European 
society to gain “in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a 
sort of surrogate and even underground self” (Said 22), that mirrored and alternate I 
of Lacan, and in Le Guin’s text, one that will create an unquestioned hierarchical 
relationship between the communities.   
                                                          
83 When Vera is separated from the men of the committee who are jailed, and she is sent to Boss 
Falco’s home instead of jail, the quandary of the unimagined situation in which a woman is in a 
position the City men view as powerful and thus punishable is a paradox that is avoided by hiding 
Vera away.  That said, Vera herself is fully aware of the need for clarity within the situation and 
delineates her position clearly and unequivocally to Luz (Falco’s daughter): “I am not a visitor, I’m a 
prisoner” (46).  It is a statement that reaffirms the need for cognitive dissonance if the men of the City 
want to claim theirs is a “natural” order.  To escape their need for that cognitive dissonance, the 
bosses must refigure the PoP as failed rebels. 
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To be a “Boss” one must have a “peasant,” a rigid construction that does not 
allow movement, thus requiring a specific series of interactions as figured in the 
discussion between Herman MacMilan and Boss Falco: “They may have to be 
pushed, we may have to crack the whip to make them fight, we may have to drive 
them to rebellion [sic]” (74).  As People of the Peace are an uncomfortable and 
intractable peasantry in that they will not be shaken free from their conception of 
themselves as selves with the freedom to choose, the pacifists must be reconstructed 
as ineffective rebels who have been bested: “We must anger them into defiance, but 
not frighten them so much that they’re afraid to act. . . We want them to strike back, 
while we have their leaders, so their defiance will be disorganized” (101).  The 
hoped-for results are a loss of ideology and identity of the PoP: “What we want to 
do, and it will take restraint on our part, is to force them to betray their ideas – to 
lose faith in their leaders and their arguments and their talk about peace” (102).  Into 
the void created by a breach of their own ideological standards, the Bosses will 
insert the identity of the slave using the PoP’s own despair and guilt to suggest 
justification for their enslavement, a logical progression of cause and effect.84  
The desired effect is that the PoP will feel their state as slaves is deserved 
and inevitable because of their own failure to live up to their ideals, and that effect is 
well on its way to completion by the end of the novel, as is made clear in discussions 
                                                          
84 One of the most striking scenes in which this style of re-figuration is enacted exists in the 2013 film 
12 Years a Slave.  The scene immediately after the abduction of Northrup is a moment of 
reconstruction in which he is beaten and, despite any statement he makes as to his own identity, is 
only offered the words “You are a slave,” a method by which the self is reconditioned and 
reconstructed in an altered form.  That said, Northrup never forgets he should be a free man because 
his lack of freedom is not posited in his own actions; whereas, if the PoP do not act “peacefully,” they 
cannot be the People of the Peace. 
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between the inhabitants of Shantih as to what went wrong in the confrontation 
between the two communities.  The PoP’s ideas of mutual aid and pacifist action are 
sound until met with an outright desire in the Other for violence and death, a set of 
desires that are completely incompatible with the social theories the community uses 
to make all decisions.  The PoP’s logic depends on an assumption that everyone is 
motivated by a desire to create a better relationship, but as Luz points out “killing 
wins nothing – only sometimes nothing is what people want” (158).  In response to 
the brawl that ends with death on both sides, the two communities reopen talks that 
will inevitably end in the abuse of the PoP despite the appearance of gains: “Some 
things are better.  The trade agreement – if they keep to it” (169).  Of course, the 
joint history suggests that the Bosses will not keep to any agreement that does not 
serve their immediate needs/desires. The strategy is appalling and recognizable, but 
it is only the most obvious and preliminary steps toward Orientalism, and mirrors 
more closely practices enacted on plantations during the Atlantic slave trade, not 
Orientalism itself.  It is in a combination of time and the “improved” trade 
agreement that complete Orientalization will create a new version of the PoP that 
will exist as a kind of metaphorized identity that elides the PoP’s original identity, 
just as the “heron” of Victoria elides the heron of Earth. 
 Although violence and force may play a part in setting up a relationship in 
which an authority Orientalizes a less powerful culture, community, or nation, the 
act itself is more elusive, more deceitful and harder to protest.  In its most insidious 
form, Orientalism is an act of layering, a metaphorization, that includes a supposed 
functional relationship; the orientalising of another takes time in which observation 
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and statement must be reflected in actions – especially those of the orientalised 
group: “Orientalism is the discipline by which the Orient was (and is) approached 
systematically, as a topic of learning, discovery, and practice” (Said, 73) by both the 
authority and the Orientalized community.  As such, Orientalism requires a kind of 
deceit that arrives wrapped in the presumption and claim of a respectful relationship, 
one that slowly erodes the self and community to end in what will be presented as 
the inevitable relationship of oppressed and dominant.   
Such a relationship is evident in Balfour’s claims about the greatness of the 
Egyptian people, while carefully situating that greatness in the past where it is 
irrelevant to the more contemporary “greatness” of England.  It is, as well, at the 
conference table at which the Bosses and those who speak for the PoP sit, where 
exists the false presumption that both sides value peace and thus are meeting to 
construct a respectful relationship; whereas, for the authority figure who is 
constructing the Oriental whether it be on Earth or on Victoria, there is no desire to 
come to a mutually beneficial relationship.  Rather, the table at which they negotiate 
is only one in a collection of means by which the transformation is effected, a form 
of manufactured consent, a system by which a group is constructed in a particular 
mode with specific attributes, a “schematization” (Said, 68) by which one is placed 
in a relationship to which one has not consented.  Luz notes the inevitable erosion of 
the community in her statement about the nature of the new relationship: “You crawl 
into Marquez’s trap in the South Valley and call that standing firm!” (171).  In Le 
Guin’s text the only escape from the new, Orientalized identity is to leave because 
after a violent interaction in which both sides have behaved with aggression but only 
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the PoP feel that there was serious loss (loss of a communal connection to peace and 
integrity) that loss/failure becomes the foundation of the new identity.  Over time, 
that foundation in combination with the “knowledge” the Bosses have produced as to 
the two allowable positions within their society and the structures in those new 
South Valley farms, the PoP will become what the Bosses “know” they are – 
peasants and tools – embodiments of hours worked, “a class of labourers, who live 
only so long as they find work . . . a commodity” (Marx, 42), thus MacMilan’s 
characterization of the Shanty-towners as “excess population” (ibid).  Unless 
working, the PoP are “excess.”  At the end of Le Guin’s text, the PoP’s community 
splits with a small group leaving to create a new settlement outside the reach of the 
city, and we can already see the differences in the divided populace of the People of 
the Peace. 
 Resignification – the Orientalizing – of the People of the Peace is an 
enactment of a determinative metaphor in that the identity of the PoP is reassigned 
(they are labeled what they are not – that original conception of metaphor as a 
“misnaming”) according to the desires of the Bosses.  Although Boss Falco seems 
completely cognizant of the process creating the new signification through both 
words and actions, others of the bosses – specifically Herman MacMilan – are 
reactive in their interactions rather than employing Falco’s proactive stance.  
MacMilan is responding to an instinctive desire; according to his understanding of 
the situation, he is merely stepping into what he views as his natural position, 
claiming that his abstraction is concrete and material fact: “We’re men, free men, 
masters of a whole world.  It’s time we came into our inheritance” (72).  In evoking 
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the word “inheritance,” MacMilan is employing the idea of the natural, and in doing 
so must reconstruct the PoP as peasants and rabble because “[c]onquering nations 
hold it to be Nature’s own dictate that the conquered should obey the conquerors” 
(Mill, 18).  As such, the signification of the PoP as “peasants” is a “misnaming” 
according to the pacifists, but seems a “natural” truth to MacMilan and thus acts as a 
determinative metaphor in that MacMilan uses an impertinent predication to 
reconstruct the PoP not as a joint reflection or living metaphor in which consent of 
all involved – the signaler, the receiver, and in this case the referent – has been 
received.  Rather, in using a person as a referent rather than an object or action, the 
Bosses have created a metaphor that is not based on Derrida’s “fabulous scene” 
(ibid), that material referent.  Instead, they have constructed their metaphor from 
what they desire and imagine without reference to the literal facts that already exists 
defining the Other that is their referent, and without the consent of that referent.  As 
such, the determinative metaphor stands alone, outside the interconnected metaphors 
that exist as a triad: living, effaced, and metaphorized words.  Even so, determinative 
metaphors still require consent which must be gained from somewhere.   
Where Falco is using the equivalent of Jakobson’s metalanguage to discuss 
the reconstruction of the PoP through the words they use to identify themselves – 
even in their name – MacMilan is unaware of the metalanguage (exists in a state of 
ignorance that behaves as a kind of aphasia [Jakobson, Aphasia 229]) and simply 
reverts to his implicit and unquestioned belief in the natural relationship – his 
imagined world.  Metaphor in general exists as a mix of the two – both in the 
conscious attempt to “re”-name and in the unconscious attempt to adjust the “tenor” 
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to one’s own conception that is the new word or phrase – the “vehicle” (ibid).  
Falco’s scheming is an attempt to use language/metaphor to combine the act of 
naming with the attribution implied by metalanguage such that the naming is a 
deviation from the direct attribution, so in Falco’s case an attempt to restructure the 
PoP as slaves includes changing the PoP’s actions.  MacMilan is more direct 
because, unlike Falco who plans around his recognition of the PoP as subjects, for 
MacMilan his “knowledge” of the PoP as objects is the only knowledge, or as 
Jakobson states, “for an aphasic who has lost the capacity for code switching, the 
idiolect indeed becomes the sole linguistic reality” (Aspects, 249).  Determinative 
metaphor for the conscious transmitter is metaphor resulting from a desire for an 
imagined end, but the receiver and subsequent less conscious transmitter (as the 
receiver becomes in exporting the new metaphor) behaves as a kind of aphasic, 
negating information that is relevant to the situation because, for the less conscious 
transmitter, that information does not exist or is not relevant.   
MacMillan, although not an aphasic, has the same limitations, and, because 
the “peasants” exist only as objects to him, his misnaming becomes a “bound [word] 
form” (Jakobson, Aspects, 246) (i.e. gains meaning only from context, in this case 
from MacMillan’s desired end) and is not adaptable to influence from the referent.  
As such, he is only able to create determinative metaphors.  With the inclusion of 
MacMilan’s limitations, any renaming leaps over the stage of living metaphor and 
becomes immediately effaced and disconnected from the apparent source and 
referent because that referent is not the PoP, but rather MacMilan’s desire to reach 
his perceived natural position; as such, the metaphor is completely rigid/bound.  The 
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infrastructure of determinative metaphor is interesting not just because of the results 
of said metaphor in the world but also as an indication of the structure of living 
metaphor: that to be a living metaphor, a metaphor must interact as a whole that 
requires “consent” from, not just the transmitter and receiver, but from the referent 
as well.85  As such, living metaphor cannot be a linear response based on cause and 
effect from a material source, and even an effaced metaphor begins as a living 
metaphor.  All of which necessarily works to decenter our conception of the 
structure of metaphor as primarily material. 
That said, the complete Orientalising of the PoP is yet to come because they 
are not objects and, as such, cannot be misnamed without comment and action. In 
fact, the reconstruction will take years of fruitless meetings based on the false 
assumption that the Bosses’ goal is to work together, meetings that will act as a sink 
into which the PoP’s efforts and attention will be lost, while in fact, each day will 
include the next forced back-step into the role of enslaved non-citizen, a scene that 
has been replayed over and over again throughout colonial history.  As with the 
forms of Orientalization that exist throughout the world, relationships in which 
people and cultures are “misnamed” and metaphorized in an attempt to construct an 
imagined, desired world that services the agenda of the imaginer, the text leaves the 
reader with a sense that the reconstruction of those of the PoP who stay behind is 
inevitable.  The Eye of the Heron makes clear that, without a shared standard of what 
is valuable, those who make and change the rules to the game, renaming/misnaming 
                                                          
85 The connotations of this interactions become more complex when the referent is not a living 
subject, but is rather an object, but the need for consent does not drop away.  The consent of a non-
subject referent will be dealt with in the final chapter. 
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as they travel through what is presented as reasonable negotiations, will inevitably 
win both the battle and the war, and determinative metaphor is their weapon of 
choice. 
  
FEMINISM AND THE NARRRATIVE I AS CONSENT IN METAPHOR 
There’s women’s literature, but there isn’t men’s literature.  Modernism is 
male, white, urban because anything that isn’t urban is called “regional,” and 
northern because it isn’t “southern,” and eastern because it isn’t “western.”  
There is a norm that is not honestly declared a norm. (Le Guin quoted by 
Walsh, 199)  
“I am a woman writer, not an imitation man.” (Le Guin quoted by Walsh, 
200) 
 Some of Le Guin’s most important texts are texts dealing with gender and 
capitalism.  Specifically, the novella “A Woman’s Liberation” in Four ways to 
Forgiveness, is a text in which the abuses and interactions between the genders are 
negotiated in first person narrative, with all its “metaphor, or prosopopeia” (de Man, 
Autobiogrophy, 930), and is an example of Le Guin’s ability to employ the living 
metaphor of first person narration with its overt consent in the fact of a narratorial 
“I” to counter the “manufactured consent” of the effaced metaphors of capitalism.  
As in de Man’s discussion of autobiography, as a metaphorical interaction between 
the writer of the text and the narrative “I,” Le Guin, in making the choice to use the 
narrative “I,” extends the metaphor she claims as the position of all fiction to an 
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additional metaphor86 in which she replaces the narrative with the narrator.  In doing 
so, she is suggesting that first person text acts as a sort of Lacanian specular “I” in 
the negotiation between subject and world, a relationship which travels back and 
forth between self and reflection to create a layered conception of the self.  That 
more complex and complete form/reflection creates definition which then allows for 
placement in the larger scene within which the resultant self can engage.  Lacan’s 
form, that whole that is created through the mirror stage through interaction with the 
specular “I,” allows for entrance into and interaction with the outside world – the 
“Umwelt” (Lacan, 1288),87 and de Man suggests that autobiography acts a 
metaphorical extension of the self in the replacement of the narrative “I” for the 
writing subject.  Each structure acts as a metaphorical extension that is able to 
recognize and counter the effaced metaphors that underpin oppressive systems.   
The two forms of “I” – specular (at least in a metaphorical form) and 
narrative – are at work in many of Le Guin’s texts, and it is through the combination 
that some of her most radical feminist discussions take place, metaphorical thought 
experiments that call into question the universalist assumptions as to what we know 
about the way gender acts as a regulatory structure.  In “A Woman’s Liberation,” 
through Rakam’s autobiographical telling of her journey from a child who has never 
                                                          
86 Although de Man specifically makes a distinction between fiction and autobiography, noting that 
“[a]utobiography seems to depend on actual and potentially verifiable events in a less ambivalent way 
than fiction does” (Autobiography, 920), he goes on to add that the “replacement by the actual voice 
of the living in fact reintroduces the prosopopoeia in the fiction of address” (928) suggesting that the 
very presentation of the narrative “I” as the authorial “I” is both fiction and metaphor. 
87 Jacques Lacan’s essay “The Mirror Stage as Formative” is a discussion of the way that an infant’s 
interaction with her/his reflection is a moment which determines the individual as a defined being, a 
position from which the outside world can be negotiated, one which allows the individual to 
“establish a relation between the organism and its reality” (1287). 
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seen her own reflection to house-slave and “use-woman” to revered academic and 
activist, the narrative “I” and the specificity it offers acts as a counter to the effaced 
metaphors that keep the repressive societies in which she lives frozen within 
inherited forms of oppression.  Through Rakam’s knowledge of self that is gained 
despite determinative metaphors that categorize and instruct women as to their 
position and roles in a rigid society, Le Guin suggests that the narrative I as specular 
I allows the individual to determine knowledge and desire such that decision making 
is possible and, from that, definition of self.  It is from that defined self that change 
can be effected, producing societies of selves that – although not perfect – are at 
least capable of change.  
The planet Yeowe has served as resource and colonized product that supports 
its twin planet Werel similar to the way Caribbean plantations supported European 
aristocracy as well as England’s general economic structures.  Werel, a feudal style 
hierarchy in which all inhabitants fall into one of two categories, “owner” or “asset,” 
uses Yeowe as both a site of production and a penal colony.  In the present of the 
novel, Yeowe has gone through a number of changes over many years including 
existence as a strict work farm in which there is only the most basic social structures 
and slaves/prisoners are used up, i.e. worked to death, and replaced; the planet then 
passes through a transformation into a prison society to which use-women are 
imported in an attempt to replace the slave population through breeding, to the 
present of the story in which the Yeowen society has been reborn as a result of a 
recent revolution.  Regardless, the social structures remain ones that promote the 
brutal oppression of women.   
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The most obviously feminist of Le Guin’s arguably feminist oeuvre, Le Guin 
uses the inherited structures and morality in which, rather than re-structuring the 
society after the revolution, the position of “boss/owner” is not replaced; instead, it 
is merely refilled by the men who have been liberated, leaving liberation for the 
women as an unnecessary inconvenience to be avoided.  As discussed by Audre 
Lorde in her text “The Master’s Tools will Never Dismantle the Master’s House,” 
any revolution which fails to adjust the structures that underpin social interchange 
will fail to create radical changes; rather, the roles and patterns by which the people 
negotiate daily life will merely shift from one agent to another.  In this text, Le 
Guin’s adept anthropological background comes into play, as she constructs a 
cohesive history of an all-male community to which women were merely an 
addendum, leaving those women disenfranchised and ghettoized – and most 
importantly – oppressed.  It is an oppression that does not change merely because the 
identity of the “Boss-man” has changed; despite the change in the agents’ skin color, 
the hierarchy remains in place.  Their position is defined in the character Yeron’s 
interactions with the Ekumenical Envoy in the third novella “A Man of The People”:  
Women made the Liberation.  They worked and they died for it just like the 
men. But they weren’t generals, they aren’t chiefs.  They are nobody.  In the 
villages they are less than nobody, they are work animals, breeding stock. . . 
Our men are the owners now.  And we’re what we always were.  Property. 
(167)   
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Yeron’s statement creates equivalence based in metaphor (that is people as 
“nobody”), specifically effaced and determinative metaphors in which the consent 
has been a matter of force, manufactured consent that is created through the double 
bind in which so many oppressed peoples are caught. 
Marilyn Frye’s discussion of oppression in her text of that name – 
“Oppression” – discusses the “double bind” (42) which manufactures a kind of 
consent to life as it is offered to the oppressed in all its limitations, but also to the 
determinative metaphors that define and categorize, placing those oppressed 
conveniently outside protected groupings.  Frye identifies the double bind as the 
structure at the base of much invisible oppression: “One of the most characteristic 
and ubiquitous features of the world as experienced by oppressed people is the 
double bind – situations in which options are reduced to a very few and all of them 
expose one to penalty, censure or deprivation” (42).  Frye goes on to give outline 
specific examples:  
It is common in the United States that women, especially younger women, 
are in a bind where neither sexual activity nor sexual inactivity is all right . . . 
If she is heterosexually active,  . . . a woman is open to censure and 
punishment for being loose, unprincipled or a whore. . . On the other hand, if 
she refrains from heterosexual activity, she is fairly constantly harassed by 
men who try to persuade her into it and pressure her to “relax” and “let her 
hair down”: she is threatened with labels like “frigid,” “up-tight,” “man-
hater,” “bitch” and “cocktease.” (42)  
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Frye makes clear that there are any number of double binds, certainly for women, 
but as well, for any other oppressed group, and those double binds are not accidental 
and not singular but work as a system to create “forces and barriers which are not 
accidental or occasional . . . and penalize motion in any direction” (43).  The double 
bind leaves the oppressed faced with a choice that often includes a recategorization 
through determinative metaphor.  Thus, in the case of women, a young woman must 
consent to being either “loose” or a “bitch” – both dterminative metaphors that 
reflect the desire of the transmitter rather than the state of the woman – because there 
are no other options available within the heterosexual lexicon if all the metaphors 
available signify the only two options – sexually active or sexually inactive.  If she 
does not consent, the metaphor continues because, as in Orientalism or any other 
form that uses determinative metaphor, only the consent of those who determine the 
metaphor is necessary.  In Rakam’s early life, categorized as an “asset,” she is either 
a “pup” (196), the sexual “pet” “Toti” (the name is shared with “my Lady’s” last 
dog) (204), or a “field hand” (196) – a moment of synecdoche that lies between 
effaced metaphor and a metaphorized word.  There are, of course, choices to be 
made here, but not ones that include a position as anything but an oppressed 
“subject,” or more precisely, an object.  
 In fact, the elision of the Other as subject is important to the next stage by 
which the necessary consent for any metaphor is manufactured, especially those 
determinative metaphor that act as foundation to the polarized positions of 
“Owner/bossman” and “asset” so important to the social structures of both Werel 
and Yeowe.  As in Orientalism, determinative metaphors can be produced or 
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borrowed to reorganize the position of inhabitants who live within a power structure; 
however, at first glance, the claim that all metaphor requires consent seems to 
produce a safeguard against just such abuses.  After all, what subject would consent 
to a characterization of her/himself as an object, animal, or limb?88  However, the 
movement from subject to object is a direct response to the need to circumvent the 
subject’s rights, and the first right to be circumvented is that of consent to the 
metaphor. In fact, the determinative metaphor creates a tautology that changes the 
equation of the consent required because as a subject becomes object and referent 
rather than one of the receivers of the metaphor, that subject/receiver – now object – 
is no longer a position from which to give consent.  As such, the determinative 
metaphor truncates the form of living metaphor and forecloses the need for the 
consent of the referent whether that referent is person, object, or state. 
In the case of the owners and bossmen of Le Guin’s text, consent to the 
determinative metaphors that allow for people to be brutalized, sold, or killed can be 
given only by other receiver subjects, that is, the owners – i.e. those in control of the 
constructed metaphor.  The assets are in the position of the object of the 
metaphorical statement and, in a determinative metaphor, are not in a position from 
which consent can be given.  Thus, it is the very act of refusing that moment of 
                                                          
88 Margaret Atwood brilliantly satirizes this process in her short story “Homelanding” in which she 
describes stereotypes of the two heteronormative genders, stating that “the prong people” (men) claim 
the “cavern people” (women) are “not people at all and are in reality more akin to dogs or potatoes” 
(90).  Playing first on the synecdoche of “prong” and “cavern” she moves on to disrupt the ubiquitous 
metaphorized characterization of women as “dogs,” “cows,” or any number of (usually) domestic 
animals.  Atwood then takes it one step further to the homely “potato” and in doing so, shifts the 
criticism from women to men in a moment of reductio ad absurdum.  But regardless, the consent for 
the metaphorization of women as farm animal still exists between the subject transmitter and receiver, 
i.e. men, not the object/referent of the metaphorization, i.e. women. 
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consent despite the referent’s ability to receive and disagree with the metaphor that 
acts as dehumanization and objectification of the referent.  But the same is true when 
the referent is not an obvious receiver.  If we return briefly to a consideration of the 
living metaphor in the first chapter – particularly that of foretelling and the hint that 
the unknown as the object of the metaphor must also “consent” through the consent 
of the weaver after a consideration in which one can only presume the weaver 
consults her/his knowledge of the unknown.  In other words, in order that the 
metaphor be fully effective in its representation of the “fabulous scene that brought it 
into being” (ibid) the unknown must be “consulted” and the knowledge thereof acts 
as a kind of consent.  In determinative metaphor, the metaphor becomes merely a 
method by which to complete a task in response to a desire, and both the subject 
turned object or any other referent of the living metaphor are demoted to objects.  As 
such the predication embedded within the living metaphor which moves from 
impertinent to pertinent, is then moved beyond pertinent to irrelevant, all relevancy 
being consumed by the needs of the oppressor. 
 In constructing this equation in which living metaphor is bypassed in the 
production of determinative metaphor in order to oppress subjects by turning those 
subjects into objects, Le Guin turns our attention to the effaced metaphors at the very 
root of capitalism as human beings are turned into assets and women into a means of 
production becoming a “conduit of a relationship rather than a partner to it” (Rubin, 
21).  Regardless of whether the planet of Yeowe is a prison planet or a free world, 
the state of women does not improve (becomes, in fact, worse) as the determinative 
metaphors involving women are moved from the laws of the “Owners” to the 
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conventions of the “bosses,” the men of Yeowe who have replaced the foremen of 
the owners.  Because Yeowe was an all male prison planet before it became a prison 
community, when women were imported to maintain the population of workers, 
there was no position for them as a subject within the culture, and rather than adjust 
that culture, the women were simply re-produced as objects, even going so far as to 
remove the idea of biological fatherhood.  Because no woman has only one sexual 
partner, she cannot make claims of connection with any one man:   
It’s important that girls cease to be virgin as soon as possible, you know.  
Always more than one man must have them, you know.  So that they can’t 
make claims – “this is you son,” “this baby is the chief’s son,” you know.  
That’s all witchcraft.  A son is chosen.  Being a son has nothing to do with 
bondswomen’s cunts. (Le Guin, AMOP, 184) 
The disconnect from the biological facts of interconnection is important in the 
production and maintenance of the culture, but even more important is the signaling 
of the state of that information and the attempt to move the statement from 
determinative metaphor (woman as reproductive mechanism) to fact/knowledge 
posited in the repetition of the words “you know.”  The old man who is informing 
Havzhiva of the “facts” of the situation, has already accepted the determinative 
metaphor as a “fact” not to be questioned.  It has been given the “sanction of 
society” and the “bosses” have substituted “public and organised means of asserting 
and protecting these rights [men’s refusal of a subject state to women], instead of the 
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irregular and lawless conflict of physical strength” (Mill, 11).  As such, the 
determinative metaphor becomes metaphorized and hegemonically sanctioned. 
 Women’s position on Yeowe is a direct reflection of the equation outlined in 
Gayle Rubin’s text “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of 
Sex” in that they are merely a means of the production of bodies, and that 
determinative metaphor creates a series of other determinative metaphors in which 
women’s roles and positions are delineated and limited.  It is a process through 
which “natural similarities” are suppressed (Rubin, 24) and “biological differences 
between the sexes. . . create gender” (Rubin, 23) in order that a segment of the 
population be demoted from subject to object.  These conceptions based on 
foundational determinative metaphors are so deeply embedded they are presented as 
“facts,” as posited in the old man’s “you know,” but they also appear in carefully 
constructed theory.  Rubin notes Freud’s essays on femininity are “descriptions of 
how a group is prepared psychologically, at a tender age, to live with its oppression,” 
creating a situation in which “women have few means for realizing and expressing 
their residual anger” (32).  This difficulty in recognizing the dynamic affecting the 
subject is directly related to the determinative metaphor and the tendency of the 
transmitter of such to treat the metaphor as “fact” rather than to acknowledge that the 
statement is both a misnaming and that the source of the metaphor is a desired 
situation rather than a response to a scene.  As such, we can see at the base of many 
if not all oppressive bans, laws, and edicts the determinative metaphor that figures a 
person primarily as an “undesirable,” an “alien,” or any other of a huge number of 
convenient delineations rather than as a human being.  Determinative metaphors are 
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a brutal force in the oppression of any subject, and according to Le Guin, the only 
response must come in the reclamation of the subject state, that is, in the first person 
narrative – in the use of the “I.” 
 Le Guin makes her position on the only possible response to determinative 
metaphor through her ordering of the novellas that make up the text Four Ways to 
Forgiveness.  If the desperation of the situation that exists on Yeowe comes to 
fruition in “A Man of the People,” the women’s answer to the determinative 
metaphors, both historical and current, exists in that final novella “A Woman’s 
Liberation.”  Le Guin posits all rebellion as starting with the individual subject, as 
presented in the singular nature of the liberation.  That is not to say that we work 
alone; rather, as Le Guin makes clear, it is only as subjects – single voices and 
bodies that recognize ourselves as individual selves – that we can approach the 
massive force that exists in determinative metaphor, that misnaming that insists we 
are not subject but, rather, objects to be used and organized.  As such, Khoury’s 
disappointment with Le Guin’s positing of a new world in Shevek’s single 
realization is unseated because status as a subject rather than object is a state that 
must be sought first, as an individual, and only then, as a community of individuals.  
Le Guin makes no claim that the subject individual is some sanctified state, merely 
that it is a necessary step to community. 
QUEER THEORY AND JUDITH BUTLER  
 Le Guin has dealt with multiple forms of sexuality and gender alternatives 
through much of her career including homosexual interactions in (even) The 
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Dispossessed, a text often criticized for its celebration of a monogamous, 
heteronormative, central relationship, as well as the struggles of the lesbian 
protagonist of The Telling who finds herself in a society that has morphed into a 
repressive, traditionalist autocracy during her voyage to reach her post.  However, 
the first text in her oeuvre to garner attention for dealing with gender alterity was 
The Left Hand of Darkness.  Despite criticism over the use of the pronoun “he” and 
her decision not to bring a sexual relationship between the two protagonists to 
fruition, what is quite astounding in the novel is the way in which Le Guin’s 
metaphorical structure mirrors Judith Butler’s work with performativity within 
Queer Theory.  According to Butler’s work, hegemonic dictates limit both sexuality 
and gender construction through an interconnected structure of performative words 
that lead to a nearly unavoidable performance of a limited number of preconstructed 
and circumscribed gender roles.  Interestingly, and despite being written decades 
before Butler’s work, The Left Hand of Darkness creates a network of metaphors 
that enact the relationships Butler describes, while still resting on the consent that 
any metaphor requires. 
 As discussed earlier, the unknown is a foundational trope and a necessary 
component of the most important philosophical relationship within the novel. As 
such, metaphorical representations of the unknown exist in all sorts of material 
imagery: the Ekumen, space, the other, and – for the purposes of this chapter – the 
“ice.”89  The journey across the ice for Genly and Estraven is of course a 
                                                          
89 Naomi Jacobs notes that the ice as an important metaphor in the text because “it tests their loyalty 
as well as their endurance, creating a bond of brother hood” (Frozen, 199) responding to Le Guin’s 
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metaphorical representation of a trip into the unknown, but for the purposes of this 
chapter, that unknown becomes a specific unknown, the unknown of the exterior that 
exists outside social norms and beyond regulation.  Butler’s discussion of excrement 
– of shit – and of the way exteriority functions in relation to normative practices 
suggests that positions within and without society produce identities determined by 
the position of the individual relative to the border between inner and outer: 
What constitutes through division of the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds of the 
subject is a border and boundary tenuously maintained for the purposes of 
social regulation and control.  The boundary between the inner and outer is 
confounded by those excremental passages in which the inner effectively 
becomes outer, and this excreting function becomes, as it were, the model by 
which other forms of identity- differentiation are accomplished.  In effect, 
this is the mode by which Others become shit. (182) 
As such, Butler represents the social body as constructed not unlike the human body, 
one that is permeable and far more interconnected to the outer world than we often 
care to think.  Air, food, ideas, and excrement breach that boundary calling into 
question the reality of the separateness we value as determining self and 
individuality; with separateness in question, it is that mirror image as separate from 
both Other and self that allows for that definition (Lacan, 1286).  As such, position, 
whether that position is inside the social world or outside its regulation, is an 
                                                          
statement that LHD is a book “about betrayal and fidelity” (Gender, 161).  Although this is 
irrefutable, the field of trust is a discussion of the unknown, and I am arguing that regardless of the 
author’s intention, the trope of the unknown is much broader than this discussion suggests. 
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important factor in determining what is within reach, including any possible changes 
to those norms within the “body,” whether that body is a being or a society. 
Genly and Estraven make the decision to cross the Gobrin ice field – a choice 
only made in desperation as success is possible only if the winds and fates agree, as 
Estraven states overtly in his comment that “Without luck, we will not make it” 
(202) – because both of the protagonists have been re-categorized as outlaws.  The 
categorization is a determinative misnaming that has leapt past impertinent and 
pertinent predication – and of course, consent of the referent – to a rigid 
recategorization within the countries who have applied those determinative 
metaphorical transformations.  Estraven has been exiled from Karhide, but as well, 
his last acts in Mishnory will earn him assassination or incarceration if he does not 
leave quickly: “Until I went to Shusgis, no one in the Sarf but Guam had considered 
me worthy their notice, but now they would be hard at my heels” (185).  Genly, on 
the other hand has been “disappeared” and exists only as an invisible prisoner whose 
re-emergence would be a national scandal.  That the two consider themselves 
outlaws90 is put beyond question when they respond to questions of their identity at 
the end of the trip with “One person may be outlawed in Karhide, another in 
Orgoreyn” (273).  Their choices and behavior signal both their own comprehension 
of their outlawed state, and the relative meaning of an outlaw status – that to be an 
outlaw is a position of exteriority without necessarily attached judgement or value.  
                                                          
90 It is worth noting that, although neither of the two believe that s/he is guilty of any wrong doing, 




To Karhide, Estraven is, metaphorically, excrement and has been excreted through 
his exile; in other words, through his exile, he is removed from the body politic and 
the nation as a whole.  Genly, on the other hand, is kept within the body of Orgoreyn 
while moved from the center to the invisible margin, but in his refusal of that 
control, when Estraven breaks him out of Pulfen Farm, both he and Estraven are 
excreted by the social body into the unknown – the Gobrin Ice.  Although apparently 
a choice, it is a choice for which the only other option is death creating that double-
bind as discussed by Frye.   
Not only is the Gobrin outside of the social structures of the two nations, it 
exists only as an unknown.  Unmapped (Estraven’s limited map of the area is 
inaccurate) and untracked, the Gobrin exists as a space outside Gethen social 
structures, a space where little to nothing is predictable; as such, regulation falls 
away.  Set apart and separate from the rest of the Gethen, the ice acts as a position in 
which change can occur (admittedly that change includes a likely death), a space 
where alterity becomes possible, and as such, the future becomes slippery and even 
less predictable than its already unpredictable state.  As such the metaphor of the ice 
corresponds with Butler’s discussion of drag.  If change is impossible within a social 
structure that insists on a hegemonic determination of gender, then one must leave 
that space/structure to make even small changes.  In Le Guin’s novel that leave 
taking exists as the materialized metaphor that is the trip across the Gobrin, and in 
Butler’s text, in the performance of drag. 
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According to Butler, the performance of drag creates both a material space in 
which the rigid constructions of gender are destabilized such that they can be 
questioned, and as well, a perspective shimmy that allows cognitive space for 
alternative possibilities, and it is only in combination of that material and immaterial 
that such a space can exist.  Butler quotes Esther Newton’s discussion of drag as a 
complex whole that repeatedly reverses itself: 
At its most complex, [drag] is a double inversion that says, “appearance is an 
illusion.” Drag says . . . “my ‘outside’ appearance is feminine, but my 
essence ‘inside’ [my body] is masculine.”  At the same time it symbolizes the 
opposite inversion; “my appearance ‘outside’ [my body, my gender] is 
masculine but my essence ‘inside’ [myself] is feminine.” (186) 
Butler continues Newton’s logical progression to note that the very existence of drag 
as imitation opens a space in which gender as imitation can exist: “In imitation 
gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself” revealing 
gender as “falsely naturalized as a unity” (187).  The desired unity is in fact a 
determinative metaphor that disallows change and manufactures consent to that 
refusal of change – a connecting of a material fact (the body) with a specific and 
unalterable immaterial reading (the gender).  As Butler notes, drag’s disruption 
between the “three contingent dimensions of significant corporeality: anatomical 
sex, gender identity, and gender performance” suggests a “dissonance not only 
between sex and performance, but sex and gender, and gender and performance” 
(187).  The dissonance then creates an instability (the perspective shimmy) that 
Sheckler 170 
 
allows for a failure of the determinative metaphor, that misnaming and then 
metaphorized relationship: i.e. that naturalized reading of a gendered body as stable 
and tethered to a specific corporality.  The hegemonic norms are dependent on that 
unity – that rigid, determinative and metaphorized relationship as a whole, and as 
that unity becomes unstable, the norm becomes questionable.   
This need for unity is also the basis of Genly’s distrust of Estraven, that 
previously discussed assumption of de Beauvoir’s “Eternal Feminine” (ibid), that 
rigid association between a specific corporality and an associated hegemonic 
ideological understanding of that corporal state.  Regardless of all the attempts of 
both characters to work together, Genly is not able to trust Estraven because he 
insists on viewing Estraven as a recognizable unity – i.e. strictly male or strictly 
female – and falls into distrust and dysfunction with each interaction that does not 
subscribe to his expectations.  Only outside of the recognizable world – outside 
society as a structure both material and ideological – can Genly make effective 
change in his interaction with gender, and thus with Estraven; only in a tent in an 
entirely alien space and disconnected from the hegemonic norms created from 
determinative metaphor can Genly see what he “had always been afraid to see, and 
had pretended not to see in him [Estraven]: that he was a woman as well as a man” 
(248).91  In terms of metaphor, what is interesting here is the layered response of 
material body and metaphor to the layered existence of material setting and 
                                                          
91 Again, Genly use of the pronoun “he” and his tendency to use the word “man” as a general 
denomination of all Gethenians has been criticized roundly in a number of responses to Le Guin’s 
text.  But, considering the argument I am making in this chapter, for Genly, with all his hegemonic 
baggage, to do otherwise would compromise the characterization and damage the text. 
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metaphorical space created by the fading of the rigid determinative metaphors that 
are read as the only ideological possibility attached to a particular body when that 
body is within the social structures that determine its meaning.  What is available on 
the Gobrin, which is not available within the rigid hegemonic reading that exists in 
regulated space, is the moment of consent that determinative and effaced metaphors 
disallow and that living metaphor requires.  So, as metaphor is so very dangerous in 
both determinative and effaced states, the question at this point becomes whether or 
not the relationship between material body and immaterial or unmeasurable forces 
can be continued without metaphor, and Le Guin’s answer is that it cannot. 
One of the most effective metaphors employed by Le Guin at this point in the 
novel is a specific extension of a system of tropes used throughout the text: the 
shadow.  Le Guin’s metaphorical shadow is produced as a master trope, but not a 
determinative or effaced metaphor as it is closely linked to and accurately reflective 
of the ideas and material components that make up the metaphorical whole.  For the 
Gethenians, shadows are linked to the social code that structures all relationships in 
Gethen, from interpersonal to political: shiefgrethor.  As previously discussed, 
shiefgrethor is explained by Estraven as a complex form of reputation through his 
implementation of the metaphor of the shadow: a product of a combination of light 
and corporality to produce a shape within the social space that is connected to the 
corporal body, caused by a relationship between the corporal body and light, but not 
a part of that corporal body.  Le Guin extends this metaphor in several different ways 
throughout the text, including Genly’s confusion and frustration at his inability to 
reach any kind of lasting contact as he continues to attempt to interact with the 
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Commensals of Orgoreyn to no avail, stating that it is “as if they did not cast 
shadows” (147).  Here associated with a lack of transparency in the political fields of 
Mishnory that disallows meaningful discussion and lets slip accountability for 
actions within that political field, Le Guin then moves the metaphor of “shadow” to 
a linked form of the metaphor on the Gobrin as the two protagonists move through 
weather in which flat light creates a shadowless landscape, “the unshadow” (266), 
making it difficult if not impossible to move, an important fact and an important 
metaphor.   
The various semic fields that underlie the metaphor of the shadow – depth of 
field, relationship with light, shape, form, etc. – overlap, to create a fluid and yet 
connected metaphorical network.  That network produces a logical strata that creates 
a system of shadows within the text that allows the reader to create an interlinked 
conception of the ways in which shadows are both materially and metaphorically 
productive.  For the protagonists, the lack of material shadows is productive of a 
moment in which they step outside the world and into “an even, white, soundless 
sphere: we moved along inside a huge frosted-glass ball.  There was nothing inside 
the ball, and nothing was outside of it” (265).  In that space movement is difficult, 
requires a tether to one’s traveling companion, and is exhausting, but also, in 
learning to move in that space, new and alternative relationships are discovered.  In 
other words, although it is extremely difficult to move through space when that 
space is “nothing,” that “nothing” allows for alterity. 
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Within that “shadowless” space that exists on the Gobrin, Genly and 
Estraven reach a relationship that is unreachable within a society where every move 
they make has political repercussions.  Only on the Gobrin is Genly able to 
understand Estraven as both male and female; only on the Gobrin is Estraven able to 
accept his own permeable self through “mindspeak.”  The Gobrin exists in the text 
as a form of other space in which metaphor is a productive connector of “I and thou” 
– living rather than determinative or effaced and a method of control – as suggested 
in the way Genly remembers the time spent in extremity as one of joy:   
Sometimes as I am falling asleep in a dark, quiet room I have for a moment a 
great and treasurable illusion of the past.  The wall of a tent leans up over my 
face, not visible but audible, a slanting plane of faint sound: the susurrus of 
blown snow.  Nothing can be seen.  The light-emission of the Chabe stove is 
cut off, and it exists only as a sphere of heat, a heart of warmth.  The faint 
dampness and confining cling of my sleeping-bag; the sound of the snow; 
barely audible, Estraven’s breathing as he sleeps; darkness.  Nothing else.  
We are inside, the two of us, in shelter, at rest, at the center of all things.  . . .I 
am not trying to say that I was happy, during those weeks of hauling a sledge 
across an ice-sheet in the dead of winter. . . I certainly wasn’t happy.  
Happiness has to do with reason, and only reason earns it. What I was given 
was the thing you can’t earn, and can’t keep, and often don’t even recognize 
at the time: I mean joy. (240-241)   
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The system of living metaphors that are the shadow and the ice act as access to the 
immaterial and the unmeasurable, a fact that prompts Le Guin to avoid the move to a 
more material connection for the characters – that unfulfilled sexual potential.   
Le Guin chooses to create a situation in which becoming sexual partners would 
change an already precarious situation, and so, the two protagonists choose not to 
have sex, citing the dangers in doing so, and that refusal of sex produces unforeseen 
and metaphorical benefits:  “For it seemed to me, and I think to him, that it was from 
that sexual tension between us, admitted now and understood, but not assuaged, the 
great and sudden assurance of friendship between us rose: a friendship so much 
needed by us both in our exile” (248).  In making this choice, Le Guin creates a 
relationship between the characters which does not allow explanation through 
pointing to an overt relationship between bodies; rather, the less material nature of 
the bond requires living metaphor in any kind of explanation.  Le Guin even places 
the relationship as a center that exists outside the bodies and minds of the two 
protagonists; in making the chabe stove the center of the relationship, in making it 
the “heart of warmth” (ibid) around which Genly memory is centered, Le Guin’s 
metaphor insists on a decentered conception of the relationship between the two.  As 
well, the discussion as to whether to change their relationship to a sexual one is 
carefully negotiated and consented to in a mirrored presentation of the consent 
necessary to all of Le Guin’s metaphors.  Through their mutual consent to their 
friendship, that “heart of warmth” (ibid) comes into existence; through mutual 
consent, metaphor allows us to understand another’s conception of the world. 
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 Only in a space beyond the social spaces of Gethen can such a discussion 
take place, can such choices exist as viable.  In making those choices, the 
protagonists choose as well, their own gender and emotional constructions that 
remain after their return to “civilization,” just as Butler suggests that drag acts as a 
space where choices that present alterity can be “chosen” on the stage in which 
gender is revealed to be imitative and thus susceptible to choice.  That those spaces 
are profoundly connected to metaphor and metaphorical representation of self and 
body seems clear as soon as one destabilizes the connection between gender and 
body. 
 
THE METAPHOR IN THE I  
 All the forms of identity with which Le Guin engages suggest the need for 
the “I,” both the narrative “I” and the “I” within the narration of another.  That that 
“I” is itself a metaphorical position is suggested by Estraven’s disconnect and loss of 
balance when faced with “mind-speak.”  His utter loss of balance in the face of 
permeability is a recognition of the delineation of the “I” as merely a metaphorical 
methodology with which to face the world.  That we exist as a separate whole is a 
position that is in need of constant reconsideration.  Where exactly does that 
boundary lie?  At what point does the air we breath cease to be a part of the 
environment and become strictly a part of our bodies?  The same question can be 
asked about food, liquid, and even ideas.  What are the limits and parameters of our 
selves, and how do we make those claims without calling into question the 
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parameters of others? – and not just human others, but all others, including the 
planet.  Le Guin’s work presents us with these questions as not yet answered and in 
need of consideration.  She reminds us that all of our conceptions of self are 
metaphors – misnamings that we have decided to look on as pertinent predications – 
and she suggests that the greatest dangers in naming those parameters lay in the 
creation of determinative metaphors that become metaphorized and invisible 





Something from Nothing: Acts of Creation in Le Guin’s The Telling. 
 
 We tell Aristotelian stories, and we are compelled to do so, possibly because 
of longstanding habit or because of the way we have been taught to interact with the 
world or perhaps simply as a response to the way in which our cognition organizes 
that which we see.  Certainly, our construction of stories, our acts of emplotment, 
our insistence on the scaffolding of “beginning,” “middle” and “end” allow us to 
“shape our confused, formless, and in the last resort mute temporal experience” (sic) 
(Ricoeur, Text, 5-6).  We then organize those stories into genre, “culturally 
constructed” categories that “rest on the binary between what is normal and what is 
deviant” (Baccolin, 519).  In other words, we organize our comprehension into 
structures that offer solutions and resolutions, structures that offer comprehension 
and determine the parameters of that comprehension.  But what if there is no 
solution, no final resolution that when reached allows us to dust off our palms and 
walk away?  What if we are always in the process and that process is so large it 
cannot be encompassed in any fully defined manner?  How do our stories work for 
us if they have no endings?  And perhaps most important of all – where does 
metaphor come into the equation?   
In Ursula K. Le Guin’s novel The Telling, the author suggests that subversion 
of hierarchy and the creation of a collective require alternative structures and 
alternative interactions, that to create an understanding of the world that includes all 
members of a community takes a multiplicity of stories and a nearly endless number 
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of styles of “telling” – a multiplicity of moments of consent that include a 
willingness to accept a lack of closure and/or a failure to resolve complex 
interactions.  Subversion of hierarchy requires a willingness to make peace with the 
risk associated with both the alternative and the unknown.  She suggests as well, that 
to do so is necessary, to do so is the only way to interact with our material 
environment as a whole.  As well, Le Guin suggests to do so we must employ living 
metaphor,92 not only in explaining the content of these stories, not only in the way in 
which we construct our stories, but as well, to construct a world that allows for what 
is yet to be created, in which creation must exist as a position that allows for a 
functional relationship between body and world.  Such a relationship is made 
possible within living metaphor because in the repeated pattern of movement from 
impertinent predication to newly pertinent predication and the consent required by 
that interaction the world is reconstructed.  In The Telling, Le Guin offers 
interactions that suggest that to reach that functional relationship between word and 
world, we must include in living metaphor the particularized form of materialized 
metaphor – a form of metaphor that creates a moment during which the literal meets 
the figurative to exist as layered and resonant such that it can become the 
un/imaginable.   
The imaginable and the unimaginable are so closely linked in this text that 
they are not separable; rather, for Sutty on Aka, imagination must be expanded on a 
daily basis.  Sutty literally cannot imagine the things that she sees because of a lack 
                                                          




of reference, yet as that catalogue of reference expands, her ability to imagine also 
expands so that the imaginable and the unimaginable inhabit the same space.  Her 
state suggests that the act of imagination is a complete interconnection and 
coordinated interaction between world and viewer in which sight and imagination 
must work in tandem.  In other words, to be able to see/observe we must be able to 
imagine that which we see.  The moment when the unimaginable is observed is a 
moment of Suvin’s cognitive estrangement and as well, a moment when the 
imagination must “catch up” in order that what is viewed can be accepted.  In the 
text’s use of materialized metaphor, Le Guin reflects the tension between science 
and the unknown (as well as the potentially unknowable) and suggests that what 
appears to be faith and mysticism, with the extension of the imagination that allows 
a reflection of what has been observed, can instead exist as the expansion/access that 
allows for an interaction with that which is beyond reason – i.e. the unmeasurable, 
the unknown, and the unknowable.  In the case of materialized metaphor, the consent 
necessary in metaphor is twofold in that, beyond the usual consent between the 
transmitter, receiver, and referent, there must also be an earlier moment of consent 
offered by the imaginer to the expansion of her/his imagination such that the new 
moment in which the metaphor becomes a material act can be accepted.  In other 
words, materialized metaphor exists as a moment when imagination and metaphor 
work in tandem to – quite literally – recreate the material world, an act that mirrors 
the way we create/recreate our stories.   
 Le Guin has certainly structured The Telling within the agreed upon western 
standard of story telling, but the interior stories that construct the core knowledge-
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bank of the community of Aka and the central quest of the text are non-linear, non-
Aristotelian in their structure.  There are a few notable exceptions to this traditional 
style in Le Guin’s work, like the texts “It was a Dark and Stormy Night; Or, Why 
Are We Huddling about the Campfire?” and Always Coming Home.93  Both are 
nonlinear, multi-perspective discussions concerning story telling and its function in 
creating differentiation, and thus allow the storytellers to avoid “disolv[ing] entirely 
into his surroundings” (Le Guin, Dark, 198).  But in general, Le Guin’s novels, 
stories, and essays are usually recognizably Aristotelian, with the familiar 
scaffolding of traditional tales that produce each move through beginning, middle, 
and ending, and make use of conflict and crisis, rising action and dénouement.  That 
said, within its recognizable structure, The Telling incorporates many other styles of 
storytelling, instructions and guidelines that comprise “the Telling,” the oral and 
written collection of knowledge that acts as library, archive, and instructional guide 
to those who take part in the religion/culture of the Rangma of Aka. 
 
WHAT THERE IS TO KNOW 
The “Telling” is the “religion”94 that has existed on the planet Aka for the 
thousands of years preceding contact with the Ekumen (community of planets) – 
                                                          
93 Always Coming Home seems to be an experiment that mirrors many of the patterns of “the Telling” 
in The Telling.  With a culture safeguarded in and expanded by multiple views, multiple tellers, and 
multiple forms of telling, the people of the valley interact within a network of culture that is 
interconnected with everything they do, much as is true for the Rangma of The Telling. 
94 Religion is a fraught term in this text.  As will be discussed later in this chapter, Sutty spends much 
of her time determining whether “the Telling” is a religion or not, moving back and forth between a 
presumption that it must be to relief that it is not, settling finally on the less loaded term “system.” 
However, I will continue to use the term religion on occasion and in combination with others because 
the “system” is so complex as to make the use of any single term too one-dimensional. 
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specifically Terra – whose bungled interaction has sparked an aggressive move to 
technology on Aka which has prompted a ban on the “old things. . . Old worlds, old 
ways” (Le Guin, TT, 95).  The ban is problematic as well as difficult to enforce 
because “the Telling” is non-Aristotelian in its communication, and as such, it is not 
structured in the same manner as any of the major, recognizable religions95 – i.e. 
through narrative – such that it has no single sanctified story or text – “No bible.  No 
Koran.  Dozens of Upanishads, a million sutras” (110) – and has no certified leaders: 
“religion as an institution demanding belief and claiming authority . . . had never 
existed on Aka” (105).  As such, it contains beginnings that appear to be middles, 
and rising action that has little to do with the close of the tale, and the endings that 
exist are merely next steps in the process at hand.   
Peopled by protagonists who are identifiable despite their switch of gender, 
personality, and attributes, and despite the apparent incoherence, each segment or 
tale of “the Telling” seems to hint at a kernel of meaning: “these stories weren’t 
gospel.  They weren’t Truth.  They were essays at the truth” (184).  This complex 
polyglossia creates what Ricoeur calls “a functional unity among the multiple 
narrative modes and genres” (Text, 2), offering an array of perspective and choice as 
to approaches to the surrounding world that work together and act as a connecting 
network and a foundation to the necessary codes.  Each a part of the underpinning of 
the banned religioculture, the myriad stories of “the Telling” are non-linear and 
                                                          
95 Of the major religions, “the Telling” most closely resembles Buddhism or Taoism in its lack of a 
deity, funeral traditions, and overall tone – a fact that Sutty herself notes (102) – but even that 
resemblance has limitations, as Aka’s religion is not recognizable as a religion at all in that it is older, 
more expansive, and more process oriented, requiring no belief, loyalty or penance.  
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belong to no single person; rather, there are literally as many stories as there are 
adherents, and as well, those stories are rife with metaphor: human bodies are trees, 
“the Telling” is a mountain or a forest or a jungle (111), etc., etc.  As each story is 
told by a particular member of the community, the particularity of the story telling 
requires the expansion of the imagination of the listener – or listeners – in order that 
s/he be able to comprehend what is told.  As such, living metaphor is both 
unavoidable and remains “living” metaphor in that the metaphor must be reinvented 
with each new addition of a particular participant.  Also, as such, the “stories” often 
leave the listener/reader with unanswered questions and little sense of completion, 
suggesting simply a next step rather than a completed journey.  That said, despite the 
metaphor of the journey with its suggestion of a linear teleology, the components of 
“the Telling” are not linear in their connection to the religioculture or – as Sutty, the 
protagonist, prefers – the “system” (103), yet each tale – each version of each tale – 
works in combination with the vast array of other versions, other tales, other 
versions of other tales, etc., etc. 
What the maz (those educated in “the Telling”) have to share is widely 
variable, and although largely communicated in storytelling form, covers a vast 
variety of knowledge and skills.  As an observer for the Ekumen, Sutty attempts to 
listen and record the various maz – all of whom are willing to share – but finds the 
multiplicity of what there is to “know” confusing in its variety:  
Some of them, specialists in ceremonies, resembled the priests of 
conventional Terran religions, officiating at the rites of passage, marriages, 
funerals . . .Some maz were physicians, healers, herbalists, or botanists. . 
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.Some maz worked mostly with books: they taught children and adults to 
write and read ideograms, they taught the texts and ways of understanding 
them. (114)   
The more Sutty observes, the more pieces and variety of form she finds, but in her 
attempts to comprehend, she is regularly pulled aside to a version of what she 
believes must exist – the core precept: “Early in the winter she thought she had 
found the central texts of the system in a series of poems and treatises called The 
Arbor” (110).  However, she is reminded, despite a willingness “to be lost there for 
years,” that “this isn’t the Telling, this is just a part of it, just a small part of it . . .” 
(111).  In fact, for much of the novel, Sutty’s collection of “knowledge” seems to be 
not just confusing in its incoherence, but in fact, incomprehensible as a whole: “How 
did it all hang together?  Was there any relation at all among these disparate things?” 
(115).  The problem is, of course, one that Le Guin’s work brings up repeatedly – 
that of scale.  “The Telling” is, in essence, non-linear segments of a collective 
knowing so large as to be unknowable as a whole and even unapproachable if one 
approaches without metaphor. 
 
METAPHOR AND SCALE  
The “Telling” is a system so vast that, as Sutty finds in her attempts to 
organize the information she is offered, “the incoherence of it all was staggering” 
(Le Guin, TT, 115).  So, despite the fact that we and the protagonist are tempted to 
effect an organization of the huge collection (as if it were a kind of jigsaw puzzle) in 
the hopes that if we can just sort out the tales, recognize the metaphors, and create 
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some kind of order so that we may begin to comprehend what this collection means, 
the text makes clear, internally to Sutty and externally to the reader that, although 
one can “know” a portion of what is available, one cannot know everything.  In fact, 
the information gains value as the knower accepts her/his limitations and turns to the 
collective, reimagining the management/exploration of knowledge as a shared task: 
“She knew now that all she would ever know of the Telling was the least hint or 
fragment of what there was to know.  But that was all right; that was how it was” 
(198).  So, rather than order as a central organizing point, fluidity becomes the 
position from which one must work when engaging with a system that is neither 
temporally stable nor comprehensive as a whole.  In the shifts and flow of “the 
Telling” remains a profoundly comprehensive “system” that by the very nature of 
the form must adjust to each new moment, each new participant – a form that 
mirrors almost exactly that of living metaphor.  In fact, the grand metaphor of The 
Telling is incorporated in the very size of the “system,” in the paradox of knowledge 
as unknowable – certainly as a single subject, a solitary “knower” – including in that 
construction the need to accept what cannot be known (contained or owned), and a 
comprehension that in that acknowledgement there is a need for a reversal in our 
relationship with the act of knowing – an inverted ontology, as it were.   
Within the fictional structure that underpins The Telling, rather than treating 
knowledge as a collectible substance, Le Guin/the members of the community treat 
knowledge as a field of nearly infinite expanse, or as Quantum Field Theory 
suggests, “a large number of degrees of freedom” (Kuhlmann, np), freedom which, 
in this case, exists as differentiation.  From the perspective that defines knowledge as 
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a field, it (knowledge) cannot be acquired or owned; it can only be visited, interacted 
with, or made use of, a position that changes our sense of entitlement – i.e. our 
relationship with that knowledge – and is not unlike Martin Heidegger’s discussion 
of our relationship with technology in which he notes that within the context of 
technological relationships “even the Rhine itself appears as something at our 
command” (7).  Our environment, the very planet we live on, and – in the case of 
knowledge – our relationship with what is known become merely economic and 
technological resources over which we have control.  Such a position is skewed, 
creating a breakdown in the network of relationships which ends in disaster, as 
presented in the producer/consumer government of Dovza in the novel in which 
students are defined by how many cups of “akakafi” they consume and “[n]obody 
talk[s] about reading or course material” (66).  Such an approach to knowledge 
produces a closed relationship, denying the effect of the participants because an 
ownership relationship suggests that knowledge is stable and the transmitter and 
receiver add nothing to the equation.   
In opposition to the community at Dovza, the Rangma, the alternative 
community on Aka, whose interactions with the world are based on “the Telling,” 
functions within a reversal of this consumer/owner relationship with the world and 
knowledge, and in doing so, switches that owner relationship with knowledge to one 
of shared maintenance in which the members of the community act as collective 
librarians, archivists, and member/users.  Such a relationship creates a system by 
which both the access to the “library” and tasks in maintenance of the “library” 
remain fluid, variable, shared, and – often – exist as materialized metaphors.  In such 
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a system, the knowledge imparted by “the Telling” acts in material ways and is also 
maintained in material ways by both the institutions and the single members of the 
institution, just as it is metaphorically maintained in the minds and the community of 
the single members of the Rangma community as well as in the community as a 
whole.  The reversal that exists in the relationship between those who take part in 
“the Telling” and “the Telling” as a whole requires an acknowledgement of the fact 
that what one knows at any given time is merely a fragment of what can be 
discovered – one of those “degrees of freedom” – in that field as well as a 
recognition of the variability that comes with the added interaction of each 
participant, something that may slip away or change in the changing moment.  Such 
a relationship necessitates a multiplicity of views that both recognize the immediate 
knowledge (the particle) and the greater unknown (the field), and that even minimal 
comprehension of the field requires multiple positions within that field as well as 
multiple “knowers,” as each “knower” changes the knowledge with which s/he 
interacts and, as such, insists upon the collective as necessary to knowledge and 
knowing, while recognizing the resulting and necessary fluidity that the interchange 
creates.   
In Le Guin’s text, each of the maz (the educated/educators) recognizes that 
s/he has only a tiny piece to offer, and none hoard their knowledge: “So far she had 
met no arcane wisdoms in the Telling, no holy secrets that could be told only to 
adepts, no knowledge withheld to fortify the authority of the learned, magnify their 
sanctity, or increase their fees” (116).  In fact, the lack of arcane knowledge or the 
refusal to hoard knowledge in an attempt to gain authority is antithetical to “the 
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Telling” itself because “the Telling” cannot exist in a hierarchical form.  The present 
state of affairs, in which the old ways are banned, is in direct relation to the changes 
to “the Telling” that have been the result of an attempt to reconstruct it in 
hierarchical form.  When the “barbarian” (178) tribes of the plains began to 
incorporate themselves into “the Telling” they brought with them antithetical 
practices, creating acceptable usury and “boss maz” allowing inherited positions 
instead of allowing “the Telling” to flow: “they made the maz into bosses, with the 
power to rule and punish.  Gave maz the power to tax. . . They made the sons of maz 
all maz, by birth” (179).  The resulting backlash is insurrection and a concerted 
effort to destroy all of the “old ways” (ibid), to destroy “the Telling.”  Logically 
speaking, “the Telling” becomes an altered and destructive form in becoming 
hierarchical because the very structures of hierarchy depend upon the stasis that 
keeps the elements of that hierarchy in position – not “the Telling” at all.  By nature 
and definition, “the Telling” is fluid and cannot exist in the stasis of hierarchy.  As 
shared, any one position is limited and becomes fluid only in interconnection with 
the whole, allowing the overall construct the ability to expand beyond what a static 
construction can support, and so, “The Telling” is a network rather than a hierarchy, 
a network of a scale that means any one position is merely a part of the whole – 
allowing the whole to become vast indeed. 
In the recognition of one’s limited position within “the Telling,” each of the 
maz acts as caretaker rather than possessor of the knowledge s/he “Tells” putting no 
limits on who can access/visit/use said knowledge.  Only as a group, only in 
interconnected existence does the knowledge exist as a whole, and all newcomers 
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are welcome, as is made clear by Sutty’s reception by the members she visits and 
interviews.  “The Telling,” by definition, is a group effort and as such expands what 
can be known while the very size of the known requires that it exists in the 
metaphors of connection that occur over and over again in the text:   
. . . it was a marvelously painted map or mandala of the One that is Two 
giving rise to the Three, to the Five, to the Myriad again to the Five, the 
Three, the Two, the One . . .  A Tree, a Body, a Mountain, inscribed within 
the circle that was everything and nothing. (130) 
The repeated doubling followed by the reversal back to “the One” followed by the 
myriad metaphorical replacements suggests the structure of “the Telling” as a whole, 
a simultaneously extant and intricately interwoven system of knowing – a collective 
ontology that must be shared because it is a relationship that depends upon the 
collective to exist, each field of knowledge cannot be a possession and access is, by 
definition, offered to and dependant on the collective group, i.e. the whole.   
 
HOW TO KNOW 
The reversal of the relationship to knowledge from ownership to shared trust 
allows for an acceptance of the fact that knowledge cannot be encompassed within a 
single self and gains both scope and depth in the shared management of what is 
known, in that the knowledge shifts and reflects differences each time the viewer 
visits or that visitor shifts.  Just as utopia must be reinvented in each interaction as 
the participants carry forward what is understood to be adapted to the next utopic 
exchange creating an immense interconnected range of utopic moments which are 
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not entirely visible as a whole although the state of that whole effects each next 
moment, “the Telling” can only be told in snippets and glimpses which are offered in 
non-linear stories that exist within a pattern too large to discern, such that it must be 
posited in an array of views (“knowers”).  As the individual recognizes the limits of 
his or her portion the whole becomes larger yet: “We are the world.  We’re its 
language.  So we live and it lives.  You see?  If we don’t say the words, what is there 
in our world?” (142).  It is, as Sutty notes, “[a] world made of words” (127), but as 
such, it is a world so huge that despite the fact – or perhaps because – it is made of 
words it overlaps and affects all the world it touches, as metaphor and material world 
overlap allowing access to both the material and immaterial.  As such, for those 
trying to control that world, living metaphor, and in particular materialized metaphor 
is the enemy, as noted by the Monitor as he attempts to limit Sutty’s movement and, 
more generally, her interaction with the field of knowledge she is exploring – that is 
“The Telling.” 
The Monitor is a displaced adherent of the “old ways,” and, in playing out 
the trope of refusal, in a response to his displacement he has become a fanatic in his 
refusal of that which he has lost.  As such, he dogs Sutty in her travels, warning her 
in his exclamations that she should not “betray” the comunocapitalist “Corporation” 
that acts as government to Aka (Le Guin, TT, 93).   However, embedded in his 
warnings are statements about the relationship between language and governance: 
“They [the followers of the old ways] are the enemies of truth, of science.  Their so-
called knowledge is rant, superstition, and poetry” (92).  The Monitor’s inclusion of 
poetry is an indication of the scope of metaphor, that metaphor is a “displacement 
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and . . .extension of the meaning of words” (Ricoeur, Rule, 1), and as such, it is also 
a creative force through its relationship with predication.  Metaphor can be a “one 
word trope,” a replacement,  but can also exist as an “interaction” which in the 
context of discussion of the non-literally discussable allows new meaning, as 
outlined in “interaction theory” (Rule, 75) which Ricoeur attributes to Max Black 
(Ricoeur, Metaphorical, 143) in which “the predicative act. . . points to an extra-
linguistic reality which is its referent” (Ricoeur, Rule, 256) rather than a mere 
replacement of one object for another or an object for a simple abstract.  Thus, as an 
extension96 of meaning, metaphor becomes necessary in a consideration of that 
which is unmeasurable – in this case, specifically within many interactions of “the 
Telling” – (an anathema in modern Aka as a society based on measurement and 
definition) in that it (metaphor) allows for language to exist as a form of reference to 
replace that of measurement as a standard by which to comprehend the state to 
which one refers.   
In a space that exists between the world and the word, the idea of metaphor 
becomes a metaphor within the metalanguage (Jakobsen, Aphasia, 235) that allows 
for discussion of the implicit structures that underlie the explicit structures of control 
in Aka as well as in those unmeasurable interactions of which “the Telling” consists.  
However, because “the Telling” is unmeasurable and exists within metaphor, the 
monitor is on a fruitless mission, as the very structures he relies on deny the 
possibility of the unmeasurable and so denies “the Telling” itself, and thus, “the 
                                                          
96 Again, although metaphor is less centered than the words “extension” and “expansion” suggest – 




Telling” slips sideways through metaphor and remains out of reach in the daily 
interactions of the people.  After all, how does one ban exercise because it is one of 
the “old ways” (ibid)?  How does one ban a recipe for breakfast because it exists as 
sedition?  In his attempts to catch Sutty in her interactions with “the Telling,” the 
Monitor – who understands the nature of the Telling far more fully than other agents 
of the government and thus recognizes moments of the Telling others do not – is 
made ridiculous, spinning in circles and finally refused by his own government 
because they believe he is chasing ghosts.   Yet there is no question that these 
seemingly innocuous actions are part of “the Telling” and have a dual life that spans 
daily interactions through metaphor to the unmeasurable that exists in the grand 
multi-temporal, multi-viewed system that is “the Telling.”  As such, metaphor acts 
as a bridge that allows the “system” to survive despite the repressive attempts of the 
government.  In that relationship between metaphor and survival lies the narrative of 
Sutty’s escape from her past and the limitations of monotheism. 
 Sutty’s greatest obstacle and the dilemma that has placed her deep in 
depression at the start of the novel is a loss created through the replacement of living 
metaphor with effaced and determinative metaphors – i.e. a loss of consent in the 
way her life is constructed.  As discussed earlier, such a replacement is a mode used 
by many systems that attempt to control and limit their citizens through the 
standardization of the message and terms of the ruling ideology such that it creates 
stasis rather than interaction; the “consent” necessary is manufactured through 
“educative pressure . . . applied to single individuals so as to obtain their consent and 
their collaboration, turning necessity and coercion into ‘freedom’” (Gramsci, 502).  
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Such coercion is presented in Le Guin’s text in the shouting students who meet for 
endless cups of akakafi (66) and in the rhetoric of the monitor who has replaced his 
early education with the slogans of the party.  In attempting to escape the polarized, 
restrictive government and hegemony of Terra, Sutty has chosen to work within the 
rich tapestry that is the ancient culture of the planet Aka but arrives to find a replica 
of the society which she has left behind.  Despite the fact that Terra has been under 
the punitive and restrictive religion/government of the “Unists” and Aka is rabidly 
secular in its communocapitalist government, the two are equally and similarily 
restrictive.  Aka, with its ZIL cards that track citizens and its ban on the “old ways,” 
reflects the deterministic methodologies of a combination of 20th century communist 
USSR and capitalist USA, but it also reflects Aristotelian story structures without the 
freedom and expansion allowed for by living metaphor, replacing said metaphor 
with its rigid relatives, effaced and determinative metaphor, both of which refuse 
change and deny difference; all of which, sets up a polarized binary. 
On Aka, within the Dovza norms, the measurable and the immeasurable exist 
in a polarized binary in that there is no interaction between the two except that of 
elision.  Thus, one must prove one is “modern” by refusing the “old ways” as made 
clear in the Monitor’s demand noted previously that Sutty understand that the 
proponents of the “old ways” are “the enemies of truth” who employ “poetry” in 
their sedition (ibid).  His claim is a statement about the way “the Telling” 
interconnects living metaphor and linguistic function within poetry, and in 
consequence, the adherents of “the Telling” are not restricted to the literal and 
definitive.  There is no irony in his claim to the ownership of truth; as a 
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representative of the government the monitor is expressing his need for a determinist 
understanding of reality, a necessary component in Aka’s technologically aggressive 
“PRODUCER-CONSUMERS. . .MARCH TO THE STARS” (7)97 as the 
propaganda has it, and within such determinism, poetry and metaphor are not 
allowable in their implied ambiguity as well as the resulting complexity which gives 
voice to the literally ambiguous interactions of the community.   
Simplicity and clarity are necessary to any polarized dualism, and Dovza, 
deep in its monotheistic ideology in which capitalism has been placed in the position 
of deity, has created just such a polarized binary between the literal and the 
figurative. Within that binary, only the literal – the science – is allowed, but of 
course, with the loss of the figurative, subtlety and complexity are lost as well and – 
in consequence of the loss of the other two and most important of all – accuracy is 
also lost.  As Le Guin suggests in any number of texts, polarized binaries are non-
dynamic and function in a limited manner and only for the few.  This narrowing of 
the privileged/valued community is a result of the fact that an effaced or 
determinative metaphor both allow for and necessitates a narrowing of meaning and 
a creation of stasis that requires in turn static and limited standards; as such, the 
polarized binary creates a need for the foreclosure of the relationship with the 
unknown allowed for, and in fact, sought after in living metaphor.98 
                                                          
97 The propaganda of the “Corporation” expressed in the text as effaced and determinative metaphors 
is represented by a shout of capital letters.   
98 As discussed earlier, both effaced and determinative metaphors are often produced by a desire – 
specifically in this text, desire for measurable and explicit standards – and are always used as a means 
of control.  To reiterate, effaced metaphors consist of a displacement of the original metaphor through 
the disconnect between metaphor and referent.  Determinative metaphor is constructed without 
reference to a “fabulous scene” (Derrida, 11) from which other metaphor is originally produced, but is 




THE SILENCE OF THE POLARIZED BINARY 
Le Guin’s texts consistently insist on the damage inflicted through the use of 
binaries, in particular polarized binaries.  Reminiscent of Baccolin’s statement about 
genre, in Le Guin’s texts, trouble comes in systems of control that also “rest on the 
binary between what is normal and what is deviant” (ibid).  In The Telling the binary 
is between the literal and the figurative – science and culture – with the figurative as 
deviant, a clear sign that the planet is in trouble because “ambiguities never absent 
from [Le Guin’s opus] do not primarily flow from a static balancing of two yin-an-
yang-type alternatives, two principles or opposites. . .Rather, the Leguinian 
ambiguities are in principle dynamic” (Suvin, Parables, 271).  However, binaries are 
as hard to avoid in Le Guin’s text as they are in life as Sutty finds when she is 
sucked into a relationship based on loathing and hatred for the Monitor, who himself 
is tormented by a need to simplify or determine some form of “truth,” a need which 
produces a binary that leads to a kind of insanity.  Such insanity is the obvious 
outcome, as Patrick Parrinder notes in his discussion of the way in which Gulliver, 
after his travels through one polarized community after another, falls into “a state of 
alienation’ which amounts to madness” (48).  It is that same state of madness that 
consumes the monitor in The Telling, as made clear in his conversation with Sutty at 
“The Last Library”:   
                                                          
metaphor becomes a free agent that acts as justification for rigid categorizations – disallowing the 




“This is where you were coming. . .The place where they hide the books.  
This is it.” 
“Who are ‘they,’ Monitor?” 
“The enemies of the state.” (205) 
The monitor’s division of the modern conformist citizens and the “traitors” who 
follow the “old ways” as “us” and “them” is implied by his use of the word “they,” 
but his anger is a response to more than a simple disagreement about how the 
community is organized.  His rage is prompted by fear that is produced by the way 
language and living metaphor destabilize his conception of the truth.   
Polarized binary relationships only allow for the existence of a defined and 
non-dynamic “Truth,” the kind of truth the monitor seeks and claims.  His fury with 
the proponents of the “old ways” and his claim that “[t]hey are enemies of the truth, 
of science” makes clear his polarized position, a position which indicates his truth is 
inextricable from that of science and science is inextricable from his “truth” as a 
whole.  But such a position also demands that truth be understood as something that 
can be obtained and owned, a position well suited to a community that equates 
“work” and “wealth” (75) in a simplistic equation that refuses to take into account 
other less measurable factors because factors that are less measurable muddy the 
economic/political waters.  Much the way scientists even today claim an 
“objectivism” which purports to be based in “value-free, impartial, dispassionate 
objectivity that is supposed to guide scientific research” (Harding, 741) without 
reference to the agent of that scientific research – that mythical “neutral” scientist – 
the “Corporation” of Aka suggests that “PURE SCIENCE DESTROYS 
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CORRUPTION” (8).  It is a statement dependent on a false presumption that “pure 
science” can exist as pure once the scientist – i.e. the subject – has engaged in 
perception, experimentation, record keeping, funding, etc.  Such subjective positions 
within “pure science” also demand recognition of a clearly delineated ownership 
through discovery and position.   
The propaganda further suggests that the old ways in their ambiguous state, 
with their living metaphor and poetry, cannot be pure, and thus, cannot be “true” as 
the state of “pure” science must have corruption to destroy, and the word “pure” 
suggests an oppositional position to that which is not pure – ambiguity and variety.  
So, for the Monitor and the Corporation and its “consumer/producers” with values 
posited in ownership, any available truth must be encompassed within science, and 
within that categorization, those truths must be both comprehensible and a potential 
acquisition, as represented in Aka’s single-minded and often brutal quest for 
technological advancement, that much touted “march to the stars.”  But Le Guin 
suggests that the unmeasurable – despite the fact that its unmeasurable state makes 
ownership and valuation nearly impossible – has a value all its own, that, whether a 
society chooses to ignore the unmeasurable or not, the unmeasurable is the 
foundation of day-to-day life, and although ignoring it may be a choice, avoiding the 
consequences is impossible. 
Sutty’s despair at the beginning of the novel, which is made clear in her 
frustration with the “bad food,” “stupid unnecessary traffic jams,” and “noise all the 
time” which combine to produce her conclusion that Aka is a “people hyping itself 
into making every mistake every other population in FF-tech mode had ever made” 
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(9), is in fact despair at the simplification and elision of a thousand-year-old 
narrative based in living metaphor.  The difference between the shout of the 
“Corporation” (those shouts of capitalized letters, the slogans that offer simplistic 
platitudes constructed in effaced and determinative metaphors) and the murmur of 
“the Telling” is the difference suggested by Ferdinand de Saussure in his 
reorganization of our relationship with language such that language is no longer “a 
transparent tool for describing in clear ways a reality that exists around us” (quoted 
by Haslam, 75).  His is a statement that changes our relationship with languages but 
also refuses and denies the concept that “reality” is static and clearly delineated.  
Such is not the state of either language or the world; rather, as Jason Haslam writes, 
“language. . .shapes the very way we see that reality” (75).  In fact, the very 
existence of living metaphor – and even those more destructive and limiting forms of 
metaphor – reflects that lack of clarity as well as the fact that language takes an 
active part in the creation of that reality.   
Metaphor insists that predication embedded in a form that – unlike simile 
which compares – insists upon a replacement must be an expansion, a new 
construction, an altered view that reinvents that which it views.  The idea that 
language shapes and creates rather than describes is a reversal that proscribes the 
idea of that single “Truth” so prized by the Monitor, but one with which Le Guin 
takes us even farther in the way “the Telling” posits meaning primarily within 
storytelling and living metaphor, and the processes by which both are created.  It is a 
process that eventually reaches a culmination in what appears to be mysticism, but is 




METOPHOR AS MAGIC?  
Le Guin is extremely hesitant in her relationship to anything that can be 
classified as the “occult,” stating in her essay “A Response to the Le Guin Issue” that 
she “loathe[s] occultism” and that in her texts ESP is a “metaphor” (Response, 158), 
and yet, in The Telling, Le Guin has chosen to present scenes that appear 
“supernatural” in very literal terms within a science fiction text rather than the more 
apparently suitable genre of fantasy in which she also writes.  Within the novel, 
Sutty too loathes the unexplained, the mystical, the arcane, finding any hint of 
mysticism disturbing in its suggestion that “the Telling” is just another religious 
hoax perpetrated to manipulate followers, yet, all the while, she longs for access to 
the sublime.99  For the most part in The Telling there are merely hints at the 
impossible, and Sutty turns with distaste from the maz who claim “arcane 
knowledge, and supernal powers” (132), categorizing such claims as “drivel” (132) 
and “hocus pocus” (131) – an opinion that seems to reflect Le Guin’s own.  She also 
steps past moments that call into question her conception of what is reasonable, such 
as her response to the moment during her introduction to Okzat-Ozkat in which she 
stands with the barrow man looking up at the mountains, and “others stop to help 
                                                          
99 In leaving the Unists of Earth behind, there is a valid argument that Sutty has replaced a simple 
deity with the complex world of the Ekumen as an alternative god.  The possibility is briefly 
addressed when at the Last Library one of the maz finally recognizes that the people of Aka have also 
done just that: “‘I thought of you . . . of all the people of the Ekumen, as very wise, above error.  How 
childish.’  Goiri said.  ‘How unfair.’” (215).  It is a moment of recognition of assumptions that relieve 
the “lesser” member of the dynamic of responsibility.  In Sutty’s case, her search is clearly a search 
for meaning, and her attempts to maintain that search only within the tangible effects of culture 
evolves and transforms to include the idea that that meaning must include more than the measurable 
and the material. 
Sheckler 199 
 
them gaze” because “[t]hey all knew what Silong looked like and therefore could 
help her see it” (53).  After a communal discussion about the possibility of traveling 
to Mount Silong and what benefit is to be found there (including three hundred years 
of sex and the ability to fly), those “others” “vanish” (54), a term that is left in limbo.  
Le Guin never makes clear if that “vanishing” is a literal unexplained phenomenon 
(suggested by the statement that they “waver” before vanishing), an hallucination 
experienced by Sutty (unsupported by the text), or a metaphorical “vanishing” (quick 
exit) in response to the hated “Monitor” who has arrived.  By refusing to explain and 
specifically implying more than one possibility, Le Guin suggests that all forms of 
meaning available are relevant and present a form of accuracy, creating layering that 
implicates the arcane and the every day.   
In Le Guin’s refusal to pin down definition and its consequent offering of 
layered possibility and multiple meaning, she expands this metaphorical reading to 
include her other references to the still extant knowledge of “the Telling” such as the 
still visible writing that can be seen through the mandated whitewash on the walls of 
the lotions shop: Sutty notes that those ideograms just barely readable through the 
layers of whitewash pulse “evenly, regularly, expanding and shrinking very gently, 
as if they were breathing” (57) and offer “a queer subliminal legibility” (55) as does 
Le Guin’s own layering of information.  In fact, despite her own refusal of the 
unmeasurable and the unexplained – that is, of course, the unknown – Sutty 
consistently finds herself in situations in which her actions and interpretations of a 
moment call into question her own relationship with “reality” suggesting other 
“realities” beneath the surface or to the side of the material state she is expecting.  In 
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fact, despite her consistent attempts to dismiss the recurring instances when she is 
confronted by empirical evidence of the impossible, eventually she can no longer 
simply turn away from those moments in which the literal and the figurative meet 
while both remain extant such that they work in synch to expand the meaning 
beyond the sum created by the confluence of the two states – measurable and the 
unmeasurable.   
After dismissing earlier moments as mere confusion, Sutty is less able to 
ignore the steadily occurring anomalies that exist within the alternative relationship 
with the material world that is “the Telling” and is, in consequence, faced with the 
limitations of a single human brain and perception.  When a half-witted attendant of 
a meditation Sutty is attending attempts to help her with an unfamiliar movement 
during a group exercise/meditation by walking into the air, whispering “Up – like 
this – see?” such that he is “standing barefoot half a meter above the floor” (137), 
Sutty’s ability to claim her own conception of what is possible as the only acceptable 
truth fails.  That the man’s position is not an hallucination is made clear when the 
leader of the meditation reaches up to help the man down saying, “Come down, Uki” 
(137), a response that confirms that the man is, in fact, elevated (standing on air) and 
that the position is not surprising to the group leader (the maz).  Anyone acquainted 
with meditation and yoga is used to the incorporation of metaphor in commands 
such as “be nothing,” “lift your heart to your chest,” etc., but here Le Guin, suggests 
a material realization of such commands, and she does so within the – in some ways 
– rigid confines of science fiction, i.e. fiction which is supposed to comply with 
“accurate technical and scientific detail” (Hubble, xiii).  As a self-avowed sceptic, 
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there must be a reason for Le Guin’s inclusion of what appears to be the materially 
impossible in a science fiction text – especially considering her own work in the 
genre of fantasy and the options that offers – and that reason is encompassed in the 
need to take a close look at the unstated limitations that Sutty (and through Sutty, all 
of us including Le Guin) is placing on her perceptions of what is reasonable.   
As Sutty listens to the various maz she places limits on what she is willing to 
hear because she is originally unwilling to step into an area she feels is fraught and 
unhealthy because of her past interactions with religion and specifically the Unists 
attempts to limit the movement and choices of the people through multiple means 
including determinative and effaced metaphor.  Her response to certain of the maz 
suggests a desire to pick and choose what she will consider as valid in an attempt to 
protect her own appreciation for the system – suggesting a belief that her own 
perceptions are in fact the standard by which she can determine the “reasonable” – 
and as such, her own ideas of what is acceptable within that system: “She was afraid 
that this woman who embodied the system fully, who lived it totally, would force her 
to admit that it was hysterical, obsessional, absolutist, everything she feared and 
wanted it not to be” (141).  Sutty’s fear suggests her standard includes a rationality 
that must reign in a state of “purity” as untainted (and as brutal?) as the Monitor’s, 
suggesting that if we cannot understand an event, that event is unreasonable and 
cannot exist – that all knowledge can be conscribed within rationality/science.  That 
Sutty is more sophisticated and understands the world as more complex than the 
Monitor does not change her need for everything to be explainable, everything to fall 
within the reasonable.  However, as maz Elyed says with calm reason, “What we do 
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is unreasonable” (141).  In that one calm admission, the “reasonable” as 
unimpeachable standard and the single subject/agent as determiner of what is 
“reasonable” is called into question.   
If the Monitor has made a deity out of science, Sutty has done the same with 
human comprehension.  Only when Sutty begins to accept the limitations of human 
comprehension does her comprehension of “the Telling” become more than a 
personal search for meaning and a deification of human intellect.  After all, if the 
human brain and cognitive process can comprehend/encompass all, how is that 
human intellect different from a deity?  It is through a recognition and acceptance of 
the unreasonable – i.e. that which is beyond human scope or comprehension – that 
Sutty is able to really begin her exploration of “the Telling,” and of course, the only 
way the “unreasonable” can be expressed in language is through metaphor and 
poetry.  Thus, Le Guin’s presentation of the materialized metaphor – that moment 
when the man who is half-witted, i.e. unable to employ rational thought and thus not 
limited to the “reasonable,” steps into the air to express his comprehension of the 
command to rise – suggests not faith nor mysticism, but rather, the very fact of 
metaphor.   
The temptation is to speak of metaphor as productive in either the most 
basically material of ways (Lakoff and Johnson’s direct equation) or in the most 
immaterial of ways, a style that often suggests that metaphor merely offers a new 
view.  But in fact, metaphor constructs, if not always in measurable ways, in 
unquestionably visible ones creating influence that changes language, response, and 
the world in which those interactions exist.  Ricoeur suggests analysis of metaphor 
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be enacted through “propositional logic,” that “metaphor be considered within the 
framework of predication” (Ricoeur, Rule, 118), and in its predication, metaphor as a 
replacement (substitution theory) can also be considered as a new creation 
(interaction theory) (Ricoeur, Rule, 119).  If Uki – with his limited ability to reason – 
does not understand the command to rise as a metaphor and thus performs the move 
authentically in the material world, the metaphor becomes a creator of something 
new well beyond the realm of language; he materializes the metaphor, and that 
materialization is the source of change.  Le Guin creates such materialized metaphor 
in nearly all her texts, as is in the case in The Eye of the Heron when the People of 
the Peace become newly constructed slaves – a state that is produced through 
determinative metaphor, or the connecting arc of the bridge between Gethen and the 
Ekumen that is produced through the living metaphor of Estraven’s death as the 
blood and mortar in The Left Hand of Darkness, or in fact, the way Sutty’s journey 
to the “last Library” acts as a materialized metaphor in which her metaphorical move 
to acceptance of scale and inaccessibility matches step for step her material trek 
through blind valleys and nearly impassable mountain ranges.  
As such, Le Guin’s choice to place Uki’s scene in a science fiction novel is 
not about miracles; it is a reference to how little we know about the relationship 
between world and word, the size and scope of the patterns.  It suggests the “size” of 
the “field” of knowledge is beyond comprehension – at least human comprehension 
– and that a willingness to accept – to consent to – the scene despite that inability to 
comprehend is a position that offers both a scope of view and a relationship with that 
field of knowledge that is unavailable through any other approach.  In this very odd 
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text of Le Guin’s, there is no suggestion that materialized metaphor is mysticism or 
“super”natural; rather, her construction is a recognition of a need for courageous 
acceptance of the possibility that the “natural” is far larger than we are often willing 
to consider. 
 
THE FUTURE AS METAPHOR 
That we need to broaden our relationship with the unknown and the 
unmeasurable is an idea most directly related with our relationship with the future.  
As the text draws to a close with a completely new and unpredicted outcome in 
which the last library has been discovered but not destroyed because the watching 
eyes of the Ekumen change the behavior of what has been until now a brutally 
destructive regime, Le Guin steps away from the obvious drama of total loss and 
total gain.  Under the witnessing eyes of the ultra-civilized and neutral Ekumen, who 
– although neutral – do not hide their grief at the loss of a culture thousands of years 
in the making, the Corporation rethinks its position: “Since an Akan ship is on its 
way to Hain, and being informed that an Ekumenical ship is scheduled to arrive next 
year, some elements within the Council have advocated a more relaxed policy” 
(243).  It is those eyes of the Other and that Other’s knowledge that has potential to 
keep the Library extant, as noted by one of the maz, Goiri: “But maybe the fact that 
you know about it, that the Ekumen is interested in it, would protect the Library” 
(214).  As well, Sutty’s great enemy, the Monitor, is no bogyman after all.  Left 
crippled after a plane crash on his quest to stop Sutty’s discovery of “rotten-corpse 
superstitions” (263) and, cared for by the pilgrims and scholars, his fanaticism is 
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transmuted to its original source, the fear and self-loathing of the child caught within 
the polarity of two generations.  It is only when Sutty can see the face of the person 
beneath the face of the bureaucrat and fanatic that she is able to accept the 
complexity that defies rational explanation, and only in doing so is she able to risk 
the Last Library to the unknown future.  
In fact, despite the risk to the Last Library, the adherents to the telling never 
predict the future, and consequently, never fall into the associated trap of the ends 
and means.  In the structures of “the Telling,” the present engagement must be 
balanced and the costs are never exported from the present moment.  In even the 
most mundane daily interactions, there is no borrowing or lending: “It [the Telling] 
chiefly prescribed respect for your own and everybody else’s body, and chiefly 
proscribed usury” (117), instead “cash was paid for value received” (103).  In a 
society that never defers cost, the conception of damaging immediate action as 
acceptable because of some conceived future gain becomes impossible.  As such, 
one does not predict and scheme to reach the conceived prediction; rather, one builds 
the present moment in order to reach the next moment, and because the results of 
destructive behavior are immediate they are less likely to be indulged.  In 
consequence, while fully aware of the danger the Monitor presents to the Last 
Library, there is no discussion of killing him.  One does not kill to support a 
supposed future gain because one cannot defer payment for that action, so his 
presence is a problem, but not a moral problem.  As a result, he is nursed and cared 
for and the problem is resolved through interconnection as he too must respond to 
the immediate interaction based in kindness.  As in the way utopia must be 
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reinvented in each interaction never becoming temporally stable in The 
Dispossessed, “the Telling” is a process of reinvention of self in each separate 
engagement, and so, word and world must work together and can never be deferred 
because if an agent attempts to act without reference to the effect that will be 
produced by the cause of said agent’s action the immediate consequences will bring 
the elements back into alignment.  Thus, in the present action lay the future and the 
past, all extant simultaneously; it is a reflection of the simultaneous existence of all 
the elements of a metaphor.  The future thus becomes a layered construct, 
paradoxical and metaphorical in that it is what it cannot be, extending in both 
directions at once, knowable and yet not knowable in that we can see the building 
blocks of action but not the changes produced in time.   
So, as Sutty faces the unknown response of the Corporation, she does so 
through the careful and slow steps that include an awareness of the past, a complete 
interaction with the present, and an outstretched hand to the future.  Rather than the 
dead run to that determinative metaphor that the future is for the Corporation, that 
“MARCH TO THE STARS” (ibid) that will end in broken communities and a 
destroyed planet, Sutty stops, considers, takes time to “sit on a bag” (Le Guin, LHD, 
76) and finds the next stable stepping stone in a path that is, not only unknown, but 
fraught and dangerous – but also a partner in the construction of the present moment.  
The future, as discussed in the introduction, cannot be avoided but the options in 
approach determine the outcome of that approach.  If the future is not the promised 
triumph the Corporation would like us to believe – and clearly it is not, as the death 
of the Monitor/Yara makes clear – it must be approached in the same way any 
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unknown must be approached, through an expansion of the present moment, a 
misnaming that states the future to be an extension of the present all while knowing 
that that “misnaming” – that impertinent predication – is not the thing in itself, but 
instead, an attempt to reach – to create – the thing in accessible form: the impertinent 
predication that hopes to become newly pertinent.  In other words, the future is a 
metaphor and thus requires informed consent to be “living/livable.”  Through 
metaphor and the way in which it combines what is with what is not through consent 
to that which we cannot control, be that uncontrollable variable the unknown other, 
the unknown fact, or the unknown future, we can find our next step, ask our next 
question, and consider our next move. 
When presented with the unexplainable, we flail in our terror at the 
destabilization of a world we would like to predict, and yet, when we predict, we 
often – if not usually – predict failure and doom.  The abyss is not difficult to 
imagine nor is it difficult to find.  The abyss is just at the edge of our eye, one step 
off whatever path we happen to be on, and right around the corner.  What is far more 
difficult to imagine – a far more difficult story to tell – is the complexity of a 
respectful interaction with the unpredictable.  There is no rest, no day off, for the 
thinking responder who goes beyond the kneejerk reaction; each moment requires 
engagement.  Thus, we try to discover the “rules” by which the world functions such 
that we are not frozen and exhausted; we tell stories to practice for the next 
interaction in an attempt to make rules to live by.  Yet the world changes far more 
quickly than our reaction time, and so those who live strictly by the rules must make 
more and more rules as each situation evolves.   
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Le Guin suggests adhering to very few rules; instead, rather than rules she 
offers broad precepts including accuracy and respect for the other, the self, and the 
environment in which we live.  She acknowledges the paradox that comes with a 
desire to acquire knowledge – that it is only an acquaintance, that our relationship 
with knowledge is that of maintenance person not lord.  As well, she points out the 
fact that all repression neglects a recognition of the other as enfranchised self (Hegel, 
119) and that attempted control of others is a lessening, a flattening and a move 
toward death, for in reaching for safety we reach toward the only position from 
which life is safe from death – i.e. death itself.  Le Guin makes clear that what 
control one has is limited to oneself within the moment in which one exists and 
makes reference to that occasional glimpse we gain as to the great pattern fleetingly 
recognized through the tiny portion of that pattern that we can “know” and from that 
tiny portion within a single moment we use metaphor to expand our ideas into what 
they cannot be, our guess or hunch or vision.  It is that vision that allows us to take 




Conclusion: Risky Futures 
  
In a world that has refused to make peace with risk, a world whose “failings 
of security, are nothing short of fanatic attempts to contain movement, deny change, 
and ignore anything that is different” (Whitehall, 170), effaced and determinative 
metaphor become the weapons of choice for any number of individuals and 
institutions in their attempts to control and repress – not just others – but the world 
itself.  As such, it is not without cause that metaphor has become the boogie-man of 
many of our most important theorists, but without metaphor we exist in a world of 
action and thought that is limited to the literal, the measurable, and the known 
without access to language that allows for discussion of the unmeasurable and the 
unknown.  Such a position polarizes important discussions so that they exist between 
“faith” and “knowledge” as if a world without absolutes is impossible: impossible in 
its existence, impossible to navigate.100  But it is exactly that world – one without 
absolutes – that we must face on a daily basis, and we can only do so through 
methodologies like metaphor.  By relegating our best tool for the procedure to the 
dustbin of the frivolous, the imprecise, and the decorative, by pretending that 
metaphor is either unnecessary or too inexact to be considered in careful estimation 
of any situation, or by claiming metaphor is only a repression rather than a necessary 
                                                          
100 This concept is not unrelated to what Thomas Baldwin calls “scientism” in his introduction to 
Merleau-Ponty’s work: an assumption that “the standard causal methodology of the physical sciences 
is that which is appropriate for explanatory inquiries of all kinds” (3). 
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mode of comprehension, we cripple ourselves in our attempts to interact with that 
world. 
The statement that one is “bursting with rage” may be more satisfying than 
the statement that one’s rage is “beyond control,” but it is also more accurate in that 
it encompasses not only our comprehension of that state but the result as well.  With 
the term “bursting” we understand the inherent lack of control, but we also can 
assume certain responses and result through our knowledge of material explosion.  
We understand that the result of that rage may include noise, damage, and 
destruction.  The metaphor gives us warning, declares the best guess as to the future, 
and offers us scope.  In fact, in declaring the only viable mode to be that of the exact 
and the measurable we misplace ourselves, declaring ourselves god in that the only 
world to which we will admit is one that our brains can encompass.  Alternatively, in 
refusing to accept the risk of the unknown even while admitting to it – i.e. in 
depending on faith – we hand over the job of interaction to some other god and 
employ determinative metaphor to limit the standards by which we will agree to 
comprehend the results of our refusal. 
In such a world, prediction is accepted without the necessary awareness of 
the limitations it creates or the unearned justification it lends to means put in place to 
reach that predicted end that we have forgotten is only inevitable if we make it so.  
In such a world – where imagination is limited to a repetition of what is literal, 
measurable, and known – the new becomes a state to which we are subjected with no 
agency of any kind while fully convinced that our agency is complete, ending in 
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confusion because of unforeseen results.  When we believe ourselves masters, we are 
not even agents in the one arena in which we can claim limited agency – the 
management of ourselves.  However, metaphor can act as one of Merleau-Ponty’s 
“nerve-centres of linguistic change” (qtd by Steiner, 118), and as such, is not limited 
to its repressive forms: determinative and effaced; rather, metaphor can be used as a 
means of “orienting oneself in relation to the possible” (Merleau-Ponty, 59).  
Metaphor makes possible the moment when the new and the unknown are accessible 
in the tension of the open space:  Ricoeur’s “‘tensional’ truth” that “most hidden 
dialectic – the dialectic that reigns between the experience of belonging as a whole 
and the power of distanciation that opens up the space of speculative thought” (Rule, 
371) – that moment of living metaphor.   
The existence of effaced and determinative metaphors is made necessary by 
the choices we make in attempting to secure our safety – in our refusal to make 
peace with risk – in that the costs paid for such impossible goals are not foreclosed; 
rather, they are merely exported to the Other.  In doing so, we use effaced and 
determinative metaphors to remove the moment of consent from those Others who 
might justifiably protest their dehumanization to beast of burden who carry the costs 
of that fact of life: that life is by definition at risk of death.  Grouped into sacrificial 
communities, it is only by removing the inherent humanity of those groups that the 
costs can be transferred and the sacrifice can go forward, and in doing so, one must 
replace what is with what is not, replace the conception of human with non-human, 
leapfrogging the moment of consent in that determinative metaphor for fear that it 
will (justly) be refused.  But if effaced and determinative metaphor are the method of 
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choice of those who would attempt the impossible – to secure safety – living 
metaphor is one of the most powerful responses to those tools of dehumanization.  
For in living metaphor, there is no deferring costs, no transference of engagement.  
Living metaphor exists only in particular and immediate engagement, exists only for 
those who are willing to engage over and over again with, not just the form but also, 
the Other who stands in one of necessary positions that make up the form – 
transmitter, receiver, and referent – always remembering that necessary moment of 
consent that demands respect for the Other. 
In Le Guin’s fiction, the dynamics of respect are always important.  Whether 
they are present or missing within the interactions that make up the plots that spiral 
out into the universe only to return home, gesturing always to our own affairs, Le 
Guin’s work is profoundly engaged with the way in which those dynamics are 
structured and always acknowledges the necessary space allotted to respect for the 
Other.  As such, her texts are constructions of metaphors, outlining not only an 
alternate comprehension of the world and the Other but also the very structures of 
metaphor itself, gently insisting we consider the way language works to construct 
our selves, our world, and that Other, always aware of the need to gain the consent 
of all participants if the interaction is to be legitimate.  Le Guin’s fiction consistently 
acts as a signpost, indicting the view before us without a demand as to the 
interpretation of that view.  In keeping with the foundational rule of respect – that 
each of us must have the space to make our own decisions – Le Guin’s texts insist, 
not that we do what the author thinks is best, but that we see and admit to the world 
and the Other before making our decision.   
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Of course, even in the act of indicating one is situated, placed such that any 
act of indication is a political act, but Le Guin has proven her awareness of her 
situated position in her reaction to the criticisms she has been offered over her 
career.  In her consistent acts of listening and her willingness to educate herself 
about the position of the Other, in her willingness to read and consider the schools of 
thought upon which her work touches, Le Guin has paid respect to all those Others 
she includes in her process of writing, those reader/participants (Dancing, 198) who 
take part in the “collaboration” (Dancing, 199) which she acknowledges as an 
unavoidable structure of writing.  It is in that acknowledgement of the Other and the 
Other’s position that we admit that we “know” far less than we would like to claim, 
and it is in the acknowledgement of our limited knowledge that we position 
ourselves such that our position reflects the only functional relationship with the 
universe we inhabit. 
Admitting to the unknown and including that moment of respect for the 
Other is not to say we should not strive to know; rather, I (and I would argue Le 
Guin) am suggesting that we should not limit our awareness of the world to what can 
be known.  Rather, we must take into account all those positions and states and 
planets and worlds that are not knowable as we engage in knowing, a reach into the 
sublime that “occurs at the moment when iridescent uncertainty opens into a 
metaphoric world whose moral and cognitive dimensions become statable (sic) 
values, though not (or not yet) rationally justifiable beliefs” (Leypoldt, 154).  We 
must recognize blind faith as the dangerous confabulation it is while considering the 
reason that metaphor exist: i.e. that there is much that does not fit into the literal or 
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the rational and that to limit ourselves to either is a limitation that will determine 
much more than any single interaction.  In other words, one must recognize one’s 
position in the space between the two poles, rational thought and blind faith, with 
respect for the Other to act as ballast in our process of decision making.  Any 
attempt to expand beyond the literal includes recognition of what is known and what 
is not known, and an acknowledgement that much may be unknowable for human 
bodies with human brains, but that to move beyond the rational is dangerous as well, 
and such a move requires consent from all involved.  Only then, with the 
acknowledgement that measurement and rational thought are not the only measure 
by which to determine value combined with a recognition that blind faith is not a 
tenable methodology, can one make the attempt to expand beyond the measurable 
and the literal employing living metaphor with its embedded moment of consent as 
the means by which to make the trip.  It is a process which Ursula K. Le Guin enacts 
with beauty and grace. 
Le Guin is an important writer for many reasons: as a woman, as a thinker, as 
an expert in the craft of writing, but possibly most importantly, as a person who is 
unswervingly respectful to those people and ideas with whom she interacts including 
the Other and the unknown.  As such, her metaphors are mind expanding and 
meaningful in ways few metaphors manage.  Her metaphors invite us all to see a 
world in which there is hope for that future that is itself a metaphor that we have yet 
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